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The basic aim of this dissertation was to demonstrate the way in which different label 
features influence concept formation, specifically their learning and generalization. These labels 
could be verbal or non-verbal, presented auditory or visually. In the experiments, participants 
learned novel categories (aliens) labelled with novel labels (pseudo-words or novel non-verbal 
emblems and sounds). During experiments, ERPs were recorded. 
In Chapter I, the effects of verbal auditory labels on concept formation were examined, 
specifically, the way in which the level of phonological difference between labels influence the 
learning of novel categories. Results showed that learning of categories labelled with 
phonologically more different labels was significantly faster and generalized better compared to 
categories labelled with phonologically more similar labels. Furthermore, this property is 
independent from the effects of sound symbolism. 
In Chapter II, the effects of differences of non-verbal labels (visual or auditory) on 
category learning was examined. Results showed that there were no differences of influence of 
non-verbal labels on category learning, no matter if they were more different or not. 
In Chapter III, relations between the effects of verbal and non-verbal labels on category 
learning were examined. Results showed that auditory verbal labels which were phonologically 
more different led to faster learning and generalization of novel categories, which was not the 
case with other types of labels. 
In Chapter IV, the effects of explicit instruction given to the participants in the 
experiments to pay special attention to the labels during categorisation and to learn them were 
examined. Results showed that participants learned faster and generalized better once the 
instruction was given, while the absence of instruction led to the diminishing of label effects on 
category learning. 
Finally, in Chapter V, a neural network was constructed, the task of which was to 
simulate the effects of phonological differences of labels on category learning. The model 
successfully simulated these differences, since it learned categories labelled with phonologically 






From the results obtained in this dissertation we can conclude that the effects of label 
features on category learning is significant, which is specially the case with auditory verbal 
labels and their phonological difference. As a result of these findings, category learning based on 
the difference level hypothesis was designed. This hypothesis explains category learning as 
probability, which is based on the compound difference between visual properties of the 
categories and the difference of their labels. These results lead to the more fundamental 
conclusion that relations between language and thought are mutually influential and that these 
entities are not completely independent. 
 
Keywords: Categorisation, language and thought, category learning, category labels, label 
phonological differences, category learning based on the difference level, sound symbolism, 
evoked potentials, cognitive modelling. 
 
Scientific field: Psychology 
Scientific subfield: General and Cognitive psychology 






УЛОГА СВОЈСТАВА И ПАМЋЕЊА ИМЕНИТЕЉА НА ФОРМИРАЊЕ ПОЈМОВА: 






Основни циљ ове дисертације је био да покаже како различите карактеристике 
именитеља утичу на формирање појмова, тј. на њихово учење и генерализацију. Ти 
именитељи могу бити вербални и невербални, изложени аудитивно или визуелно. 
Коришћени су експерименти у којима су испитаници учили нове категорије (ванземаљце) 
именоване новим именитељима (пресудо-речима или претходно невиђеним невербалним 
амблемима и звуковима), при чему су испитаницима снимани и ERP мождани таласи. 
У I поглављу, испитивана је улога аудитивних вербалних именитеља на формирање 
појмова, тачније како фонолошка разлика именитеља утиче на учење нових категорија. 
Резултати су показали да је учење категорија именовано фонолошки различитијим 
именитељима брже, а генерализација боља у односу на оне именоване фонолошки 
сличнијим именитељима. Такође, ова особина је независна од утицаја језичког 
симболизма. 
У II поглављу, испитиван је утицај различитости невербалних именитеља на учење 
категорија (визуелних и аудитивних). Резултати су показали да не постоје разлике у 
утицају невербалних именитеља на учење категорија, без обзира на то да ли су они 
различитији или не. 
У III поглављу, испитиван је однос утицаја вербалних и невербалних именитеља на 
учење категорија. Резултати су показали да само аудитивни вербални именитељи који су 
фонолошки различити доводе до бржег учења и генералицације, што није случај са 
осталим врстама именитеља. 
У IV поглављу је испитиван утицај експлицитне инструкције испитаницима да 
обрате пажњу на именитеље и да их запамте. Резултати су показали да испитаници брже 
уче и боље генерализују категорије када добију инструкцију, док изостанком инструкције 
ефекти на учење категорија изостају. 
Најзад, у V поглављу је конструисана неурална мрежа чији је задатак био да 
симулира ефекте фонолошке различитости именитеља. Модел је успешно симулирао ове 







Резултати добијени у дисертацији наводе на закључак да је утицај карактеристика 
именитеља на усвајање појмова изузетно битан и да се пре свега односи на вербалне 
именитеље и њихове фонолошке разлике. Као производ ових резултата, дефинисана је 
хипотеза учења категорија базираног на нивоу разлике. Ова хипотеза описује учење 
категорија као вероватноћу која је базирана на заједничкој разлици између њихових 
визуелних карактеристика и разлика у именитељима. Такви резултати наводе на 
фундаменталнији закључак да је однос мишљења и језика међузависан и да они никако 
нису потпуно независни. 
 
Кључне речи: Категоризација, мишљење и језик, учење категорија, именитељи 
категорија, фонолошке разлике именитеља, учење категорија базираног на нивоу разлике, 
језички симболизам, евоцирани потенцијали, когнитивно моделовање. 
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1. CONCEPTS AND CATEGORIES 
The world around us is enormously complex. Confirmation to this claim is the enormous 
number of objects that we are surrounded with. On the other hand, human mental capacity is 
limited, especially its working memory. With such limited resources it would be completely 
impossible to deal with such a complex world if we did not group similar objects into broader 
classes – categories. In the process of categorisation, similarities between objects are put 
forward, while their differences are neglected. 
Mental representation of the category is a concept (Eysenck & Keane, 2000; Cohen & 
Lefebvre, 2005). Once category is learned, it forms a concept. Based on concepts, we can 
structure the world around us despite its enormous complexity. Concepts enable our working 
memory to cover more objects than its capacity could normally allow. 
Theories about categories are not unified. Generally, we can divide these theories in two 
broad groups: a classical view and a modern view (Murphy, 2002; Cohen & Lefebvre, 2005). 
Additionally, we could add to this list a connectionist view, which belongs to the modern view, 
but sometimes is separately reported. 
 
Classical view 
Historically, the most dominant and enduring theory of categorisation was the theory of 
object attributes, which was rooted in Aristotelian theory of categorisation (Aristotle, 
350BC/1965) and further specified by German philosopher Frege (Frege, 1879/1952). The main 
characteristics of this view are the following (Smith & Medin, 1981; Eysenck & Keane, 2000): 
1. Categories are represented as a list of their attributes. Some of these attributes are 
necessary and some are sufficient. 2. Objects either belong to the category or not. There is no 
space between categories. 3. There are no differences within category in the sense of typicality. 
All members of the category are equally representative. 4. Categories are hierarchically 
organized. Lower members share all attributes with higher members. 
From the broader point, this view of categories and its hierarchical organization is 
presented in a once very popular model: Quillian propositional approach (Quillian, 1968; Collins 
and Quillian, 1969). 
 
The first who challenged this view was Ludwig Wittgenstein in his latter work 
“Philosophical investigations” (Wittgenstein, 1953). Firstly, Wittgenstein stressed that the 
categories are not always easily classifiable into one or another category. Additionally, it is not 
easy to give a complete list of attributes to some categories, since they are so diverse, but still 







The classical view on categories was substituted with new prototypical view which was 
developed by Eleanor Rosh (Rosch & Mervis, 1975; Rosch 1975; Rosch, 1978; Barsalou, 1985). 
This view considers that members of the category are not equal, but rather that there are 
members which are more typical and which are called prototypes. 
What makes a category member more prototypical? That is not frequency of occurrence 
(since there are many frequent members which are not prototypical, like chicken for birds), but 
rather family resemblance. Family resemblance is calculated by the number of attributes that one 
member shares with all other members of the category. Additionally, typicality is determined by 
the number of attributes that a category member shares with other categories: if this number is 
lower, a category member is more typical. Merging of these two criteria is a good predictor of 
typicality which Rosh and Mervis empirically tested (Rosch & Mervis, 1975). 
Exemplar based view. This view was developed by Medin and Schaffer (Medin & 
Schaffer, 1978) and it is based on the claim that there is no abstraction at all. The concept is 
representation of all previously encountered exemplars of the category. For example, the concept 
of dogs represents the collection of all previously encountered dogs we remember. This 
collection is based on token encounters (which are real exemplars), rather than type encounters. 
Likewise, the dog one meets in the neighbourhood every day will have the highest contribution 
to his representation, since each encounter represents an individual exemplar. 
An important aspect of this theory is the computational model of similarity calculation 
which is based on the multiplicative rule (while previous Rosch‟s model was based on 
summation rule). Attributes matched between two objects which are represented with values 0 to 
1 (0 – completely different, 1 – completely the same). These values are multiplied and overall 
similarity is calculated. As similarity is higher, two objects are categorized as the members of the 
same category. Likewise, it can happen that two objects are very similar, but they have one 
attribute very different (close to 0) and the overall similarity will be very small.  
Finally, the last approach is called the knowledge approach and is rather an approach 
than a completed hypothesis (Murphy & Medin, 1985, Мurphy, 2002). This view signifies 
influence of previous knowledge, which is not independent from the conceptual knowledge. So, 
changes in the view of one category can make changes in all other categories. For example, 
realizing that some snails are hermaphrodites can change all views of biological propagation. 
This view is closely related with concept of schema (Bartlett, 1932), which represents an 
organized cluster of concepts which are mutually interdependent and placed in so called slots. 
These slots could be used or not. Change in any part of the schema, necessarily leads to changes 
in other parts of the schema, which represents interdependence. 
 
Connectionist view 
The connectionist view of parallel distributed processing – PDP (Rumelhart, McClelland 
& The PDP Research Group, 1986; McClelland & Rogers, 2003; McLeod, Plunkett & Rolls, 
1998) considers concepts coded as connection weight between units which are organized in 
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several layers (usually three). Layers are organized in input, hidden and output layer, and all are 
interconnected, except input and output layer which are indirectly connected over the hidden 
layer. Concept knowledge is not located in one place, but rather spread over several connections. 
Concept is coded in specific units‟ activation at the output. 
These models managed to demonstrate categorization of objects very successfully. Apart 
from the previous view, this view is biologically plausible (if we consider units as individual 
neurons). Furthermore, it is resistant to damage (excluding several units or connections, still 
leads to correct classification) and successfully demonstrates the effects of some pathological 
processes. Finally, these models successfully managed to demonstrate categorical hierarchy, 
prototype effects and most of the experimental findings. For this reason, these models are very 
good in the cross-examination of experimental results, testing and generation of new hypothesis. 
The shortcoming of these models is that there is no complete biological correspondence 
between the models and brain functions (for example, nothing like the most frequently used 
learning algorithm for these models – back propagation, was identified in brain functions). 
 
2. CATEGORY LEARNING 
Concepts are not innate. Internal representations of categories are created in the learning 
process. There are numerous types and classifications of learning, but here will be presented the 
most relevant theories of category learning. 
Previously stated theories of categorization could also be assumed as learning theories. 
While for the prototype view category learning is conducted through the “building” of prototype 
representation, for an exemplar based view, the process of category learning is the process of 
learning individual exemplars. 
All these theories view category learning as a single cognitive process. Novel research 
showed that learning is not a single process, but rather consists of several independent processes 
(Ashby & Valentin, 2017; Wahlheim, McDaniel & Little, 2016). One of the most developed 
theories in this group is the COVIS theory of category learning, proposed by Ashby (Ashby, 
Alfonso-Reese, Turken & Waldron, 1998; Ashby & Maddox 2005; Ashby & Maddox 2011). 
COVIS (Competition between Verbal and Implicit Systems) considers the existence of 
two independent learning systems: the Frontal System, which is in charge for declarative 
learning and the Basal Ganglia Mediated System, for procedural learning. In examining these 
systems, two different kinds of tasks are usually used: Rule-Based (RB) and Information 
Integration (II). The RB task is based on a single (or several) explicit rule(s) which are clear-cut 
between categories and which can be easily verbally described. The II tasks are based on the 
difference of multiple incommensurable dimensions, which are not easy for verbal description. 
Frontal or declarative system is demonstrated in Rule-Based tasks, where participants 
quickly learn explicit rules (once they realize them). In this process, the most important are 
working memory, in which the testing rule is stored and executive functions, which are 
responsible for switching once the tested rule proves to be invalid. 
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Basal ganglia mediated or procedural system is demonstrated in Information Integration 
tasks. Categories are learned slowly with immediate reinforcement. In this process, connection 
between visual stimuli and proper motoric reaction is associated through reinforcement. 
There is also competition between these two systems. While a declarative system brings 
results, a procedural system is blocked and vice versa. This model is also well established with 
cognitive neuroscience data. Each of the systems is precisely described on a neural level, but 
also, there are many connectionist models which support this theory. 
 
3. THOUGHT AND LANGUAGE 
When thought is mentioned, we usually consider internal representation of the outside 
world along with processes of categorization and reasoning. This relies primarily on semantic 
representations where the core elements, as it was illustrated in the previous chapter, are 
concepts. For this reason, when thought is mentioned in the further discussion, it will mostly be 
related to the concepts. 
On one hand, concepts are not the sole property of the human, given that animals are able 
to form it too. However, this is not the case with language, since homo-sapiens are the only 
living being which can use symbols. This property made some authors to consider a man as an 
animal symbolicum (animal that uses symbols), since in it they saw distinctive features of a man 
compared to other living beings (Cassirer, 1944; Ivić, 1987). 
One of the fundamental questions in cognitive psychology and psycholinguistics is the 
relation between language and thought. This question is also widely known as a language and 
thought debate (Carroll, Von Stutterheim, & Nüse, 2004). 
Theories and hypothesis related to this problem vary from the ones which claim that 
language and thought are completely separated (and that there is supremacy of thought over 
language) to the others which claim that thought and language are basically the same thing, or at 
least mutually interdependent and very closely related. Broadly speaking, we can identify two 
groups of theories: one which claims that there is cognitive priority of concepts over language 
and the others which put forward linguistic relativity. 
 
4. COGNITIVE PRIORITY HYPOTHESIS 
This group of theories originates in philosophical rationalism and empiricism. While for 
rationalists, thought was innate, for empiricists, concept of the object should be formed, before 
we can have a name for it (Locke, [1964 (1690)]; Gleitman & Papafragou, 2005). 
Related to the question whether speaking of different languages can make people think 
differently, the answer that these theorists propose is: no. Thought is first, language is second. 
For example, German-American anthropologist, Franz Boas, who explored American-Indian 
languages, realized huge differences in the way these languages express the same thoughts, 
compared to English and other Indo-European languages (Boas, 1911). However, Boas claimed 
that these language expressions are expressions of just one part of the complete concepts and that 
different languages express different parts of the same concepts. 
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Further support of cognitive priority goes from the famous developmental psychologist, 
Jean Piaget (Piaget, [1959 (1926)]; Piaget, [1952 (1936)]; Piaget & Inhelder, [2008 (1950)]). 
Piaget‟s theory of cognitive development signifies the development of concepts, which goes 
before language development and is a precondition for it. Only after concepts are developed, we 
can learn to name them and generally, to talk. 
Additionally, work of Noam Chomsky (Chomsky, 1957; Chomsky 1965) gives further 
support in the disputation of cross linguistic diversities. Chomsky claimed that essential grammar 
structures of language are innate and that all differences between languages are only the surface 
differences. This leaves a possibility of various differences between languages, which are not 
essential and hence, not capable to influence cognition. 
At present, cognitive priority hypothesis is primarily a group of similar ideas, rather than 
a unified theory (Fodor, 1975; Clark & Clark, 1977; Pinker, 1994; Li and Gleitman 2002; 
Gleitman & Papafragou, 2005; McWhorter 2014). Despite differences, there are some common 
ideas which could be derived from these writings: 
1. Cognition and language are two different and separate processes. As Slobin noted: 
“Language evokes ideas: it does not represent them. Linguistic expression is thus not a 
straightforward map of consciousness or thought…” (Slobin, 1979). 
2. In relation between the language and cognition, cognition goes first and is a necessary 
precondition for language. As Gleitman and Paparfagou noted: “thought is first, language is its 
expression” (Gleitman & Papafragou, 2005). Additionally, the role of language is reduced to 
naming and communication: “…concepts come first and that language merely names them: 
nouns name persons, places, or things; verbs name actions and events; adjectives name 
modifying concepts…” (Gentner & Goldin-Meadow, 2003). 
This means that the conceptual system is completely independent from language. We 
have concepts, no matter if there is a language or not. 
3. Language does not have influence on cognition. Content of concept is not dependant 
on the existence of labels and language in general. There are not any cognitive consequences of 
naming and the use of language. No matter if there is a name of the concept or not, concepts will 
exist unchanged. 
Some of the arguments which were used in these writings to support the above mentioned 
claims were the following: 
1. Animals and little babies can think, even though they cannot speak. This proves that 
cognition is older (phylogenetically and ontogenetically) and consequently independent from 
language. 
2. Language is sketchy, thought is rich (Gleitman & Papafragou, 2005). No matter how 
rich a vocabulary person has, one cannot express all richness of the thought. In written or spoken 
language, many things are implicitly considered. This means that we rarely describe all details in 




3. Language cannot determine perception of space relationship, motion and time (some of 
the mostly empirically studied areas in linguistic relativity research – presented below). Since 
there were some empirical findings which were in favour of linguistic relativity, these authors 
disputed it by interpreting the same results differently. Meaning, they claimed that language 
differences are just different means used in description of the same thing (for example, Li & 
Gleitman, 2002). 
 
5. LINGUISTIC RELATIVITY 
In the years of development of linguistics as an independent science and when more and 
more languages were discovered worldwide, the question that was posed was whether these 
language differences could somehow influence thought? Since there are so many different 
languages (over 7000 languages in the world) are there any possible cognitive consequences of 
that? 
As it was previously stated, one group of theorists claimed that language can influence 
cognition and that language and cognition are at least closely related if not completely the same. 
One of the first who proposed these ideas was German philosopher and linguist, Wilhelm von 
Humbolt. In his famous book on language, he claimed that language and thought are closely 
related and since there are so many differences between languages, speakers of different 
languages perceive and think about the world differently (von Humbolt , [1988 (1836)]). This 
claim represents the cornerstone of what will become the linguistic relativity hypothesis. 
Great influence to this group of theories was given from modern philosophy. 
Wittgenstein claimed that the “The limits of my language are the limits of my mind” 
(Wittgenstein, 1922). Furthermore, most of modern philosophy, including schools such us: 
analytic philosophy, hermeneutics, structuralism, feminism, social constructivism and the entire 
post-modern philosophy, are based on the preconception that mind and language are closely 
related and that important philosophical conclusions could be driven from the analysis and study 
of language (Frege, [1948 (1892)]; Russell, [1996 (1903)]; Russell, [2013 (1943)]; Dilthey et al., 
1989; Habermas et al., 2015; Faucault, 2012). 
The most popular theory which had a significant influence on the further development of 
language and thought debate was so called Sapir-Whorf hypothesis. Even though never directly 
specified, it could be considered that this hypothesis was developed by Benjamin Lee Whorf 
who, apart from his anthropological linguistic studies, also relied on works and views of his 
professor, Edward Sapir (Sapir, 1929; Whorf 1944; Carroll, 1956). In the essence of this 
hypothesis is the claim that language crucially influences thought, perception and cognition in 
general. 
Whorf used to work in a fire insurance company and he analysed effects of language on 
treating objects, which led to the fire starting. For example, only because the kettle was moved 
off the fire and as something that was “off”, it was considered to be safe. However, sometimes it 
was not and in some cases it led to the fire. 
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Apart from these nominal effects, this hypothesis considers that grammatical structure of 
one language constraints and shapes thoughts and perception of the speaker. Meaning that since 
two languages have a different way of expressing the same thing, speakers of these two 
languages will have different perception of it. This consequently means, for example, that a 
Frenchman and a Chinese will have a different perception of the world, since these two 
languages are nominally, phonologically and primarily grammatically different. 
Whorf studied language of Hopi Indians in Arizona. He gives an example of use of 
plurals in the language of Hopi Indians: unlike Indo-European languages, Hopi Indians have 
plurals only for visible objects. For example, the concept of several days that are used in Indo-
European languages does not exist in this language, since no one ever experienced several days 
directly. This type of plural in Indo-European languages, Whorf calls “objectified” or 
“imaginary” (Whorf, 1944). But we do perceive days as quantity in the same manner as we do 
with objectively quantifying objects (ten men, for example), even if we never saw several days in 
one place. Additionally, Hopi Indians have different descriptions and consequently perception of 
time, space and other things. They develop different “habitual thought” than people speaking 
Indo-European language. This “habitual thought” represents linguistic patterns, rather than 
simple language and includes a “routine way of attending to objects and events … all give-and-
take between the language and the culture as a whole” (Whorf 1944). 
We can differentiate two versions of this hypothesis: the strong and the weak one 
(Carroll, 2004). According to the strong version, the “presence of linguistic categories creates 
cognitive categories” (Carroll, 2004, page 382). This means that concepts are essentially created 
due to the language, and which concepts will be created depends on language, not the outside 
world. This view is better known as linguistic determinism. 
On the other hand, a weak version of this hypothesis claims that: the “presence of 
linguistic categories influences the ease with which various cognitive operations are performed” 
(Carroll, 2004, page 382). According to this version, language still can have influence on 
thought, but this influence is not as crucial as in linguistic determinism. Language influences 
thought by modifying concepts and making some of the cognitive processes easier for the 
speakers of different languages. 
Consequences of these claims were enormously influential. These ideas inspired debate 
which is still present and many of the current theorists are in favour or against this hypothesis. 
Additionally, apart from theoretical debate, it influenced many further empirical researches. 
Since we can differentiate two ways in which language influences thought: lexical and 
grammatical influence, we can also identify two different empirical lines of research in which 
this hypothesis was tested. 
As far as lexical influence is concerned, vocabulary differentiation across languages was 
primarily examined. Meaning, it was noticed that some languages have more terms for the same 
group of objects than others. Frequently quoted is the example of the Eskimo language in which 
there are around 20 different terms for snow (originally quoted by Boas). More probably, there 
are only 3 different terms of snow (Brown & Lenneberg, 1954), but it does not change the point 
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that Eskimo language has more terms for snow than most Indo-European languages. The greater 
number of terms consequently means that Eskimos have 20 (or 3) different concepts of snow, 
unlike most Americans or Europeans. 
Concerning vocabulary differentiation across languages, one of the most popular topics 
for empirical testing was colour differentiation. Different languages have different number of 
basic colour terms and this number significantly varies across languages (Berlin and Kay, 1969). 
For example, Dani tribe in New Guinea has only two terms for colours: dark and light, while 
most of European languages have around 11 (including English). Eleanor Rosh (previously 
Heider, 1972) tested whether members of this tribe differentiate focal colours (the most 
representative hue of one colour) worse than English speakers. She concluded that memory of 
focal colours of Dani participants was equal to the English speakers, even though their language 
was poorer in number of language terms for colours. 
Research of Eleanor Rosh was considered to be strong proof against the Sapir-Whorf 
hypothesis. Further researches in this area were abandoned and the focus of research in cognitive 
psychology was switched from language influence on thought to concepts solely.  
Language relativity reappeared in experimental research after almost two decades of 
hibernation. According to Gentner and Goldin-Meadow (Gentner & Goldin-Meadow, 2003), 
there were several reasons for this rebirth of language relativity theories. 
One of the reasons was further studies of the differences between languages. For 
example, Choi and Bowerman (Choi & Bowerman 1991) studied spatial terms in English and 
Korean, and realized that there were significant differences between the two languages in the 
expression of those terms. These differences consequently lead to a completely different way in 
which children acquire spatial concepts. 
Furthermore, new studies of space perception dependant on language structures appeared, 
shifting empirical focus from colours (Bowerman, 1996; Brown 1994; Levinson 1996; Levinson, 
1997; Levinson, 2003), even though, new researches into colour perception go in favour of the 
Sapir-Whorf hypothesis (Roberson, Davies & Davidoff, 2000; Winawer et al., 2007). 
Finally, one of the reasons was rediscovery of Vygotsky‟s work (Vygotsky, [1962 
(1936)]) who claimed that language can influence and aid cognitive development. 
Apart from lexical, in many researches grammatical influence on thought was tested. For 
example, there are studies by Bloom (Bloom, 1981) on the difference in counterfactual reasoning 
between English and Chinese speakers. Furthermore, studies of grammatical gender expression 
difference between languages (Martinez and Shatz, 1996; Boroditsky, Schmidt & Phillips, 2003). 
 
 
In the following decades, numerous researches were conducted in the area of linguistic 
relativism, which lead to numerous hypotheses that significantly varied. They all had in common 
that language influence thought, but differed in which way that influence is conducted and how 
extensive it is. 
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There are several classifications of new hypothesis within linguistic relativism (Enfield 
2015; Lucy, 1997; Bloom & Keil, 2001), which Enfield named as Neo-Whorfianism (Enfield 
2015). However, here will be presented the classification developed by Wolff and Holmes 
(Wolff & Holmes, 2011). This classification will be presented in a slightly modified order, 
indicating the continuum from the theories according to which language mostly influences 
thought to those according to which it least influences thought. This classification includes the 
following views: 
Language-of-thought is a view which claims that language and thought are the same 
thing. Some philosophers like Plato and Kant (according to Wolff & Holmes, 2011) claimed that 
language and thought are the same thing and that people think with language. This idea was also 
proposed by some theories in psychology. For example, behaviourists considered thought as its 
language manifestation (Watson, 1913; Watson, 1920). Since their attention was focused on 
behaviour, rather than inner processes and introspection, language expression was a kind of a 
“speaking behaviour”. In this sense, thinking is nothing more than internal “silent” speaking. 
Proof for this, behaviourists found in detected tinny lip movements when a person thinks about 
something. 
Nowadays however, the dominant opinion is that language and thought are two separated 
things (Murphy, 2002; Casasanto, 2008, Thierry, 2016). Thought could be developed even by 
little babies and animals, while language is the sole property of the adult homo-sapiens. 
Linguistic determinism is previously stated as a strong version of the Sapir-Whorf 
hypothesis. As it was mentioned, according to linguistic determinism, language categories do 
determine conceptual categories. 
This theory, along with the language-of-thought view, is in a sense obsolete and there are 
not many empirical findings which support them. According to Wollf and Holmes, these two 
theories could be dismissed, while the following theories are still in use. 
Thinking after language considers cognitive effects after the use of language, meaning 
that language can direct attention to certain elements, which in return can induce some cognitive 
consequences. There are two views in this group of theories: language as a spotlight and 
language as an inducer. In language as a spotlight, certain linguistic properties can make some 
elements in the outside world more salient and likewise lead to cognitive consequences. In 
language as an inducer, language can prime the way how information is processed and lead to 
different processing. 
Common characteristic of thinking after language group of theories is that effects of 
language will not be eliminated, even if there is exclusion of verbal processing. 
Thinking with language is based on the mutual processes of language and thought which 
are activated together. These effects are conducted on-line. The main characteristic of this 
mutuality is that it can be eliminated by exclusion of verbal processing (by some verbal task or 




We can differentiate two types of theories in this group: the first which proposes that 
language is a meddler and the second, for which language is an augmenter. Language as a 
meddler is based on mutual concurrency of linguistic and non-linguistic code. Once these codes 
are consistent (are about the same thing), we have easier processing. In the opposite case, 
processing is slower. 
In the Language as an augmenter group, language and thought are combined and 
likewise, language augments thought. One of the most notable theories from this group is 
Lupyan‟s Language Augmented Thought hypothesis (described later). 
Thought before language: Thinking for speaking is a theory developed by Slobin 
(Slobin, 1996; Slobin, 2003). According to this theory, thinking can be shaped by language only 
in the preparation for language activities (speaking or listening), but that does not influence core 
cognitive processes. 
When it became evident that people use languages that are significantly different and 
which demand different cognitive resources for its use, cognition was somehow “split” into two 
types of conceptual representation: universal representations, and representation used for 
specific language (Clark, 2003), the so called “thinking for speaking” (Slobin, 1996). Universal 
representations never get influenced by the specific language, no matter of the structure of the 
language. On the other hand, thinking for speaking gets influenced by the specific language and 
can be modified by it. 
“Thinking for speaking” does not consider cognitive resources for speaking only, but also 
for listening, comprehension and formulating utterances. Thinking for speaking represents 
cognitive resources that were derived from general cognition in order to deal with the specific 
language. There is nothing in thinking for speaking which does not exist in general cognition. 
However, what resources will be taken from general cognition depends on the specific language. 
In this way, general cognition still remains intact. Any cognitive consequences of use of 
different languages would be assigned to “thinking for speaking” rather than to general 
cognition. This construct was used to explain many further arguments attempting to demonstrate 
that language differences could lead to different cognition. It was also used by theorists who 
were in favour of cognitive priority hypothesis. 
At the end of the elaboration of linguistic determinism, we can discuss some new 
classifications and new tendencies in this area. For example, we can propose another possible 
division within the theories related to linguistic relativism: theories that signify effects of 
different languages and theories that signify effects of language in general. While the first group 
of theories consider cognitive differences between speakers of different languages (which is the 
main line of research which started with the Sapir-Whorf hypothesis), the second group 
considers effects of language on thought in general, no matter if we speak different languages or 
not. The concept that is labelled with the name (language) is different from the one that is not. 
Furthermore, effects of linguistic labels are significantly different compared to other types of 
labels (non-verbal labels or features). 
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Regarding some new tendencies, Enfield proposed the new view of linguistic 
determinism, based on a different view of language functions. While there are six language 
functions (emotive, poetic, conative, referential, phatic, and meta-lingual) (Jakobson, 1960, 
according to Enfield 2015), in previous research it used only its referential function. 
Additionally, concepts are viewed as deprived from its social context. Even though these views 
are interesting, in this work, a “traditional” view will be used, since more theoretical debates and 
more empirical findings would be necessary for the Enfield‟s proposed view. 
 
In the end it should be noted that while in the past theories of cognitive priority and 
language relativism were strongly contrasted, modern views are much closer in some elements. 
Some modern interpretations of cognitive priority admit possibility that language can influence 
thought (Gleitman & Papafragou, 2013), but deny possibility that these influences alter 
conceptual representation. According to Gleitman & Papafragou, language can influence thought 
in two different ways: directly and permanently, which is the position of classical Whorfianism, 
but also in an indirect and transient way. The second way is what new interpretation of cognitive 
priority accepts: language influence thought specifically on-line, but these effects are lost after 
language is not used. And as it was noted previously, they interpret differently the entire body of 
research which linguistic relativity theorists conducted, claiming that these effects are not 
essential and permanent. Like Regier claimed (Regier et al., 2010, page 179), these findings: “act 
as a sort of Rorschach test. Those who “want” the Whorf hypothesis to be true can point to the 
fact that the manipulation clearly implicates language. At the same time, those who “want” the 
hypothesis to be false can point to how easy it is to eliminate effects of language on perception, 
and argue on that basis that Whorfian effects are superficial and transient.” (quoted by Gleitman 
& Papafragou, 2013, page 518). 
 
These different interpretations of the same empirical findings present huge problems in 
language and thought debate. It is not always easy to differentiate what are the effects of a 
“clearly conceptual” or “clearly linguistic” system. This problem also could go in favour of the 
view that cognitive functions are mutually interdependent and that it is not easy to make strict 
division between them. The same argument could also stand for the relation between language 
and thought. 
 
6. EFFECTS OF VERBAL LABELS ON CATEGORISATION 
One specific and important problem related to linguistic relativity is effects of verbal 
labels (naming) on the process of categorisation. In the light of linguistic relativity, the problem 
could be also further specified as the question: what are the cognitive consequences of naming 
(Lupyan, 2012a)? 
This problem was examined primarily in developmental cognitive psychology, but newer 




In most of the experiments on children, dishabituation paradigm (or novelty preference 
paradigm) was used (Baillargeon, Spelke & Wasserman, 1985; Schafer & Plunkett, 1998; 
Schafer, Plunkett & Harris, 1999). This experimental paradigm typically consists of two phases: 
learning (or habituation) in which children are exposed to the certain stimuli of one category and 
testing (or dishabituation) in which they are presented with stimuli from the different category. 
Variations in this paradigm are the preferential looking technique (usually used for very small 
children) and the touching and examination technique (which is used for slightly older children). 
One of the most notable findings of cognitive development theories and its relation to the 
language was that presence (or learning) of labels in categorisation task facilitates category 
acquisition (Quinn, Eimas & Rosenkrantz, 1993; Waxman & Markov, 1995; Xu, 2002; Plunket 
& Hu, 2008; Plunkett, Hu & Cohen, 2008). There are several views of this problem, but most 
notable are two opposed views, which metaphorically make distinction between: “child-as-
theorist” and “child-as-data-analyst” (Waxman & Gelman, 2009). The former resembles 
Waxman‟s linguistic labels as conceptual marker view and is rooted in rationalistic tradition, 
while the latter resembles Sloutsky‟s labels as object features and is rooted in empirical tradition 
(Sloutsky & Fisher, 2011). 
 
Labels as conceptual markers 
Markman and Hutchinson (Markman & Hutchinson, 1984) discovered that two year old 
children presented with a task in which they need to select another thing of the same kind to the 
one presented, typically select the thing which is thematically associated with the target (for 
example: dog – bone). However, if the children were told that one thing is named in a certain 
way (for example: “fendle”), and are asked to find another thing named that way, they usually 
look for a thing that is a member of the same category. This shows that labels point to categories. 
Furthermore, Waxman (Waxman, 1991; Waxman & Markov, 1995; Balaban & 
Waxman, 1997; Fulkerson & Waxman, 2007; Waxman & Gelman, 2009) claimed that linguistic 
labels refer to the concepts. Referring means that “a word links to a conceptual representation 
that is more abstract than the entities that happen to be present in the naming context” (Lyons, J., 
1997 – quoted from Waxman & Gelman, 2009, page 259). 
In their studies (for example Waxman & Markov, 1995), they used novelty-preference 
paradigm, where young children (12-13 months) were presented with some objects from the 
same category (usually toys) and after presented with two objects, one of which was a member 
of the same category as the previous objects. If a child developed concept, it would show 
preference to the object from the novel category, rather than the one belonging to the same 
category it played with before. Once these objects are named (by experimenter), children tend to 
learn concepts significantly faster (habituate to their presence). In this sense, word serves as an 
invitation to form a category, even for the objects that are not always perceptually similar 
(Waxman & Markov, 1995). 
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Broadly speaking, there is a property of verbal labels that refer to a category. The word is 
tied to an entire category rather than to the specific object. This tendency to use a label as a 
conceptual marker is somehow innate to children. 
In response to the view of labels as object features (presented later), Waxman further 
specified four crucial assumptions of her hypothesis (Waxman & Gelman, 2009, page 258-259): 
1. Words do not merely associate, they refer. This property was already explained. 
2. Words and concepts are more than a collection of sensory and/or perceptual features. 
Very often, words mark concepts which do not have a clear visual counterpart. Some concepts 
mark absent or abstract things. 
3. Words and concepts are not unitary constructs. Words often have different functions 
(for example: nouns, adjectives, verbs). Different word function mark different concept aspects. 
For example, Brown (Brown, 1957) demonstrated that grammatical form of the novel 
words determines partially their meaning. If the novel word was constructed as a noun (for 
example “dawe”), it was considered to be an object, if it was constructed as a verb (“dawing”) it 
was considered to be an action. This property was identified for the school children, but even at 
an earlier age, children are able to make difference between word functions. 
4. Words are located within intricate linguistic and social systems. Words are not 
isolated, but rather belong to the broader context, including linguistic and social. All these 
contexts are involved in the word meaning which is not explicitly stated in the form of the 
isolated word alone. 
 
Labels as object features 
The model that was developed by Vladimir Sloutsky (Sloutsky & Lo, 1999; Sloutsky & 
Fisher, 2004; Sloutsky & Fisher, 2012; Sloutsky, 2010) explains effects of verbal labels on 
categorisation treating labels as object features, which are similar to other features, like for 
example shape and colour. Faced with novel objects, based on the similarities of their features, 
children induce whether they are members of the same category or not.  In that sense, inductive 
generalization of novel categories is also affected by presence of labels. For example, children 
will more probably induce that two objects are member of the same category if they share the 
same name, rather than if they have different or no name at all (Sloutsky, Lo & Fisher, 2001). 
This property was further specified and quantified in Slutsky‟s SINC (Similarity 
Induction Naming Categorisation in young children) model. According to SINC model, as 
previously stated, labels are treated as features like other features of the objects. When two 
objects share the same name, this name increases the overall similarity of the objects, which 
leads to induction that these two objects belong to the same category. 
Model calculates similarity between two objects (using multiplicative rule), based on the 
features that are different. For example, if we calculate similarity between some object B and the 
target T, similarity can be expressed with the following equation: 
 








Where N is total number of features, k – number of matches, L – label match (label 
match – L=1, label mismatch – L=0), Sv.a. and SL (ranging from 0 to 1) represent attentional 
weights of a mismatch (higher number, lower attentional weight) for visual attributes and labels 
respectively. These attentional weights are not usually the same: they are higher for labels (lower 
S value), meaning that labels have more influence on similarity compared to visual features. 
In most of the experiments that were used in these researches, participants had a task to 
select one of the two items presented (A or B), compared to the target item (T).This similarity 
calculation was used to calculate overall probability of selection of one item (let us say, item A). 
This probability could be calculated with the following equation: 
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Once we use similarity values from the previous equation, we get a result which predicts 
probability of selection of a certain item. 
In one such research (Sloutsky, Lo & Fisher, 2001), Sloutsky demonstrated that his 
participants (children of 4-5 years) were making selections which highly resembled to the model 
prediction (R
2
=.884). However, this was not the case for older children (11-12 years), who 
strongly relied on labels. While results between the two groups were more or less comparable in 
the condition without labels, they highly differed in the label condition. 
Sloutsky interpreted these results with developmental differences: while older children 
were capable to identify that label marks category, younger children do not. For this reason, 
children use all features (including labels) in estimation of objects similarity. 
 
This model was later updated (Sloutsky & Fisher, 2012) in order to incorporate possible 
phonological differences between labels. According to an updated model, similarity between two 
items is calculated using the following equation: 
 






Where B is an item which is compared to target item – T. λ and υ represent attentional 
weights of a label and visual property (ranging from 0 to 1), while β and B represent a number of 
feature mismatches between two labels and appearances of two items (B and T). 
This model was tested in several empirical studies (similar to the one presented) in which 
predictions were confirmed (Sloutsky & Fisher, 2004; Sloutsky & Fisher, 2012). Based on these 
findings, Sloutsky concludes that labels are object features (not conceptual markers) and that 
they increase overall similarity between items, which leads to induction that two objects belong 
to the same category. 
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The advantage of this model is that it uses precise mathematical equations with which it 
is possible to predict results of categorisation. The problem with this model is that it was 
developed only for younger children and it is not suitable for adults. 
 
Language augmented thought hypothesis 
Both previous theories were developed on children to explain effects of labels on 
categorisation in developmental context. These authors do sometimes interpret what effects 
labels can have on adults, but they did not conduct much empirical testing. 
Hypothesis that was entirely developed by research conducted on adults is language 
augmented thought hypothesis. This hypothesis was developed by Gary Lupyan (Lupyan, 
Rakison & McClelland, 2007; Lupyan, 2012a; Lupyan, 2012b; Lupyan, 2015). Lupyan thinks 
that labels (and language in general) have strong influence on thought. Linguistic labels highlight 
the most fundamental features of the category. Once labels are learned, they keep making 
influence on the concept on-line, meaning that activation of the category will influence activation 
of label. This label will in return activate fundamental features of the concept and further 
enhance its categorical representation. For the reason of this enhancement of thought, which is 
actually thought augmented by the language, this theory got the name. 
The foundation for his claims, Lupyan got from the work of William James, who claimed 
that language can influence thought and concept formation. Based on previously stated basic 
principles, Lupyan predicts further consequences of this view (from Lupyan, 2012a): 
 
1. Verbal labels modulate “non-linguistic” representation, 
2. Effects are deep, meaning that they can influence visual processing, 
3. Verbal labels are special in the sense that there are no similar effects of other types of 
labels. 
 
In order to test these predictions, Lupyan conducted series of research. He demonstrated 
that participants learned novel stimuli (types of aliens) much faster and generalized them better 
once these aliens are combined with verbal labels than without labels (Lupyan et al., 2007). It is 
important to signify that these labels were presented to the participants only after their response, 
so the labels were completely task redundant. In this research, it was also demonstrated that there 
was superiority of verbal labels compared to non-verbal labels, such as space directions. 
In further research, influence of verbal labels on visual perception was demonstrated 
(Lupyan, 2008, Lupyan, 2010, Lupyan & Spivey, 2010; Lupyan & Thompson-Schill, 2012). For 
example, in the picture verification task, participants who were presented with the verbal label 
just before the exposure of the picture, were significantly faster than the participants who were 
presented with non-linguistic labels, such as sounds related to the picture (for example “moo” 
sound for the cow). One of the reasons for this effect is identified in more prototypical activation 
of the concept by the verbal label, than by the non-linguistic label. Basically, verbal and non-
linguistic labels activate different elements of the same concept. 
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In latter work, this effect was interpreted as property of verbal labels as unmotivated cues 
(Edmiston & Lupyan, 2015). Unlike non-verbal cues which are motivated cues, (such as for 
example dog barks) which vary with different types of items (bigger dogs bark deeper than small 
dogs, for example), verbal labels are cues that do not vary with different types of items (dog is a 
name for all sorts of dog). 
On-line effects of language, Lupyan demonstrated with “non-linguistic” tasks using 
transcranial direct current stimulation - tDCS (Lupyan, Mirman, Hamilton & Thompson-Schill, 
2012). Participants showed that cathodal stimulation (inhibitory stimulation) led to poorer 
performance on the tasks, which was interpreted as quasi impairment produced by blocking of 
linguistic capabilities. Additionally, it is recorded that aphasic patient have problems with 
categorisation tasks (Lupyan & Mirman, 2013). 
 
Non-verbal labels. According to our knowledge, there is no systematic research related 
to the effects of non-verbal labels on category learning and generally, cognitive consequences of 
non-verbal cues on concepts and cognition. Gary Lupyan demonstrated in several researches 
(Lupyan et. al., 2007; Lupyan & Thompson-Schill, 2012; Edmiston & Lupyan, 2015) that there 
is supremacy of linguistic labels over non-linguistic labels (space orientations, object relevant 
sound, pseudo-sounds). Particularly, there were no same effects of thought augmentation when 
non-linguistic labels were used instead of the linguistic ones. 
 
Cognitive priority view 
This view is not separately developed for the effects of labels on categorisation, but 
rather it can be extended from the general view according to which language (and also words) do 
not have any influence on thought. As previously quoted, thought is first, and language is its 
expression. Existence of concepts is a necessary condition for labels, but labels cannot influence 
concepts or thought in general. 
 
7. NON-BEHAVIOURAL METHODOLOGY IN LANGUAGE AND THOUGHT RESEARCH 
The majority of the previously stated empirical findings and research are based primarily 
on behavioural methodology. There are however, some limitations of behavioural methodology 
in the language and thought debate: very often the same behavioural results could be interpreted 
differently (Gleitman & Papafragou, 2013). Furthermore, it is often impossible to partial out 
though from the language process. As it was stated previously, it is not always easy to identify 
independently whether the obtained effects are from thought or language. Furthermore, in non-
linguistic tasks, participants usually automatically use language which makes non-linguistic tasks 
not that non-linguistic (Thierry, 2016). 
Finally, the problem is quantity of behavioural experiments. Very often, conducting 
experiment for each possible experimental manipulation is not practical. Thousands of 
participants would be needed for research like these. 
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There are many non-behavioural methodologies used in research related to language and 
thought debate (and not only for it). The most prominent are neurobiological methods, such as: 
neuropsychological methods (already quoted in the previous chapter - Lupyan‟s research on 
aphasic patients), neuroimaging methods (such as ERP, MEG, PET scan, fMRI) and invasive 
neural methods (tDCS, tACS, TMS, Intracranial stimulation). Additionally, in novel research, 
the method of computer stimulation of cognitive processes is very frequently used, of which the 
most important is cognitive connectionist modelling. 
Finally, another method that is not typical behavioural (but it is) is eye-tracking. This 
methodology is enormously used in psycholinguistic research, both for children and adults. 
These methodologies are constantly growing along with research in which they are used. 
However, research for each of the listed specific methods will not be presented. Since in this 
dissertation ERP and cognitive connectionist modelling are used, some of the relevant and 
representative research (for illustrative purposes – but not an extensive review) in which those 
methodologies were used will be presented. 
 
Event Related Potential – ERP 
This methodology is effective for language and thought research since it is capable to 
capture cognitive processes at the early stage, while still automatic, before they become 
conscious and prone to verbalization and various cognitive strategies (Thierry, 2016). 
Significant influence related to this methodology in language and thought debate was the 
work of Guillaume Thierry (Thierry, Athanasopoulos, Wiggett, Dering & Kuipers, 2009; 
Thierry, 2016). Differences in perception that can be produced by different languages, Thierry 
demonstrated with Greek and English participants whose languages differ in the description of 
the blue colour (Thierry et. al., 2009). While English have only one colour of blue, Greeks have 
two: for light and dark blue. Participants needed to respond on squares presented on the screen, 
but not on the circles. However, circles were painted in light and dark hues of blue and green 
colours. ERP signal showed differences on early perceptual stages between dark and light blue 
for Greek, but not for English participants, while there were no differences between light and 
dark green, for the two languages do not differ in description of this colour (both have only one 
term for green). 
Thierry explains these findings similarly as Lupyan, but unlike Lupyan, he believes that 
these language effects are not on-line, but rather structural, since such early differences in ERP 
signal (before 200 ms) are too early to engage any linguistic process. 
Similar findings were obtained in object perception, with similar procedures as the 
previous experiment (Boutonnet, Dering, Vinas-Guasch & Thierry, 2013). English and Spanish 
participants were examining mugs and cups for which there are two terms in English, but only 
one in Spanish. Again, there was a difference in early processing in English, but not in Spanish, 






These findings show that there are language influences on perception even when 
participants cannot consciously report these processes and when it would be very difficult to 
examine those effects with behavioural measures. This also implies that successful research of 
language and thought relation must include multiple methodologies, which would lead to 
mutually supporting findings. 
 
Connectionist cognitive modelling 
Connectionist cognitive modelling is very frequently used methodology in novel 
research. Sometimes it is much easier to test hypothesis with the connectionist model rather than 
testing real participants. It specifically includes cases when experimental situations are numerous 
and it would be impractical to conduct a behavioural experiment. Additionally, connectionist 
models are biologically plausible (there are neurons and connections in the brain), hence we can 
presume how the things are organized and implemented in the brain. 
There are some doubts related to this methodology, like the one stated by Lupyan related 
to parameters, that: “the modellers are thought to adjust the parameters to obtain the results they 
want” (Lupyan, 2012a, page 286). Even thought, connectionist models remain important tools in 
modern research, which can give important clues of how a cognitive system works and how it is 
organized. 
One of the notable researches in the language and thought debate, specifically related to 
effects of labels on categorization, which used the connectionist modelling approach, was 
Westermann’s (Westermann & Mareschal, 2014). Westermann tried to integrate most of 
empirical finding in concept development and effects of labels in concept formation. He 
developed a neural network in which he included two different neural systems: hippocampal and 
cortical, the first in charge of quick learning, while the second for slow learning. Stimuli for the 
network were shared at 4 global level categories composed of 26 basic level categories, of which 
each had 8 within category exemplars with different feature variations. Two conditions were 
present: with or without global level category label. Results showed that network formed 
categories much clearer once global level categories are introduced, which goes in favour of 
Waxman findings that labels are category markers. 
Another connectionist model was proposed by Gary Lupyan in which he presented his 
Language Augmented Thought hypothesis (Lupyan, 2012a). However, this model will be 
presented in the chapter related to connectionist modelling. 
These and other papers showed that connectionist modelling can be useful tool for the 
exploration of language and thought relations. Furthermore, as it was stated previously, it can be 
used to describe the way brain really works on a cellular level. And finally, it can be used for the 
cases when conduction of behavioural experiments would be highly impractical (which will be 





8. PROBLEMS, AIM, TASKS AND HYPOTHESES OF THIS DISERTATION 
In the previous chapter, when Lupyan‟s hypothesis of language augmented thought was 
mentioned, it was stated that he got inspired by the writings of William James. William James, in 
his “Principles of psychology” stated possibility that language can modulate thoughts during 
discriminative learning (James, [1931 (1890)]). He gives example of wine tasting: we can have 
two types of wine on different occasions. These different occasions will drag apart tastes of the 
wine, helping us to discriminate these two wines (James, [1931 (1890)], page 511).  
Furthermore, James gives examples of verbal modulation of concept learning: if the “fresh” 
snow we see in front of our house is named differently, we will form two concepts of snow. This 
effect is produced since categories of snow are similar, while names are more different. When 
we tie these names to the categories, these structures become more different than categories 
without names. So these structures became more discriminable and it is easier to learn them as 
separated concepts. 
A similar explanation is proposed by behaviourist psychologists Miller and Dollard 
(Miller & Dollard, 1941). They claimed that two similar stimuli, which are associated with two 
different responses, could increase perceptive differences between them. Since they were 
behaviourists, spoken words were considered as responses. Consequently, spoken words could 
influence concept formation. 
Before we specify problems of this dissertation, it is important to define the term label. 
Here, it will be used Lupyan‟s definition of label as something that is: “a. consistently correlated 
with a category and b. used to refer to a category” (Lupyan et al., 2007). In this sense, label could 
be verbal, but also nonverbal, sound, move, spatial relations, actions and similar. 
 
Problems of the dissertation 
1. Taking into consideration James‟ and Miller/Dollard claims, it could be concluded that 
discriminability between categories, and consequently easiness of their learning, would depend 
on the level of difference between their labels. Likewise, if there are two categories that are 
named with phonologically similar words, it would be more difficult to learn them compared to 
categories which are named with phonologically different words. 
This is the first problem that will be analyzed in this dissertation: whether the categories 
labelled with phonologically different words are easier learned from the categories labelled with 
phonologically similar words. This problem includes analysis of different level of similarity 
between verbal labels and its influence on concept formation. Additionally, this includes a 
comparison of these influences with a situation in which categories are not labelled. 
2. The second problem is related to different types of labels. James did not claim that 
labels need to be verbal. The question is whether different types of labels could also have similar 
effects on category learning? Specifically, whether non-verbal labels (visual and auditory) with 
different level of similarity could produce the same effects as stated in the previous problem? 





3. The third problem is a fusion of the previous two: what is the relationship between 
effects of verbal and non-verbal labels on category learning? From James‟ writings, we could 
conclude that both of them will have similar effects on category learning. However, Waxman 
and Lupyan thought that verbal labels have a kind of a special status (Waxman & Markov, 1995; 
Waxman & Gelman 2009; Lupyan et al., 2007; Lupyan, 2012a; Lupyan et. al., 2012; Perry & 
Lupyan, 2014; Edmiston & Lupyan, 2015) and that there is superiority of verbal labels compared 
to other types of labels. While Waxman considers labels as conceptual markers, Lupyan 
considers labels as unmotivated cues. 
4. The fourth problem is generated from the analysis of different results in researches 
related to the effects of labels on category learning. While some of the previously stated papers 
of Waxman and Lupyan demonstrate these effects, some experiments did not detect it (Batinić, 
Lalić, Taxitari & Ković, 2015). Some of these researches had different instructions given to 
participants: some directly asked participants to learn labels, while others did not. Since labels 
were redundant in most of these experiments for task completion, that could lead to different 
level of labels learning. Once labels are ignored, there is no effect of the label on an increase of 
category difference, which could lead to lower performance. Consequently, it might happen that 
these labels were ignored in the second group of experiments (meaning, not learned) and that 
was the reason why effects were not identified. 
5. The fifth problem is related to creation of cognitive models that could demonstrate 
obtained results from the previous experiments. Primarily, cognitive models could demonstrate 
effects of label difference with various difference levels, something which would be very 
difficult for behavioural experiments. Furthermore, these demonstrations could reveal functional 
dependence between levels of label differences on category learning. 
 
Additionally, models could demonstrate eventual different effects of verbal and non-
verbal labels. And finally, these results could further support and confirm previously obtained 
behavioural and neural data. 
Based on these problems, we can state the aim, tasks and hypothesis of this dissertation. 
 
The aim of the dissertation 
The aim of this dissertation is to identify effects of label difference (verbal and non-
verbal) on category learning. Additionally, the aim is to identify the relation between these 
effects, so it could be identified whether there is a special status of verbal labels compared to 
non-verbal ones. For this purpose, a multi-methodological approach will be used: behavioural – 
with measures of accuracy and reaction times, neuro-physiological – with measures of event 







Tasks of the dissertation 
Based on the problems and the main aim of the dissertation, the following tasks could be 
stated: 
1. Identify effects of the level of phonological differences of verbal labels on category 
learning, using behavioural and neuro-physiological measures. 
2. Identify effects of the level of differences of non-verbal labels on category learning, 
using behavioural and neuro-physiological measures. 
3. Identify relations between the effects of verbal and non-verbal labels on category 
learning, using behavioural and neuro-physiological measures. 
4. Identify the effects of experimental instruction on category learning, using behavioural 
measures. 
5. Create physiologically plausible cognitive models which will demonstrate the effects 
of label differences on category learning. 
 
 
The entire structure of the dissertation could be presented with the following table: 
 
 












Verbal Minimal vs. Maximal Minimal vs. Maximal 
Non-verbal Minimal vs. Maximal Minimal vs. Maximal 
 
 
An additional factor that was included in the fourth aim presents all these factors with the 








General hypotheses of the dissertation 
Within each of previously stated tasks it could be identified general and specific 
expectations – hypotheses. Here will be specified general hypotheses of the dissertation, while 
each of the following chapters will further specify and define specific hypothesis of each chapter. 
 
We can identify the following general hypotheses: 
1. Learning of categories labelled with phonologically different verbal labels will be 
faster and easier generalized compared to the categories labelled with phonologically similar 
labels. 
2. Learning of categories labelled with phonologically different non-verbal labels will be 
faster and easier generalized compared to the categories labelled with phonologically similar 
labels. 
3. Linguistic and non-linguistic labels (visual or auditory) have the same effects on 
category learning. 
4. Experimental instructions in which it is explicitly required from the participant to learn 
the label will have a higher effect on category learning, compared to the experiment in which 
there are no experimental instructions. 
5. It is possible to create physiologically plausible cognitive models which will 
demonstrate effects of label difference on category learning. 
The following chapters will in detail specify and test each of the tasks and hypotheses in 
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EFFECTS OF VERBAL LABEL DIFFERENCES ON CATEGORY LEARNING1 
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As it was stated in the introductory chapter, we represent the world around us by the use 
of cognitive concepts. Concepts are representations of entities from reality which are grouped in 
broader categories (Murphy, 2002; Sloutsky, 2010). This ability is not the exclusive property of a 
human, but also animals can create concepts. Language, on the other hand is exclusive property 
of homo-sapiens. Human ability to use symbols made some authors to consider a man an animal 
symbolicum (Cassirer, 1944). 
The relation between concepts and language is the object of debate between philosophers 
and psychologists for centuries. Roughly, ideas regarding these relations could be split into two 
broad and more or less coherent groups. 
The first group of authors consider language and concepts strictly separated (Fodor 1975; 
Li & Gleitman, 2002; Gleitman & Papafragou, 2005; Gleitman & Papafragou, 2013; Li, Dunham 
& Carey, 2009; Klemfuss, Prinzmetal & Ivry, 2012). There is a primacy of concepts over 
language and concepts exist independently of language. Language is used strictly for 
communication and cannot influence the content of the concepts. As Gleitman and Papafragou 
noted: “thought is first, language is its expression” (Gleitman & Papafragou, 2005, page 634). 
Some authors (Lupyan, 2012a) name this group of theories “cognitive priority hypothesis”. 
The second group of theories consider language and concepts interactive and mutually 
dependant. Words stabilize complex ideas in the working memory and also influence the content 
of the concept (James, [1931 (1890)]; Vygotsky, 1962; Lupyan, 2012a). This group of theories is 
identified as linguistic relativity hypothesis, which is brought to its extreme in what is known as 
the Sapir-Whorf hypothesis (Whorf, 1941; Whorf, 1956). This hypothesis considers specific 
language as a determinant of mind (for that reason it is named as linguistic determinism). Words 
we use in specific language and more importantly the grammar structure of a language 
determines the way we think and perceive outside world. 
The probable mutual influence between language and categories is empirically tested and 
further specified in Lupyan‟s Language-augmented thought hypothesis (Lupyan et al., 2007; 
Lupyan, 2012a; Lupyan et al., 2012). According to this hypothesis, names are not only used for 
communication and labelling the concepts, but they also modulate object representation on-line. 
The relationship between words and concepts is bidirectional. 
Lupyan tested his hypothesis in experiments in which participants learned labelled and 
non-labelled novel categories (Lupyan et al., 2007). Results showed that labelled categories were 
learned faster and generalized better than non-labelled ones. 
The way, in which language can influence the concepts, William James tried to explain in 
his “Principles of psychology”, specifically in the chapter related to discrimination and 
comparison (James, [1931 (1890)], pages 508-515). James claimed that there are at least two 
distinct causes which lead to improved discrimination: “First, the terms whose difference comes 
to be felt contract disparate associates and these help to drag them apart. Second, the difference 
reminds us of larger differences of the same sort, and these help us to notice it.” (James, [1931 
(1890)], page 510). 
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Accordingly, the reason for discrimination of concepts lies in the more easily 
discriminated experiences associated with those concepts. James gives an example of 
discrimination between two wines: the flavour of the wines we associate to the situations where 
we tasted them. Since these situations are different, they will drag apart flavours of the wines 
too. Formally, if concepts B and C are difficult to discriminate, but A and D could be easily 
discriminated, if A is adhered with B and D is adhered with C, AB and CD will be more easily 
discriminated then B and C solely (James, [1931 (1890)], page 511). This case could be 
presented on the following figure (Figure I-1), where distance between items on a horizontal axis 
represents a level of difference between them. 
 
 
Figure I-1: Model of James‟ hypothesis 
 
In this case, A and D could be previous experiences related to the concepts. Apart from 
experiences, James claims that role of A and D could be taken by words, or more specifically 
names of concepts. Since “the names differ far more than the flavours” (meaning wine flavours), 
”and help to stretch these latter farther apart”. 
In line with aims stated in the introductory chapter, the aim of this chapter is to test 
whether learning of categories labelled with phonologically different verbal labels will be faster 
and more easily generalized compared to the categories labelled with phonologically similar 
labels. This is in line with the previously stated James‟ hypothesis related to verbal labels: If 
distinctive elements (names) adhered with two concepts are contributing distinction to these 
concepts, then if those elements are more distinct we could expect that distinction will be higher 
between them. Meaning, categories labelled with the phonologically more distinct words would 
be learned easier compared to the same categories labelled by the less distinct words. 
Additionally, if James‟ hypothesis was entirely correct, we could expect that continuum 
of label difference leads to a continuum of effects on concept learning and generalization. Since 
it is enormously difficult to test behaviourally all possible variations of the label differences, we 
could use a level of phonological difference that lies between maximal and minimal difference, 
which we can call middle difference. If the results show that concepts that are named with 
middle different labels are learned and generalized faster than those named with minimal 
difference, but slower than those with maximal difference, we could conclude that there is a 
continuum between the level of learning compared to the level of label difference. 
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Finally, the effect of different kinds of label pairs compared to the no label condition 
could be tested. In this way we can demonstrate the effects of different features of labels on 
category learning. It is expected that condition with maximally different labels will be learned 
faster and generalized better than a silent condition, as in the Lupyan‟s experiment (Lupyan et al, 
2007). Furthermore, we expect that this effect will be lower for minimally different condition. 
For this purpose, experiment with categorization task was designed in which participants 
studied new concepts. The design and materials were similar to those used by Lupyan (Lupyan et 
al., 2007), except that phonological features of labels were manipulated. 
Additionally, electro-physiological measures are included (event-related potentials) 
which are used to measure brain responses in each of the experiment phases (learning, 
generalization and testing). It is expected that the cognitive load in the first half of the learning 
phase will be higher compared to the second half, manifested in higher P300 amplitude (Luck, 
2014; Polich & Kok, 1995).  
P300 component is sensitive to cognitive load related to the task difficulty. Furthermore, 
the first half of the learning phase requires higher effort from the participants compared to the 
second half (since stimuli are completely novel anymore in the beginning). For that reason, 
smaller amplitude of P300 component is expected in the second part compared to the first part of 
the learning phase. 
Furthermore, it is expected that in the label test phase, there will be no difference in 
semantic expectances between minimal and maximal conditions, which will be manifested in the 
similar amplitude of N400 component (Luck, 2014; Kutas & Federmeier, 2011). Given that 
N400 is sensitive to semantic congruencies, once both types of the labels are learned to the equal 
extend, it is expected that there will be no differences in the level of amplitude of this 
component. 
 
2. EXPERIMENT 1 
In this experiment, the effects of phonologically minimally and maximally different 
labels on category learning were tested. As additional conditions, effects of middle different and 




The participants were 80 psychology students, who participated in the experiment as part 
of their course credit. Participants were randomly divided into four groups. In the first group, 
participants were presented with minimally, in the second group with maximally and in the third 
with middle different labels. In the fourth group, participants did not hear any label (silent 
condition). One participant was excluded from the further analysis, since she incorrectly 
understood the instructions. Additionally, results for one participant in the label test phase for the 





The experiment was designed in the program SuperLab 4.0. The screen was a 21” LCD, 
with a visual angle of 12.23° (distance 70cm). Participants used keyboard buttons which were 
marked with the arrows (directing left and right) for response. Each participant received auditory 
stimuli through the headphones. All auditory stimuli were digitally recorded. 
During the entire experiment, EEG brain waves of the participants were recorded. This 
EEG signal was recorded in uni-polar design through electrodes placed at F3, Fz, F4, C3, Cz, C4, 
P3, Pz, P4, CP5, CP6, T3, T4, O1 and O2 locations in line with International 10-20 standard 
(Luck, 2014) which were showed in Figure I-2. The ground electrode was placed at the centre of 
the forehead, while the referent electrodes were placed at the earlobes of each participant (A1 
and A2). 
“PSYLAB EEG8 biological amplifier” in combination with “PSYLAB SAM unit” 
(Contact Precision Instruments, London, UK) was used for EEG recording. Impedance between 
the skin and each of the electrodes was below 5kΩ. During recording, the signal was amplified to 
20k and filtered with band-pass filters, so the signal in the range of 0.03Hz – 40Hz was recorded. 




Figure I-2: Location of the electrodes 
 
Stimuli. YUFO stimuli list of aliens was used (Gauthier, James, Curby & Tarr, 2003), 







Figure I-3: YUFO stimuli divided into two categories 
 
For the labels, we used pseudo nouns with a difference manipulated on the three 
dimensions: phonological structure of the label (CVCVC versus VCVC), sonority gradient for 
alveolar/postalveolar sounds and vowel position (/i/ - /e/ - /a/ - /o/ - /u/). An additional dimension 
of difference between labels was sound symbolism. Previous research showed that some pseudo 
words are characterized as more “rounded” and some others as more “spikey” 
(Köhler, 1929/1947; Ković, Sučević & Styles, 2017). Even though we do not relate these labels 
to “rounded” or “spikey” objects, we expect that difference based on this property could increase 
overall difference between labels and maximize it further. 
Phonologically minimally different labels differed in the identity of only a single 
phoneme (consonant in our case) on a minimal scale (džoset (/dʒoset/
2
) vs đoset (/dʑoset/)). 
Phonologically maximally different labels differed in the identity of all three dimensions in a 
maximum scale (ketsi (/ketsi/) vs ubom (/ubom/)). Additionally, these labels differed on the 
dimension of sound symbolism (ketsi more “spikey” and ubom more “rounded”). 
Phonologically middle different labels (đosiš (/dʑosiʃ/) – đuzetč (/dʑuzetʃ/)) had the same 
phonological structure (CVCVC), but differed on both the sonority gradient and used vowels. 
This difference was minimal for both of these dimensions, which makes a difference between 
these two labels somewhere in the middle. In the silent condition, the labels were not presented. 
Labels were digitally recorded (female voice) of equal length (700ms). 
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Design and procedure 
The experiment was divided into three phases: learning phase, concepts test phase and 
labels test phase. Participants were instructed that they will do a categorization task in which 
they will take a position of an explorer discovering a new planet. There are two types of 
creatures on the planet: good and bad. If they think that a creature showed on the screen is good, 
they should approach it by pressing a button directing towards the creature. Otherwise, they 
should escape from it by pressing a button directing away from the creature. In the instruction it 
was stated that previous missions named these types of creatures by different labels, which 
would be presented after they receive feedback. Participants were instructed to pay special 
attention to these names, since their knowledge of it would be tested at the end of the 
experiment. 
In the first, learning phase (Figure I-4), pictures of the aliens were randomly presented in 
the middle of the screen, followed by a picture of the cosmonaut, which was shown on one of the 
randomly selected (left or right) sides of the screen. Depending on the position of the cosmonaut, 
participants needed to press appropriate arrow (left or right) in order to approach or move away 
from the alien. After the button was pressed, participants received feedback (a bell or a buzz), 
which signalized if their selection was correct. Finally, participants heard labels of the category 
(names of the group of aliens). It is important to notice, that these labels were completely task 
redundant, since participants did not need these labels to solve the problem itself. 
The learning phase consisted of nine blocks (in each block the entire list of stimuli was 
presented). Additionally, in this phase, brain potentials were recorded from the onset of the 








The concepts test phase was the same as the learning phase, except that feedback and 
labels were not presented. Furthermore, in the test phase additional stimuli of the same categories 
were presented (four by each category, presented on the right side of the grey line in Figure I-3), 
that were not presented in the learning phase. This was used to test whether participants learned 
types or specific tokens of the categories. This phase consisted of four blocks. Brain potentials 
were also recorded from the onset of the picture of the alien on the screen. 
In the labels test phase, participant had a task to confirm (by pressing the appropriate 
keyboard button) whether the image of an alien was congruent with the previously presented 
label (Figure I-5). All the stimuli from the first phase were presented twice in each block (32 
trials in total), each time paired with the correct or incorrect label (half of the time correct). 
There were three blocks in the entire phase. 
During this process, the brain potentials were recorded from the onset of the picture of 
the alien on the screen. Participants responded only after the response panel (with a plus and 
minus sign) was presented on the screen, by pressing the button on the same side as the plus sign 
if the name and the alien picture were congruent (and vice versa). The distribution of plus/minus 
position on the screen was randomly selected. In this way, any lateralized readiness potential 
(LRP) that could have distorted ERP responses were prevented, since participants did not know 




Figure I-5: Trial structure in the label the test phase (phase III) 
 
However, this phase was different for the silent condition, since there were no labels in it. 
Instead of judging over congruency, participants had a task to identify a good or a bad alien. 
They did it by pressing the button which was on the side where the plus sign was if they thought 
the alien was the good or minus side if they thought the alien was the bad. Signs were also 




As a dependent variable, the percentage of correct responses was measured (accuracy). 
Furthermore, as a control variable, reaction time was recorded. Finally, an ERP measure of 
voltage was used, expressed in micro volts. 
 
Results and discussion 
Behavioural results 
Descriptive results in Reaction time analysis for each of the phases are presented in the 
following table (Table I-1): 
 
Table I-1: Descriptive results of reaction times (in milliseconds) in Experiment 1 
 
Group  N Mean St.Deviation 
Training Min.diff 19 1033.99 451.12 
Max.diff 20 872.12 229.08 
Mid.diff 20 1073.84 399.26 
Silent 20 1023.59 310.88 
Test Min.diff 19 1036.55 488.18 
Max.diff 20 768.41 173.56 
Mid.diff 20 995.34 396.82 
Silent 20 882.12 288.55 
Label_test Min.diff 19 800.93 180.16 
Max.diff 20 659.24 142.37 
Mid.diff 20 850.59 282.77 
Silent 20 654.66 167.99 
TOTAL Min.diff 19 957.16 334.37 
Max.diff 20 766.59 136.65 
Mid.diff 20 973.25 298.9 
Silent 20 853.45 237.38 
 
To analyse these results, a two-way mixed-design ANOVA was conducted with Group as 
a between-subjects factor and Phase as a within-subjects factor with two levels (traning and test). 
There was no significant main effect of Group (F(3,75) = 1.913, p = .135, η
2 
= .071). 
However, there was a significant main effect of Phase (F(1,75) = 6.347, p = .014, η
2
= .078). 




These results showed that participants faster responded in the test than in the training 
phase, which is expected, since they already knew most of the stimuli in the test condition and 
took them less time to make a selection. Furthermore, participants did not differ between groups, 
so there was no speed-accuracy trade off. 
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Accuracy. Descriptive results for accuracy (percentage of correct responses) are 
presented in the following table and chart (Table I-2 and Figure I-6): 
 
Table I-2: Percentage of correct responses in Experiment 1 
 
Group  N Mean St.Deviation 
Training Min.diff 19 71.71 12.62 
Max.diff 20 82.50 7.27 
Mid.diff 20 76.84 10.44 
Silent 20 73.33 11.51 
Test Min.diff 19 79.33 12.22 
Max.diff 20 85.47 5.26 
Mid.diff 20 82.19 11.77 
Silent 20 74.43 16.40 
Label_test Min.diff 19 65.57 14.88 
Max.diff 20 79.06 12.16 




Figure I-6: Percentage of correct responses over phases and blocks in Experiment 1 
 
As in the reaction times analysis, a two-way mixed-design ANOVA was conducted with 
Group as a between-subjects factor and Phase as a within-subjects factor with two levels 
(training and test). 
There was a significant main effect of Group (F(3,75) = 3.411, p = .022, η
2 
= .120). 
Furthermore, there was a significant main effect of Phase (F(1,75) = 32.849, p < .001, η
2 
= .305). 





Post-hoc comparison of between-group differences showed that there is a significant 
difference between maximal compared to minimal (mean-difference = 8.464, p = .018) and silent 
condition (mean-difference = 10.105, p = .04). Other groups did not differ significantly. It is 
interesting to notice that the middle different condition was between minimal and maximal 
levels, but was not significantly different from either of them. 
For further analysis of differences between groups, a one-way ANOVA was used for 
each of the experimental phases, with a Group as a between-subjects factor. There were 
significant differences between groups in the learning phase (F(3,75) = 3.987, p = .011, η
2 
= 
.138) and in the test phase (F(3,75) = 2.996, p= .036, η
2 
= .107). Since there were no labels in the 
silent condition in the label test phase, this group was excluded from further analysis. There were 




Obtained within-subjects differences are due to the learning. It is expected that 
participants will perform better in the test phase when they already formed the concepts than in 
the entire training phase. 
Interaction between Phase and Group was due to the difference between the silent 
condition in training and test phase, meaning that the pattern of this condition was different then 
for the rest of the groups. This gets obvious if we exclude the silent condition from the analysis, 
interaction becomes insignificant. Interpretation of this result is that the silent condition is not 
that well generalized as other conditions, which we will further test in post-hoc analysis. 
Post-hoc comparison for the learning phase showed differences between maximal 
different compared to minimal (mean-difference = 10.790, p = .002) and silent condition (mean-
difference = 9.167, p = .008), while other differences were not significant. In the test phase, the 
silent condition was significantly different compared to the maximal (mean-difference = -11.042, 
p = .005) and middle different condition (mean-difference = -7.761, p = .046). Finally, in the 
label test phase, significant differences were only between the minimal and the maximal 
difference condition (mean-difference = -13.492, p = .006), while the middle different condition 
did not differ from any of the other two. 
These results go in favour of James‟ hypothesis. The obtained differences demonstrate 
that participants learned faster and generalized better in maximal difference condition compared 
to minimally different condition. Additionally, since the middle difference group lies between 
minimal and maximal difference levels, we can conclude that there is a continuum of effects of 
label difference on category learning, as we predicted in the introduction. Finally, data revealed 
that even though there are no significant effects of minimally and middle different labels on 
category learning compared to the silent condition in the training phase, their effects are obvious 
in the test phase for middle difference and in the presence of interaction between minimal and 
silent condition. This goes in line with Lupyan‟s hypothesis that labels affect generalization, 





3. EXPERIMENT 2 
In experiment 1 we obtained results which go in favour of James‟ hypothesis. Hoverer, 
alternative interpretation of the obtained effect of maximally different labels is possible and it 
could be explained by sound symbolism. In some previous research (Kovic, Plunkett & 
Westermann, 2010; Sučević et al., 2015), it is showed that sound symbolism can have effects on 
concepts and its discrimination. Apart from being phonologically maximally different, the labels 
we used in experiment 1 were also different in sound symbolism. 
The question is what effects will produce labels in which there is no sound symbolism, 
but there is maximal phonological difference between labels? If these labels still produce effects 
presented in the previous experiment, we can conclude that the effects we obtained are due to the 
phonological difference, rather than sound symbolism solely. 
Additional problems present sound symbolic congruency with stimuli presented. One 
previous research (Lupyan & Casasanto, 2014) in which the same stimuli as in this experiment 
were used, showed effects of sound symbolic congruence (“spikey” label with “spikey” aliens vs 
“spikey” label with “rounded” aliens). Meaning, participants learned faster and generalized 
better a congruent combination between label and stimuli compared to incongruent. Within this 
research, a norming study was conducted which showed that participants classified the first 
group of aliens as “rounded” (top two rows in Figure I-3) and the second group of aliens as 
“spikey” (lower two rows in Figure I-3). 
In experiment 1, labels differed on the dimension of sound symbolism, but the “spikey” 
label (ketsi) was related to a “rounded” object and vice versa. In that experiment, sound 
symbolism was used only as a factor that could increase the overall difference between labels. 
Based on previous statements, the aim of this experiment is to test what are the effects of 
sound symbolism on category learning compared to the effects of labels without sound 
symbolism. For this purpose, we designed the experiment in which we used maximally different 
words with congruent sound symbolism (ketsi with “spiky” aliens) and maximally different 
words without sound symbolism. With this experiment, we wish to measure the effects of sound 
symbolism on category learning, while other phonological differences are maximized. 
This extension of the previous experiment will be additionally contrasted and compared 
with the results obtained in experiment 1 (with minimal and maximal difference condition). In 
this way we can test whether the obtained effects of label difference in experiment 1 could be 
assigned to the sound symbolism, or they are the sole property of the phonological difference 
between labels. We expected that the effects obtained in previous experiment could be assigned 
to phonological difference, rather than to sound symbolism, even though the effects of sound 




The participants were 40 psychology students, who participated in the experiment as part 
of their course credit. Participants were randomly divided into two groups. In the first group, 
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participants were presented with maximally different verbal labels without sound symbolism, 
while in the second group with maximally different labels with sound symbolism which was 
congruent with visual stimuli (aliens). Results for one participant were excluded from the further 
analysis, since she incorrectly understood the instructions. 
 
Material and stimuli 
Materials and stimuli were completely the same as in the previous experiment, except 
that the additional labels were used for maximally different labels without sound symbolism. 
These labels (citech (/citetʃ/) – nudžoz (/nudʒoz/)) differed on the same three dimensions as other 
maximally different labels, but without sound symbolism. 
In the maximally different labels which were congruent with stimuli, same labels as in 
experiment 1 were used (ketsi-ubom). 
Design and procedure 
Design and procedure were the same as in the previous experiment. 
 
Results and discussion 
Behavioural results 
In Reaction time analysis for each of the phases the following descriptive results were 
obtained (Table I-3): 
 
Table I-3: Descriptive results of reaction times (in milliseconds) in Experiment 2 
 
Group  N Mean St.Deviation 
Training Max.diff no ss 20 958.86 399.22 
Max.diff congr 19 981.98 465.16 
Test Min.diff no ss 20 902.73 333.04 
Max.diff congr 19 836.15 282.77 
Label_test Min.diff no ss 20 811.86 220.41 
Max.diff congr 19 788.34 272.94 
 
To analyse these results, a two-way mixed-design ANOVA was conducted with Group as 
a between-subjects factor and Phase as a within-subjects factor with two levels (training and 
test). 
There was no significant main effect of Group (F(1,37) = 0.036, p = .850, η
2 
= .001). 
However, there was a significant main effect of Phase (F(1,37) = 6.841, p = .013, η
2 
= .156). 




As in the previous experiment, results showed that participants faster responded in the 
test than in the training phase, which is expected, since they already knew most of the stimuli in 
the test condition and took them less time to make a selection. However, participants did not 
differ between groups, so there was no speed-accuracy trade off. 
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Accuracy. Descriptive results for accuracy (percentage of correct responses) are 
presented in the following table and chart (for each phase and within phase blocks): 
 
Table I-4: Percentage of correct responses in Experiment 2 
 
Group  N Mean St.Deviation 
Training Max.diff no ss 20 80.49 10.61 
Max.diff congr 19 81.25 5.27 
Test Min.diff no ss 20 85.42 7.81 
Max.diff congr 19 85.91 5.92 
Label_test Min.diff no ss 20 78.28 17.73 





Figure I-7: Percentage of correct responses over phases and blocks in Experiment 2 
 
As in the reaction times analysis, a two-way mixed-design ANOVA was conducted with 
Group as a between-subjects factor and Phase as a within-subjects factor with two levels 
(training and test). 
There was no significant main effect of Group (F(1,37) = 0.079, p = .780, η
2 
= .002). 
Furthermore, there was a significant main effect of Phase (F(1,37) = 19.676, p < .001, η
2 
= .347). 
Finally, there was no significant Group x Phase interaction (F(1,37) = 0.016, p = .901, η
2 
= .000). 
In the label test phase, there was no significant difference between the two groups 
(F(1,37) = 0.391, p = .536, η
2 
= .010). 
There are no differences between the two groups, except in Phase factor, which was 




4. COMPARISON OF RESULTS IN EXPERIMENT 1 AND EXPERIMENT 2 
As we previously stated, the results from this experiment were compared with the results 
for two groups from the previous experiment (the maximal difference with incongruent sound 
symbolism and a minimal difference condition). 
 
Behavioural results 
Reaction time. A two-way mixed-design ANOVA was conducted with Group as a 
between-subjects factor (four levels) and Phase as a within-subjects factor with two levels 
(training and test). 
There was no significant main effect of Group (F(3,74) = 1.302, p = .280, η
2 
= .050). 
However, there was a significant main effect of Phase (F(1,75) = 6.048, p = .016, η
2 
= .076). 




Results showed that participants faster responded in the test than in the training phase, 
which is expected, since they already knew most of the stimuli in the test condition and took 
them less time to make selection. Furthermore, participants did not differ between groups, so 
there was no speed-accuracy trade off. 





Figure I-8: Percentage of correct responses over phases and blocks 
 
As in the reaction times analysis, a two-way mixed-design ANOVA was conducted with 
Group as a between-subjects factor and Phase as a within-subjects factor with two levels 





There was a significant main effect of Group (F(3,74) = 5.595, p = .005, η
2 
= .157). 
Furthermore, there was a significant main effect of Phase (F(1,74) = 46.921, p < .001, η
2 
= .388). 
Finally, there was no significant Group x Phase interaction (F(3,74) = 1.697, p = .175, η
2 
= .064). 
Post-hoc comparison of between-group differences showed that there is a significant 
difference between minimal compared to maximal difference without sound symbolism (mean-
difference = -7.431, p = .006), maximal difference with incongruent sound symbolism (mean-
difference = -8.464, p = .002) and maximal difference with congruent sound symbolism (mean-
difference = -8.059, p = .003). Other groups (all maximal groups) did not differ significantly. 
As in the previous experiment, within-subjects differences are due to the learning. It is 
expected that participants will perform better in the test phase when they already formed the 
concepts than in the entire training phase. 
From these results, we can conclude that there is a unique effect of maximal phonological 
difference on category learning which is independent from sound symbolism. The reason why 
differences in congruent sound symbolic condition were not obtained (as in Lupyan‟s 
experiment) is probably because of the ceiling effect: participants‟ performance was around 90% 
on average in all maximally different conditions. Additionally, in Lupyan‟s experiment, there 
were sixteen blocks of learning (compared to the thirteen we have here) and still the significant 
level was p = 0.04. Finally, prior to the experiment, Lupyan conducted a norming study, not 




Apart from behavioural, data from event-related potential were also collected. Prior to the 
statistical analysis of these data, recorded EEG signals were filtered with a low-pass filter using 
the fifth level Butterworth filter with a limit of 25Hz frequency. Further, the signal was separated 
into single units and corrected compared to the baseline in the way that for each unit a subtracted 
average value was taken from the baseline. Meaning, the average value of the period of 300ms 
before the onset of each of the stimuli was subtracted from the recorded unit value. Units that 
contained artefacts produced due to eye movements were excluded from further analysis. Grand-
average waveforms for each of the experimental situations were calculated as the average 
measure of all units of all participants. 
Since there was only one cap for all the participants (which due to improper size distorted 
most of the data from the side electrodes), only data which were collected from F, C and P 
electrodes were used for the analysis. Prior to statistical analysis, subjects with too many noisy 
recordings (over 50%) were excluded from the dataset, which left the following sample by 






Table I-5: Remaining ERP sample after removal of the cases with too noisy recordings 
 





Central electrodes that remained in the analysis (C, F and P), were intended for 3x3 
factorial design. After removal of additional noisy electrodes, the following distribution of the 
recorded sample remained (Table I-6): 
 
Table I-6: Number and percentage of remaining sample by electrodes and phases 
 
  Phase I Phase II Phase III TOTAL 
  N % N % n % % 
C3 92 91,09 87 92,55 89 92,71 92,12 
Cz 78 77,23 76 80,85 76 79,17 79,08 
C4 95 94,06 90 95,74 93 96,88 95,56 
F3 82 81,19 78 82,98 71 73,96 79,38 
Fz 49 48,51 51 54,26 43 44,79 49,19 
F4 75 74,26 74 78,72 65 67,71 73,56 
P3 30 29,70 27 28,72 31 32,29 30,24 
Pz 96 95,05 90 95,74 90 93,75 94,85 
P4 99 98,02 92 97,87 94 97,92 97,94 
 
Due to an unequal distribution of the remaining electrodes sample, a cut point of 50% 
validity was implemented (those electrodes with over a 50% sample remained). In this process, 
two electrodes were removed (P3 and Fz). Since the 3x3 model could not be implemented, it was 
decided that only the 3 central electrodes should be used for the following two reasons: data from 
all these three electrodes were preserved and effects of categorisation and language tasks are 
identifiable at these central electrodes. 
For the statistical analysis of the remaining three electrodes (C3, Cz and C4) the 
difference-waves method was used, meaning that it was calculated the difference between first 
half and the second half of the exposed sample in the I phase. 
For the statistical analysis of the remaining three electrodes (C3, Cz and C4) the 
difference-waves method was used, meaning that it calculated the difference between the first 
half and the second half of the exposed sample in phase I. In the second phase, the difference 
was calculated between the old and new represented stimuli from the same category and in the 




The outliers (over 2SD from both sides) for all three phases (I, II, III) were removed. 
Variables were close to normal distribution. 
For each of the remaining electrodes, a one way ANOVA was implemented for each of 
the 20ms windows, for each of the phases. Results showed that only significant consecutive 
windows (more than two) were 16-19 of the electrode C4 (300ms-360ms) in phase I. 
Since there were too many comparisons, the Bonfferoni correction was implemented: for 
each electrode, 49 comparisons were made, which transfers p = .05 into p = .001 (0.05/49=0.001) 
as a significance level after the correction. However, only one window (16) remained significant 
after correction. 
Since further analysis would not have been necessary after this correction, analysis was 
conducted without it for illustration purposes. Windows 16 to 19 were averaged for each of the 
electrode and identified as a P3 component (300ms - 360ms). Average results for each Group for 



















































































Figure I-10: Difference waves for I phase of C4 electrode 
 
A two-way mixed-design 6x3 ANOVA was conducted with Group as a between-subjects 
factor (1 to 6) and Electrode (C3, Cz, C4) as a within-subjects factor with two levels (training 
and test). 
Results showed that there was no significant main effect of Group (F(5,47) = 1.046, p = 
.402, η
2 
= .100) and also no significant main effect of Electrode (F(2,46) = 1.048, p = .359, η
2 
= 
.044) or significant Group x Electrode interaction (F(10,94) = 1.271, p = .238, η
2 
= .119). 
Absence of results in the first phase could be interpreted in the following way: 
comparison between the first and the second half of the presented trials were not significantly 
different, since the main difference was between the first and the rest of blocks. Only in most of 
the first block trials, participants were guessing responses by chance. This was significantly 
improved in the second and other blocks. Once values of the first block are averaged with the 
rest of the first half, this difference diminishes. The difference could possibly be identified 
between the first and the last ninth block, but we simply did not have enough trials in those 
blocks for valid comparison. 
Regarding the results from the third test phase, we could possibly conclude the following: 
1. There are no effects of difference of verbal labels on category learning or any early 
ERP component. This is not highly probable: many previously stated researches identified at 
least effects of sound symbolism on ERP components (Kovic, Plunkett & Westermann, 2010; 




















2. Timings for ERP recording were not proper. ISI (Inter stimulus interval) between two 
stimuli in the third phase was 800ms (between the end of the label pronunciation and picture of 
the stimuli presentation). Since stimuli were in two different modalities (audio and visual), it was 
expected that longer ISI will provide a proper baseline for ERP recording. However, it seems 
that this ISI was too long, which resulted in an absence of identification of the experiment 
effects. 
Unfortunately, this improper timing was identified only after all the recordings were 
completed (for all experiments in this dissertation), since data processing was slower than 




Results obtained in experiment 1 show that participants learned categories that were 
labelled with phonologically maximally different labels significantly faster compared to the ones 
labelled with minimally different and the ones without labels (silent condition). Additionally, the 
phonologically mid different condition was not significantly different from either the minimal or 
maximal condition but descriptively was between the two. Based on that we can presume (not 
claim) that mid different condition lies somewhere in between and consequently leads to faster 
learning than minimal, and less than maximal. However, to claim this further research would be 
needed. 
As far as generalization is concerned (phase II), there is a similar pattern to the learning 
results, except that level of generalization in the silent condition was different compared to the 
pattern in the learning condition (interaction). So we can conclude that generalization in the 
silent condition decreases compared to the other conditions. Finally, in the label test phase, 
participants in the minimal condition learned labels significantly worse compared to other 
conditions. 
Concerning experiment 2, we obtained results which show that there are no differences 
between phonologically maximally different labels with congruent sound symbolism condition 
and phonologically maximal different labels without sound symbolism. When these results are 
compared with the results from the first experiment (maximally different with incongruent sound 
symbolism condition and minimally different condition), it was obtained that there is a difference 
between the minimal condition compared to other condition, but not between three maximally 
different conditions. 
In experiment 1, the main hypothesis of the research was confirmed: once categories are 
labelled with phonologically maximally different labels, they are learned faster and generalized 
better compared to those labelled with minimally different labels. Furthermore, the 
generalization of labelled categories is better compared to the non-labelled condition, which goes 
in line with the hypothesis that labelled concepts are generalized better. 
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In experiment 2, results showed that effects of label difference could be assigned to the 
phonological difference, rather than to sound symbolism (which could be absent due to the 
“ceiling effect”). 
 
Interpretation of these results could be taken from two different points: why categories 
labeled with phonologically more different labels are learned better compared to the ones labeled 
with phonologically more similar labels? Furthermore, why categories labeled with 
phonologically more different labels are generalized better than those labeled with minimally 
different labels? And finally, as a part of the previous question, why generalization of labeled 
conditions was better than non-labeled condition? 
The first question is related to learning, which could be interpreted through external 
properties of the categories (but could also include some internal elements). The second question 
is related to generalization, which could be interpreted through internal conceptual 
representation. 
 
Learning results could be interpreted with James‟ proposed hypothesis: effect of labels on 
category learning is obtained since labels are more different than categories. Maximally different 
names, adhered to two categories compose entities which are more easily discriminated than the 
categories solely. Once minimally different labels are adhered to the categories, those entities 
will not be easily discriminated as those with maximally different labels. Likewise, the former 
will be learned faster compared to the latter (which was obtained in the experiment), since more 
different objects are easier discriminated than more similar ones (James, [1931 (1890)]). 
Further explanation of results could be obtained from Lupyan‟s language augmented 
thought hypothesis. Lupyan claims that linguistic labels are strongly connected with typical 
features of the concepts. Once the exemplar of the category is activated, it activates the label, 
which in return activates these typical features on-line. In the process of learning categories and 
labels, this effect becomes more and more evident in the learning process. There lays the reason 
why labeled categories are learned faster, but also generalized better than non-labeled ones. In 
line with this hypothesis goes the result where participants who learned labels better (maximally 
different of all types) also learned and generalized concepts better. However, Lupyan‟s theory 
does not explain why there are effects of label difference levels, which was obtained in this 
research. 
 
Related to the generalization problem and phonological difference of labels, we could 
again interpret results based on James‟ hypothesis: once concepts are created and labels learned, 
they are stored in the long term memory, but somehow interconnected (associated). Activation of 
one, leads to the activation of the other and vice versa. This activation increases discriminability 
between concepts, because they do not consist solely on visual representation, but also on the 
name as an additional feature (labels). 
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However, this does not mean that representation of concept consists of unified label 
representation and representation of visible features, since contemporary theories consider that 
language and thought are separated (Murphy, 2002; Gleitman & Papafragou, 2005; Wolff & 
Holmes, 2011). Furthermore, most of the present theories accept an exemplar based view of 
concepts, so there is no one single representation. 
Labeled category is represented with concept – exemplars, that are associated with label 
representation, which mutually activate each other. This view is close to the Lupyan‟s view, 
except that learned labels also influence internal discriminability between concepts based on 
their phonological difference. 
 
In order to quantify previous interpretations, we can use logic from Sloutsky‟s model of 
Similarity Induction Naming Categorisation in young children – SINC (Sloutsky & Fisher, 2004; 
Sloutsky & Fisher, 2012). Even though this model was developed for children, it can be used 
here since it uses multiplicative rule for exemplar differences (Medin, 1975; Medin & Schaffer, 
1978) with which object differences can be quantified. Furthermore, it includes quantification of 
label phonological differences. And finally, even if adults in Sloutksy‟s experiments (for 
example Sloutsky, Lo & Fisher, 2001) do rely almost solely on labels in category classification 
task, in our experiments it is not possible since labels are presented after the participant‟s 
response. In a strict empirical sense, this label can be considered as another feature (needed to be 
learned) which adheres to the conceptual representation and which does not help in solving 
individual experimental trials. 
According to this model, similarity between two exemplars is calculated with the 
following equation: 






Where i is an item which is compared to item j. λ represent attentional weights of a label 
and υ the same for the visual property (ranging from 0 to 1), while β represent a number of 
feature mismatches between two labels and B the number of feature mismatches between 
appearances (visual features) of two items (B). 
Another tool that could be used in the description of differences between category 
exemplars is the previously mentioned Context Model (Medin, 1975), but also Generalized 
Context Model, proposed by Nosofski (Nosofsky 1992; Nosofsky & Palmeri 1997) and amended 
by Maddox and Ashby (Ashby & Maddox, 1993). 
Both Sloutsky‟s and the Generalized Context Model - GCM are designed to illustrate a 
comparison of exemplar to either another exemplar (Sloutsky) or group of exemplars (GCM). 
For the purpose of explanation of these results, we can establish an alternative view: the model 







The description of the model starts with a definition of Between Category Difference 
(BCD). Each category consists of several dimensions – D
3
. Let us assume that these dimensions 
are values from 0 (no difference) to 1 (maximum difference). In that case, psychological 
difference between two categories in one dimension we can express with the following equation: 
 
diff (I, J)i = Si * Di 
 
where I and J are two categories, i is a dimension, S is the attentional weight of the 
dimension i (0 – no attention, 1 – maximum attention) and Di is the difference between 
categories on the dimension i. 
We can further specify overall difference of the categories, using multiplicative rule: 
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where ∏ represents product from i=1 to m (number of relevant dimensions). This value 
will be between 0 (no difference) to 1 (maximum difference). 
If we assume that difference between two categories will be learned easier once the 
overall difference is higher (Nosofsky 1992). In that sense, once this difference level is 
calculated, probability (meaning ease) that these two categories will be differentiated (learned) 
can be expressed with the following equation: 
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where P(I,J) represents probability that categories I and J will be discriminated (learned). 
 
All previous discussion was related to visual features. We can conduct a similar 
calculation for the Label Difference (LD
4
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where IL and JL are labels of the categories I and J, Si and Di are attentional weights and 
level of differences on dimension i. 
 
 
                                                 
3
 Detailed description of between categories difference for each dimension Di will be specified in 
discussion section of the dissertation. 
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Likewise, the total difference of labeled categories can be specified with the following 
equation: 
diff (I,J)T = diff(I,J)*diff(IL,JL) 
 
and probability of learning labeled category of it as: 
 
P (I,J) = diff(I,J)T = diff(I,J)*diff(IL,JL) 
 
At this point, we still cannot claim whether the space of label difference is only 
tridimensional and is it orthogonal or not. Further, this model does not specify whether influence 
of labels on concept similarity is different than influence of visual attributes, meaning whether 
words have special status compared to visual features. 
This attempt of quantification was conducted for the learning process. As far as 
generalization is concerned, we can assume that a similar representative process is involved: 
mental representations of individual category exemplars and names are stored and more easily 
discriminated if they are more different. This would explain why generalization was better for a 
maximal different condition compared to a minimal different condition: the former were more 
different than the latter. 
 
Finally, it is necessary to note that this is a kind of speculative quantifying (how things 
could work). For further confirmation, additional empirical testing with a different research 
objective would be necessary. 
As a final constraint, we can specify that these results are based on presupposition that 
participants do not have any previous knowledge about categories and labels (which was 
achieved by use of novel stimuli and labels). In real life, previous knowledge is always used and 



















C H A P T E R   II 
 
 










In the introductory chapter, Lupyan‟s definition of labels was used, as something which 
is: “a. consistently correlated with a category and b. used to refer to a category” (Lupyan et al., 
2007). Meaning, labels could be any entities, no matter if they were verbal, non-verbal or spatial. 
While much of the attention was given to verbal labels, there are significantly fewer 
studies related to non-verbal labels. Reasons for such disproportion could be because verbal 
labels are more attractive for studying or that studies of non-verbal labels were not always 
statistically significant, so they are rarely reported in published papers. The second problem is 
partially correct, since much of the data with non-verbal labels are generated from research that 
primarily studied verbal labels, but used non-verbal labels as a control of their effects. 
Some of these researches were conducted by Gary Lupyan who primarily studied effects 
of verbal labels, but used non-verbal labels to illustrate superiority of verbal labels. He used 
spatial non-verbal labels (Lupyan et. al., 2007) and non-verbal sounds (Lupyan & Thompson-
Schill, 2012). In both of these researches, superiority of verbal over non-verbal labels were 
demonstrated, which allowed Lupyan to conclude that verbal labels have a special status. 
There is also group of research conducted on children with similar results. For example, 
Fulkerson and Waxman (Fulkerson & Waxman, 2007) demonstrated that infants between 6 and 
12 months are sensitive to verbal, but not non-verbal sounds  and that verbal labels are inherently 
used as category markers. The problem with studies including children is that we can never sure 
be if the obtained results are valid for adults too. 
On the other hand, from the logical point of view and from the previously stated James‟ 
hypothesis, there is no reason to believe that verbal labels have some different status from non-
verbal labels. What we described as James‟ hypothesis states that the elements adhered to the 
concepts could be some other things, like contexts (like in the example with wine) or some other 
features that could have the same property as a verbal label. 
Additionally, concerning the results from the previous chapter, we can see that only 
highly differentiable labels lead to category learning effects. There is a possibility that research 
with non-verbal labels were conducted with labels which were not easily discriminable. 
Furthermore, the question is whether there are modality specific effects of non-verbal 
labels? Some researchers suggest that there is some superiority of auditory modality in attention 
weight, which overshadows visual input (Sloutsky & Fisher, 2012). 
 
In the line with the aims stated in the introductory chapter, the aim of this chapter is to 
identify effects of level of differences of non-verbal labels on category learning, using 
behavioural and neuro-physiological measures
5
. Furthermore, these effects were compared to the 
non-label condition in order to specify effects of non-verbal labels compared to the baseline. 
                                                 
5
 For the reason stated in the previous chapter, these measures are suspended. Since these measures are 
recorded, using EEG cap, it is important to report it here (along with the hypothesis), since participants (and the 




Even though some research showed that there is supremacy of verbal compared to non-
verbal labels, in predictions of outcomes we will stick to basic hypothesis used in this 
dissertation: James‟ hypothesis. This hypothesis does not differ between verbal and non-verbal 
labels, so we expect that categories named with maximally different non-verbal labels will be 
learned faster and generalized better compared to those labelled with minimally different non-
verbal labels. Furthermore, we expect that there will be an overall effect of maximally different 
non-verbal labels, compared to the baseline condition (silent condition). 
For this purpose, two experiments with non-verbal labels were designed. In the first, the 
effects of visual non-verbal label differences were tested. These non-verbal labels were emblems 
that were described as emblems of the alien‟s tribes. In the second experiment, the effects of the 
auditory non-verbal label differences were tested. These auditory labels were digitally modified 
sounds described as the sound produced by the specific group of aliens. For both experiments, 
data for silent condition were taken from Chapter I (first 15 participants). 
Like in the previous chapter, electro-physiological measures were included (event-related 
potentials) which are used to measure brain responses in each of the experiment phases (learning, 
generalization and testing). For the same reasons as in the previous chapter, it is expected that the 
cognitive load in the first half of the learning phase will be higher compared to the second half, 
manifested in higher P300 amplitude (Luck, 2014; Polich & Kok, 1995). Furthermore, it is 
expected that in the label test phase, there will be no difference in semantic expectances between 
minimal and maximal conditions, which will be manifested in the similar amplitude of N400 
component (Luck, 2014; Kutas & Federmeier, 2011). 
 
 
2. EXPERIMENT 1 
In this experiment, the effects of minimally and maximally different visual non-verbal 




Participants were thirty psychology students, who participated in the experiment for the 
course credit. Participants were randomly divided into two groups. In the first group, participants 
were presented with minimally, while in the second group with maximally different visual non-
verbal labels. Data for the third group were taken from Chapter I (silent condition). 
 
Material and stimuli 
Material and stimuli were the same as those in Chapter I, except labels which were non-





Visual non-verbal labels were taken from Hedge & Van Esen (Figure II-1), with 
permission (Hedge & Van Esen, 2003; Hedge & Van Esen, 2004). These labels were generated 
in Matlab 2010b, by the script provided by the authors. Minimally different labels represent 
textures created by the parameters in a polar coordinate system (marked in this paper by number 
42 and 44). One of the maximally different labels was also created in a polar coordinate system 
(marked as number 44), while the second one was produced in a hyperbolic coordinate system 












Design and procedure 
The design and procedure were the same as in the previous chapter, except that instead of 




Figure II-3: Trial structure in the learning phase (phase I) 
 
 
Participants were instructed that the visual non-verbal labels were emblems of the group 
of aliens (one for good and one for bad). Like in the first chapter, these labels were completely 
task redundant, since participants could do the task even if they completely ignored them. Again, 
participants were instructed to pay special attention to these emblems, since their knowledge of it 
would be tested at the end of the experiment. 
In each phase of this experiment, brain potentials were recorded from the onset of the 
picture of the alien on the screen. 
As a dependent variable, the percentage of correct responses (accuracy) was measured. 
Furthermore, as a control variable, reaction time was recorded. Finally for the ERP measure, 
measure of voltage was used, expressed in microvolts. 
 
Results and discussion 
Behavioural results 
Descriptive results in Reaction time analysis for each of the phases are presented in the 







Table II-1: Descriptive results of reaction times (in milliseconds) in Experiment 1 
 
Group  N Mean St.Deviation 
Training nl_VIZ_MIN 15 930.26 387.01 
nl_VIZ_MAX 15 1083.43 427.54 
Silent 15 955.64 307.42 
Test nl_VIZ_MIN 15 980.54 347.78 
nl_VIZ_MAX 15 1034.81 411.08 
Silent 15 790.99 273.60 
Label_test nl_VIZ_MIN 15 804.60 197.07 
nl_VIZ_MAX 15 813.43 334.45 
 
A two-way mixed-design ANOVA was conducted with Group as a between-subjects 
factor with three levels (minimal, maximal and silent) and Phase as a within-subjects factor with 
two levels (training and test). 
Results showed that there was no significant main effect of Group (F(2,42) = 1.111, p = 
.339, η
2 
= .050) and also no significant main effect of Phase (F(1,42) = 2.231, p = .143, η
2 
= 




Finally, there were no significant differences in reaction times in the label test phase 
(F(1,28) = .008, p = .930, η
2 
= .000). 
These results show that there are no differences in reaction times across conditions and 
that there was no eventual speed-accuracy trade off. 
Accuracy. Descriptive results for accuracy (percentage of correct responses) are 
presented in the following table and chart (Table II-2 and Figure II-4): 
 
Table II-2: Percentage of correct responses in Experiment 1 
 
Group  N Mean St.Deviation 
Training nl_VIZ_MIN 15 68.98 12.27 
nl_VIZ_MAX 15 74.12 11.95 
Silent 15 76.94 9.88 
Test nl_VIZ_MIN 15 75.42 12.69 
nl_VIZ_MAX 15 79.17 11.11 
Silent 15 77.71 15.61 
Label_test nl_VIZ_MIN 15 55.28 9.93 










Figure II-4: Percentage of correct responses over phases and blocks in Experiment 1 
 
 
As in the reaction times analysis, a two-way mixed-design ANOVA was conducted with 
Group as a between subject factor and Phase as a within-subjects factor (training and test). There 
was no significant main effect of Group (F(2,42) = 0.856, p = .432, η
2 
= .039). However, there 
was a significant main effect of Phase (F(1,42) = 10.822, p = .002, η
2 
= .205). Additionally, there 
was no significant Group x Phase interaction (F(2,42) = 1.892, p = .163, η
2 
= .083). 
For the label test phase, results follow the same pattern: there were no significant 
differences between groups (F(1,28) = .222, p = .641, η
2 
= .008). 
Within subject differences are due to the learning. Similarly to most of the experiments of 
this type, it is expected that participants will perform better in the test phase when they already 
know concepts compared to the entire training phase. 
 
These results do not support James‟ hypothesis. It seems that visual non-verbal labels, no 
matter if they are minimally or maximally different, do not affect concept learning and 
generalization. The reason for these effects we can interpret through low level learning of the 
labels. Additionally, there is possibility that non-verbal labels do not draw attention at the same 






3. EXPERIMENT 2 
As it was stated in the introduction, in this experiment the effects of auditory non-verbal 
labels and their effect on category learning and generalization were tested. 
Unlike previous labels, for which we used some linguistic or mathematical measures to 
create minimal and maximal difference, for auditory non-verbal labels, a norming study was 
conducted in order to identify minimally and maximally different stimuli. 
 
Norming Study 
In this study, 8 independent judges participated. Their task was to rate on a 7 point scale 
(1-completelly same to 7 maximally different) the overall difference between pairs of auditory 
stimuli they heard. Eight sounds were compared between each-other and the pair with the 
minimal average score (1.13) was selected as minimally different, while the pair with the 




The participants were thirty psychology students, who participated in the experiment for 
the course credit. Participants were randomly divided into two groups. In the first group, 
participants were presented with minimally different non-verbal auditory labels, while in the 
second group with maximally different ones. Data for the third group were taken from Chapter I 
(silent condition). 
Material and stimuli 
Materials and stimuli were completely the same as in the previous experiment, except 
that non-verbal auditory labels were used which were maximally and minimally different, based 
on the results from the norming study. 
All stimuli were digitally recorded natural sounds, which were cut and equalized in 
length (700ms) so that the type of the original sound could not be recognized (for example, the 
sound of a leaf while walking, which was over two seconds in total was reduced to 700ms). 
Selected minimally different labels were digitally altered in the programme Sound Forge 7. 
Digital wave recording of a minimally different pair is presented in the following picture (Figure 
II-5): 
 
               
 






In order to make these labels more inherent to the aliens, participants were told that these 
are sounds that aliens make (like their speech). Meaning, one group of aliens make one type of 
the sound while the other makes another type of the sound. 
 
Design and procedure 
Design and procedure were the same as in the previous experiment. 
 
Results and discussion 
Behavioural results 
In Reaction time analysis for each of the phases the following descriptive results were 
obtained (Table II-3): 
 
Table II-3: Descriptive results of reaction times (in milliseconds) in Experiment 2 
 
Group  N Mean St.Deviation 
Training nl_AUD_MIN 15 1007.27 353.95 
nl_AUD_MAX 15 1142.89 357.33 
Silent 15 955.64 307.42 
Test nl_AUD_MIN 15 965.30 401.63 
nl_AUD_MAX 15 1068.31 439.58 
Silent 15 790.99 273.60 
Label_test nl_AUD_MIN 15 880.65 229.22 
nl_AUD_MAX 15 933.56 400.65 
 
A two-way mixed-design ANOVA was conducted with Group as a between-subjects 
factor with three levels (minimal, maximal and silent) and Phase as a within-subjects factor with 
two levels (training and test). 
Results showed that there was no significant main effect of Group (F(2,42) = 1.958, p = 
.154, η
2 
= .085), no significant main effect of Phase (F(1,42) = 3.785, p = .058, η
2 
= .083) and no 
significant Phase x Group interaction (F(2,42) = .580, p = .564, η
2 
= .027). Finally, there were no 
significant differences in reaction times in label test phase (F(1,28) = .197, p = .660, η
2 
= .007). 
These results show that there are no differences in reaction times across conditions and 
that there was no eventual speed-accuracy trade off. 
 
Accuracy. Descriptive results for accuracy (percentage of correct responses) are 







Table II-4: Percentage of correct responses in Experiment 2 
 
Group  N Mean St.Deviation 
Training nl_AUD_MIN 15 76.20 15.12 
nl_AUD_MAX 15 76.16 15.29 
Silent 15 76.94 9.88 
Test nl_AUD_MIN 15 77.43 12.47 
nl_AUD_MAX 15 78.96 18.71 
Silent 15 77.71 15.61 
Label_test nl_AUD_MIN 15 54.72 8.87 





Figure II-6: Percentage of correct responses over phases and blocks in Experiment 2 
 
As in the reaction times analysis, a two-way mixed-design ANOVA was conducted with 
Group as a between subject factor and Phase as a within-subjects factor (training and test). There 
was no significant main effect of Group (F(2,42) = .010, p = .990, η
2 
= .000). Additionally, there 
was no significant main effect of Phase (F(1,42) = 2.515, p = .120, η
2 
= .057). Finally, there was 
no significant Group x Phase interaction (F(2,42) = .375, p = .690, η
2 
= .018). 
For the label test phase, results showed that there is a significant difference between 
groups (F(1,28) = 7.081, p = .013, η
2 
= .202) in favour of maximally different non-verbal labels 
which participants learned much better. 
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Results showed, like in the previous experiment, that there are no effects of auditory non-
verbal labels on category learning. Which is more interesting, there is a significant difference 




Results obtained in experiment 1 showed that there are no differences between maximally 
and minimally different visual non-verbal labels on category learning and generalization. 
Additionally, there are no differences in the level of labels learning between conditions, even 
though the level of learning of these labels was low (slightly above chance). Finally, none of 
these labels facilitated category learning or generalization, since there were no differences 
compared to the silent condition. 
In the experiment 2, similar results were obtained: there were no differences between 
participants who learned categories labelled with minimally different labels compared to those 
who learned them with maximally different labels. The same pattern was seen with 
generalization. There is a difference in label learning, since labels were better learned in a 
maximally different condition. However, this difference did not contribute to better category 
learning or generalization in this condition. And finally, as in the previous experiment, these 
labels did not facilitate category learning or generalization, since there were no differences 
compared to the silent condition. 
 
We can conclude that non-verbal labels do not facilitate category learning or 
generalization. This does not support James‟ hypothesis. The question is why are there no effects 
of non-verbal labels? 
 
As far as learning is concerned, first of the possible options is that attentional weights of 
non-verbal stimuli are not high enough to contribute to better learning. There are no researches 
which support this claim, but Sloutsky claimed that auditory stimuli overshadow visual ones and 
leads to higher levels of attention (Sloutsky, 2012). This higher attention levels in return leads to 
better learning. However, this is not the case here, since we had both auditory and visual non-
verbal stimuli, but the effects were the same, except that the auditory maximally different labels 
were learned better. 
This brings us to another possibility: the level of labels learning was low and that brought 
about minor effects in learning (and generalization). This claim cannot be accepted, since 
maximally different auditory labels were learned better, but this did not cause better learning (or 
generalization). 
Finally, the most probable possibility is that these labels represented one additional 
dimension which did influence the overall difference, but not sufficiently enough to be recorded. 
Based on the equations from the previous chapter, we can represent the effects of non-verbal 
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As we can see, there is one dimension of non-verbal labels, so the overall difference 
between two categories, and likewise probability that they will be learned, can be represented as 
follows: 
 
P (I,J) = diff(I,J)T = diff(I,J)*diff(IL,JL) 
 
Similar logic is used for generalization. Once labels and exemplars are learned, the 
overall difference of their representations will not be that high, so it will not bring any significant 
difference in generalization. 
 
The key problem in this segment is why there are effects of verbal labels, but there are no 
effects of non-verbal labels. This is one of the key questions of this dissertation which will be 



















C H A P T E R   III 
 
 
RELATION BETWEEN EFFECTS OF VERBAL AND NON-VERBAL LABELS 










In the previous two chapters, the effects of the auditory verbal and both auditory and 
visual non-verbal labels were examined. The question about their relation, or better to say, 
relation between their effects on category learning is relevant for several theoretical 
reasons/questions: 
- Is there supremacy of certain types of labels and why? This question is important since 
some authors claim that there is a special status of verbal labels, compared to other types of 
labels (Lupyan, 2012a). Furthermore, some authors claim that this supremacy of verbal labels 
compared to non-verbal labels is somehow innate, since labels serve as concept markers 
(Waxman & Markov, 1995). If it is shown that verbal labels are superior to non-verbal labels, it 
would go in favour of these hypotheses (but also, it would not prove it). On the other hand, if 
labels represent just another additional feature (Sloutsky & Fisher, 2004), it would be expected 
that there would be no difference between verbal or any other (including non-verbal) feature. In 
this case, we would expect that verbal and non-verbal labels would have the same effects on 
category learning. However, if there is a different effect of two types of labels, from Sloutsky‟s 
perspective, it could be assigned to different attentional weights. This raises another problem 
related to label modality. 
- Is there supremacy of label modality on category learning? Verbal labels are naturally 
auditory, while visual features are related to visual modality. If we accept the position that the 
conceptual level is not modality specific, for it is propositional (Pylyshyn, 1973; Fodor & 
Pylyshyn, 1988) or more probably distributed in nature (McClelland & Rogers, 2003; Rogers & 
McClelland, 2004), eventual differences across modalities we could expect not to be semantic, 
but most probably attentional in nature. In Sloutsky‟s terms, there should be a difference in 
attentional weights which are related to specific modality. These effects would be recorded on 
one modality only, independently from the nature of labels (verbal or non-verbal). 
Sloutsky‟s work falls partially in favour of this view, where he interpreted effects of 
verbal labels as cues which increase attention and consequently better retention of the cues and 
concepts. The problem with this is that these results are identified only in children, but not in 
adults (Sloutsky & Fisher, 2012). 
 
 
- Are labels unmotivated cues? If labels are unmotivated cues, as Edmiston and Lupyan 
claim (Edmiston & Lupyan, 2015), than any other unmotivated cue could produce the same 
effect as a verbal label. In our case, non-verbal labels are not in any particular way correlated to 
any variations within categories which the participants learned, so we can consider them as 





Prior to the discussion of different kinds of label effects, it is necessary to complete an 
entire set of different labels. The only type of labels that were not examined so far, are written 
verbal labels. Though, the effects of these types of labels will be examined. 
From the point of view of James‟ hypothesis, the label effects on category learning and 
generalization are expected. Furthermore, Lupyan used written labels in his research (Lupyan et. 
al., 2007) and obtained those effects compared to no label condition (silent condition). But what 
we want to test here is whether there are effects of maximally or minimally different written 
verbal differences on category learning and generalization. The aims and logic of the study is the 
same as in the first two chapters. 
 
Like in both previous chapters, electro-physiological measures were included (event-
related potentials) which are used to measure brain responses in each of the experiment phases 
(learning, generalization and testing). For the same reasons as in the previous chapters, it is 
expected that the cognitive load in the first half of the learning phase will be higher compared to 
the second half, manifested in higher P300 amplitude (Luck, 2014; Polich & Kok, 1995). 
Furthermore, it is expected that in the label test phase, there will be no difference in semantic 
expectances between minimal and maximal conditions, which will be manifested in the similar 
amplitude of N400 component (Luck, 2014; Kutas & Federmeier, 2011). 
 
2. EXPERIMENT 
In this experiment, the effects of phonologically minimally and maximally different 
verbal written labels on category learning were tested. Additionally, the effects of these labels 
compared to baseline (silent condition) were tested. Data for the silent condition were taken from 




Participants were thirty psychology students, who participated in the experiment for the 
course credit. The participants were randomly divided into two groups. In the first group, 
participants were presented with minimally, while in the second group with maximally different 
written verbal labels. Data for the third group were taken from Chapter I (silent condition). 
Material and stimuli 
Material and stimuli were the same as those in Chapter I, except that labels were written, 
instead of being spoken (džoset (/dʒoset/) and đoset (/dʑoset/) for minimal difference and ketsi 
(/ketsi/) and ubom (/ubom/) for maximal difference). 
Design and procedure 
The design and procedure were the same as in the first chapter, except that instead of the 






Figure III-1: Trial structure in the learning phase (phase I) 
 
As in the previous experiments, in each phase, brain potentials were recorded from the 
onset of the picture of the alien on the screen. 
 
Results and discussion 
Behavioural results 
Descriptive results in Reaction time analysis for each of the phases are presented in the 
following table (Table III-1): 
 
Table III-1: Descriptive results of reaction times (in milliseconds) 
 
Group  N Mean St.Deviation 
Training ver_VIZ_MIN 15 914.85 311.53 
ver_VIZ_MAX 15 873.14 191.76 
Silent 15 955.64 307.42 
Test ver_VIZ_MIN 15 881.07 320.08 
ver_VIZ_MAX 15 855.07 251.71 
Silent 15 790.99 273.60 
Label_test ver_VIZ_MIN 15 791.56 227.27 
ver_VIZ_MAX 15 699.78 154.97 
 
A two-way mixed-design ANOVA was conducted with Group as a between-subjects 
factor with three levels (minimal, maximal and silent) and Phase as a within-subjects factor with 
two levels (training and test). 
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Results showed that there was no significant main effect of Group (F(2,42) = 0.142, p = 
.868, η
2 
= .007), but there was a main effect of Phase (F(1,42) = 4.970, p = .031, η
2 
= .106). 
Additionally, there was no significant Phase x Group interaction (F(2,42) = 1.890, p = .164, η
2 
= 
.083). Finally, there were no significant differences in reaction times in the label test phase 
(F(1,28) = 1.670, p = .207, η
2 
= .056). 
The differences in Phase are due to learning: in the test phase, since participants learned 
categories, reacted slightly faster. Between groups, there are no differences in reaction times 
which mean that there was no eventual speed-accuracy trade off. 
Accuracy. Descriptive results for accuracy (percentage of correct responses) are 
presented in the following table and chart (Table III-2 and Figure III-2): 
 
Table III-2: Percentage of correct responses 
 
Group  N Mean St.Deviation 
Training ver_VIZ_MIN 15 67.82 13.50 
ver_VIZ_MAX 15 71.44 10.61 
Silent 15 76.94 9.88 
Test ver_VIZ_MIN 15 73.33 13.16 
ver_VIZ_MAX 15 78.47 11.07 
Silent 15 77.71 15.61 
Label_test ver_VIZ_MIN 15 67.29 15.88 









As in the reaction times analysis, a two-way mixed-design ANOVA was conducted with 
Group as a between subject factor and Phase as a within-subjects factor (training and test). There 
was no significant main effect of Group (F(2,42) = 1.317, p = .279, η
2 
= .059). However, there 
was a significant main effect of Phase (F(1,42) = 10.099, p = .003, η
2 
= .194). Additionally, there 
was no significant Group x Phase interaction (F(2,42) = 1.830, p = .173, η
2 
= .080). 
Finally, in the label test phase, there was no significant difference between the two 
groups (F(1,28) = 0.035, p = .854, η
2 
= .001). 
Within subject differences are due to learning. As in the experiments from previous 
chapters, it is expected that participants will perform better in the test phase when they already 
formed concepts compared to the entire training phase. 
Surprisingly, these results do not support James‟ hypothesis. The only difference between 
this experiment and the first experiment in the first chapter is that we used written, instead of 
spoken verbal labels. Additionally, Lupyan‟s results which were obtained in a similarly 
structured experiment are not replicated. 
One of the reasons for this difference could be in the sample size: in Lupyan‟s 
experiment, the sample was slightly larger. However, descriptive results obtained in this 
experiment are not supporting the possibility that a larger sample size could bring to different 
results. 
Another possibility is related to modality specific effects of labels. It might happen that 
auditory labels have higher attentional weights compared to visual ones. This property made 




The present experiment showed that there are no differences in written verbal labels on 
category learning. Furthermore, there are no differences between minimally and maximally 
different conditions. 
Lupyan‟s experiments showed that there are effects of written verbal labels (Lupyan et 
al., 2007). Furthermore, in the first chapter we showed that there are effects of auditory verbal 
labels. As we stated, one of the possibilities why this occurred might be due to the small sample 
compared to Lupyan‟s experiment. Furthermore, there is a possibility that auditory labels have a 
higher attentional weights and that they encouraged better learning and generalization. 
In the first chapter, we identified effects of auditory verbal labels on category learning 
and generalization. These effects were not identified with non-verbal labels (chapter II). These 
effects were absent, even when participants learned some labels better than others. With results 
from this chapter, all modalities and also verbal and non-verbal labels are examined. Further we 
can discuss the key question of this chapter: why verbal labels do facilitate category learning and 
generalization, while non-verbal labels do not? Specifically, what makes words special? 
As we noted in the introduction, Edmiston and Lupyan considered verbal labels superior 
compared to non-verbal labels (Edmiston & Lupyan, 2015). In their experiments, they tested 
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how words or non-verbal sounds, which are strongly associated to category members, activate 
conceptual knowledge. They showed that the name “dog” does not vary with different exemplars 
of dogs, while for example, different barks do (bigger dogs bark deeper than small dogs). For 
this reason, superiority effects of verbal labels are due to this partial association of category 
members to a non-verbal label (like a bark). Verbal labels are considered to be unmotivated cues, 
unlike barks which are motivated, since they are associated with one subcategory (those dogs 
that bark in the presented way). 
This interpretation cannot be accepted here, since all category members are associated 
with a label (visual or auditory, non-verbal or verbal). In these experiments, non-verbal labels are 
unmotivated cues in all cases, but similar effects as in Lupyan‟s experiment were not obtained. 
Another interpretation of superiority of verbal labels is given by Waxman and Gelman 
(Waxman & Gelman, 2009). Unlike non-verbal labels which associate, verbal labels refer to the 
category. This reference is more abstract, since verbal labels are linked to an abstract 
representation of an entire category. 
From this interpretation, we can conclude that Waxman and Gelman consider concept as 
a kind of a prototype, or abstract entity to which a name is related. This view is opposite from the 
one where concept consists of individual exemplars. 
There is also an alternative interpretation. If we go back to James‟ hypothesis, we can 
make some amendments on it, with which we will be able to interpret these results. Additional 
features (like a label) will increase discriminability between two categories. However, it might 
happen that the incremental effect of this feature will not be that big to bring a significant overall 
discriminability between categories. On the other hand, labels might increase discriminability in 
two different ways: by increasing attention or by increasing categories difference on multiple 
dimensions. 
Sloutsky claimed that auditory stimuli can increase attention, since auditory stimuli 
overshadow visual elements (Sloutsky, 2012). Likewise, in his SINC model, he suggested that 
attentional weights are higher for auditory stimuli. Since these weights are higher, participants 
learn better labelled categories (the additional effect of labels is that they bring overall 
similarity). 
In these experiments, we showed that there are no differences between auditory and 
visual non-verbal labels, so we can consider the argument that auditory stimuli leads to a higher 
level of attention incorrect. There is possibility that this is the case, but only for the verbal labels, 
not non-verbal. 
On the other hand, there is possibility that verbal labels do not represent only one 
dimension. It might happen that labels represent multi-dimensional element, which increases 
dissimilarity between categories named with them. We identified three dimensions of verbal 
label difference (phonological structure, sonority gradient for alveolar/post-alveolar sounds and 
vowel position). It might happen that these dimensions combined represent an additional feature 




Concerning the generalization, we can follow a similar pattern to learning. Since 
attention is essential only for learning, we will here focus on labels as a feature of increasing 
category differences on multiple dimensions. Once stored, non-verbal labels influence 
discrimination between concepts, but this discrimination is not that high, since there is only one 
dimension. On the other hand, verbal labels differ on several dimensions, and their influence on 
overall dissimilarity between the two concepts is higher, which leads to better internal 
discrimination and also to better generalization. This happens when typical features of the 
categories are related to several, but not only one dimension. Additionally, each of the three 
dimensions of verbal labels is associated to typical features of categories, which will additionally 
emphasise them in the process of activation. 
 
Proposed interpretation could be integrated in the Category based on the difference level 
model presented in the first chapter. Both category differences and label differences were 
calculated as in the first chapter, except that label difference was calculated for one dimension 
only (previous chapter). 
 
      (     )   ∏     
 
   
       
 
From the equation it is visible that there is only one dimension, unlike 3 in the equation 
calculating verbal label difference. This means, if we have similar values for S and D, this 
difference would be considerably significantly lower compared to the one labelled with verbal 
labels. 
The overall difference would be similarly calculated with the equation from the previous 
chapter, based on which we can calculate probability that these categories would be learned: 
 
P (I,J) = diff(I,J)T = diff(I,J)*diff(IL,JL) 
 
However, there is one problem with this kind of interpretation: labels are presented after 
the feedback was given, not before. It might happen that this feature (label) does not contribute 
to the difference directly as other visual features do. 
If the label was given simultaneously with the object, participants would focus on labels 
solely and learning would be completed after several trials. In this case, attentional weights of 
labels would be close to 1 and the overall difference would be high, which would lead to instant 
learning. On the other hand, even if labels are not presented along with visual stimuli, they do 
need to be learned and are associated with exemplars in the learning process. In order to describe 
this influence on the difference, we can assign lower attentional weights to the labels compared 
to the case when they are presented with a visual object. However, at this moment we can only 
speculate about the values of these attentional weights. 
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Another potential problem which could influence the results and conclusions of these 
experiments is the fact that participants did not learn labels that well, except for the maximal 
auditory condition. However, the fact that participants learned maximal auditory labels better 
that the others, did not lead to faster learning or higher generalization, as it was in the case of the 
experiments with verbal labels. From this we can conclude that non-verbal labels do not have 
influence on learning or generalization, no matter if they are learned or not. 
Further discussion of attentional weights and labels learning in general, will be further 

















C H A P T E R   IV 
 
 
EFFECTS OF ATTENTION ON LABELS INDUCED BY EXPERIMENTAL 











In previous chapters, it was demonstrated that auditory verbal labels, unlike non-verbal 
labels, produce effects on category learning and generalization. Those effects were assigned to 
label learning which consequently leads to a higher conceptual difference. Apart from objective 
differences of categories, learning also relies on attention. The reason why attention is important 
is its high correlation with learning. Some classical research on attention, which used the 
shadowing task (Cherry, 1953; Broadbent, 1958) tested effects of attention through learning. 
Results showed that a more attended object will be more easily discriminated and learned faster. 
In the calculation model presented in previous chapters that described category learning, 
one of the elements contributing to category difference/ learning was attention or attentional 
weights. It is supposed that once these weights are higher, participants will be more capable to 
identify differences between categories with certain features and consequently learn those 
categories easier. 
According to the model, each visual feature and label had its attentional weights. Hence, 
we can identify two types of attention contributing to the learning: attention to visual properties 
and attention to labels. 
As far as visual properties are concerned, especially those of living creatures (real or 
imaginary), some parts of the object are more attended to than others (for example, Batinic, 
Lalic, Taxitari & Kovic, 2015). Meaning, the head is usually more attended to than the tail or 
legs. Furthermore, this attention depends on individual strategies of the participants. However, 
since visual properties in all previous experiments were the same across conditions, we can 
consider that eventual differences in strategies would be averaged and consequently diminished. 
A more interesting problem is attention to the labels, since in this dissertation, labels are different 
across experiments. 
In previously stated research (Batinic, Lalic, Taxitari & Kovic, 2015) the effects of labels 
on category learning were tested. Results showed that participants did not learn better categories 
that were labelled, but those in which certain features were more salient. Similarly to the 
experiments in this dissertation, labels were completely task redundant. However, participants in 
this study were not instructed to learn labels, so they could simply ignore them and complete the 
task independently. 
We can presume that attention to labels in the mentioned study was lower than in the 
experiment presented in this dissertation. One of the questions this research raises is: what are 
the effects of lower attention to labels in categorization tasks in general? One possibility is that 
labels will be ignored and categories will be learned in the same way as without labels. In this 
way, effects of labels identified in previous experiments will not be recorded. If effects are 
identified, they can be assigned to higher attention to visual features induced by the simple 






A further possibility is that labels will not be learned at the same level as when attention 
is high, which will consequently lead to a lower generalization (as presented in the previous 
chapters). Finally, there is a possibility that labels will be learned, no matter if participants are 
instructed to learn them or not. In this way, similar effects as in the previous experiments in this 
dissertation should be obtained. 
 
From a theoretical perspective, we can predict some of the outcomes of the experiment 
without instruction. Relying on James‟ hypothesis, we can presume that once labels are less 
attended, the effects on learning of labelled categories will be smaller compared to the cases 
when labels are attended. Consequently, effects of less attended labels on category learning will 
not be recorded or will be significantly smaller compared to the effects of more attended ones. 
Additionally, these expectations could be deduced from Lupyan‟s hypothesis, according to 
which labels influence concepts only once they are learned (Lupyan, 2012a; Lupyan, 2012b; 
Lupyan & Thompson-Schill, 2012). 
As far as non-verbal labels are concerned, there is a similar view. From James‟ 
perspective, we could not expect effects of labels for the same reason as in the previously stated 
expectation. Furthermore, since results from Chapter II showed that there were no effects of non-
verbal labels when experimental instruction was present, we also do not expect these effects to 
be obtained once instruction is not present and consequently labels are not attended. 
 
The aim of this chapter is to identify effects of absence of experimental instruction 
(meaning lower attention to labels) on category learning. It is expected that the effect of labels on 
category learning and generalization will be identified only if there are explicit instructions given 
to the participants to learn the labels. If participants do not get the explicit instruction, the effects 
should be smaller or non-existent.  
For this purpose, three experiments were designed in which the effects of instruction on 
category learning were tested: for verbal labels, spoken and written (experiment 1 and 2) and 
non-verbal labels (experiment 3). In experiment 3, only visual non-verbal labels were used, since 
in Chapter II, effects of both types of non-verbal labels were not obtained even when instruction 
was present. 
 
The design and stimuli were completely replicated from the previous chapters, except 









2. EXPERIMENT 1 
In this experiment, the effects of minimally and maximally different auditory verbal 




Participants were thirty psychology students, who participated in the experiment for the 
course credit. Participants were randomly divided into two groups. In the first group, participants 
were presented with minimally, while in the second group with maximally different spoken 
verbal labels. Data for the no labelled condition were taken from Chapter I (the first 15 
participants). 
Material and stimuli 
Material and stimuli were completely the same as those in chapter one (minimally and 
maximally different). 
Design and procedure 
The design and procedure were the same as in the first chapter, except that participant 
received different instruction. Instead of getting the instruction to pay special attention to labels 
and to make efforts to remember them (as in all previous experiments), they received no 
instruction related to labels, except that labels will be presented. 
 
Results and discussion 
Descriptive results in Reaction time analysis for each of the phases are presented in the 
following table (Table IV-1): 
 
Table IV-1: Descriptive results of reaction times (in milliseconds) in Experiment 1 
 
Group  N Mean St.Deviation 
Training NI_ver_AUD_MIN 15 1064.64 530.80 
NI_ver_AUD_MAX 15 905.47 254.76 
Silent 15 955.64 307.42 
Test NI_ver_AUD_MIN 15 1012.50 346.24 
NI_ver_AUD_MAX 15 910.69 255.58 
Silent 15 790.99 273.60 
Label_test NI_ver_AUD_MIN 15 779.65 221.01 
NI_ver_AUD_MAX 15 922.25 401.60 
 
A two-way mixed-design ANOVA was conducted with Group as a between-subjects 
factor with three levels (minimal, maximal and silent) and Phase as a within-subjects factor with 
two levels (training and test). 
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Results showed that there was no significant main effect of Group (F(2,42) = 1.086, p = 
.347, η
2 
= .049). However, there was a significant main effect of Phase (F(2,42) = 4.641, p = 
.037, η
2 
= .100). Additionally, there was no significant Phase x Group interaction (F(2,42) = 
2.323, p = .110, η
2 
= .100). 
Finally, there was no significant difference in reaction times in the label test phase 
(F(1,28) = 1.452, p = .238, η
2 
= .049). 
These results show that there are no differences in reaction times across groups and that 
there was no eventual speed-accuracy trade off. The differences between phases are due to 
learning: once participants learn categories, they tend to react much faster than in the training 
phase. 
Accuracy. Descriptive results for accuracy (percentage of correct responses) are 
presented in the following table and chart (Table IV-2 and Figure IV-1): 
 
Table IV-2: Percentage of correct responses in Experiment 1 
 
Group  N Mean St.Deviation 
Training NI_ver_AUD_MIN 15 71.16 13.64 
NI_ver_AUD_MAX 15 76.90 13.72 
Silent 15 76.94 9.88 
Test NI_ver_AUD_MIN 15 78.47 16.31 
NI_ver_AUD_MAX 15 76.60 18.43 
Silent 15 77.71 15.61 
Label_test NI_ver_AUD_MIN 15 70.35 18.31 




Figure IV-1: Percentage of correct responses over phases and blocks in Experiment 1 
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As in the reaction times analysis, a two-way mixed-design ANOVA was conducted with 
Group as a between-subjects factor and Phase as a within-subjects factor with two levels 
(training and test). 
There was no significant main effect of Group (F(2,42) = .131, p = .878, η
2 
= .006). 
Furthermore, there was a marginally significant main effect of Phase (F(1,42) = 3.426, p = .071, 
η
2 
= .075). Finally, there was a marginally significant Group x Phase interaction (F(2,42) = 
2.889, p = .067, η
2 
= .121, shown in the Figure IV-2). This marginally different interaction is due 
to the relation between maximally and minimally different conditions. This is visible when the 
silent condition is removed – interaction reaches significance (F(1,28)=4.453, p = .044, η
2
=.137). 
In the label test phase, there was no significant difference between the two groups 






Figure IV-2: Interaction between training and test phase in Experiment 1 
 
The obtained results showed that the effects on category learning we found in Chapter I 
disappear once instruction is removed. Additionally, there is a marginally significant interaction 
between Phase and Group. This interaction (as we can see from the Figure IV-2) is due to the 
minimal difference condition, since there is a lower score in the training compared to test phase, 
while the other two conditions have a similar pattern for both phases. Meaning, once there is no 
instruction, participants learn poorer if labels are minimally different, but generalization is the 
same, no matter if participants learned concepts labelled with maximally or minimally different 
labels (or not labelled). This data is even more interesting if we notice that there is no difference 
between groups in the level of learned labels, since there are no differences in the label test 
phase. It seems that similar level of labels learning leads to same generalization, but a minimally 
different condition brings some kind of an inhibition in the learning process, even though 




Comparison with results from the experiment with instruction 
In order to get complete picture of the effects of the instruction, we need to compare the 
results from experiments where the instruction is given with those where instruction is not given. 
For this purpose, results from this experiment and results from Experiment 1 from the first 
chapter will be compared. These two experiments are completely the same, except the difference 
in instructions. The first 15 participants for each condition (minimal and maximal) from the first 
experiment in the first chapter were taken for the further analysis. 
For reaction times analysis, a two-way mixed-design ANOVA was conducted with Group 
as a between-subjects factor with four levels and Phase as a within-subjects factor with two 
levels (training and test). 
Results showed that there was no significant main effect of Group (F(3,56) = 1.654, p = 
.187, η
2 
= .081). Furthermore, there was no significant main effect of Phase (F(1,56) = 1.208, p = 
.276, η
2 
= .021). Additionally, there was no significant Phase x Group interaction (F(3,56) = 
0.861, p = .467, η
2 
= .044). Finally, there was no significant difference in reaction times in the 
label test phase (F(3,56) = 2.519, p = .067, η
2 
= .119). 
These results showed that participants responded with similar speed across conditions. 
This means that there was no speed-accuracy trade off. 
 
Accuracy. Descriptive results for all five experimental conditions are together presented 











As in the reaction times analysis, a two-way mixed-design ANOVA was conducted with 
Group as a between-subjects factor with four levels (minimum and maximum difference in both 
experiments) and Phase as a within-subjects factor with two levels (training and test). 
There was no significant main effect of Group (F(3,56) = 2.029, p = .120, η
2 
= .098). 
However, there was a significant main effect of Phase (F(1,56) = 18.562, p < .001, η
2 
= .249). 
Finally, there was a significant Group x Phase interaction (F(3,56) = 3.907, p = .013, η
2 
= .173, 
shown in the Figure IV-4). 
 







Figure IV-4: Interaction between training and test phase 
 
From the Figure IV-4, it is obvious that interaction is induced by a maximally visual 
difference, which does not follow similarity between phase patterns as in the rest of the 
conditions. It seems that maximally different labels without instruction do not bring a higher 
generalization compared to learning as other conditions. Furthermore, concerning the relation of 
previously stated effects of minimally different labels without instruction and its relations to the 
ones with instruction, we can presume that there is possibility that minimally different labels in 
general lead to category learning inhibition. However, since labels lead to better generalization, 
this effect is recorded in the test phase. This is obvious with maximally different labels without 






3. EXPERIMENT 2 
In this experiment, the effects of minimally and maximally different written verbal labels 




The participants were thirty psychology students, who participated in the experiment for 
the course credit. Participants were randomly divided into two groups. In the first group, 
participants were presented with minimally, while in the second group with maximally different 
written verbal labels. Data for the no labelled condition were taken from Chapter I (the first 15 
participants). 
Material and stimuli 
The material and stimuli were completely the same as those in Chapter III. 
Design and procedure 
The design and procedure were the same as in the previous chapter, except that 
participants received different instruction. Instead of getting the instruction to pay special 
attention to labels and to make an effort to remember them (as in all previous experiments), they 
received no instruction related to labels, except that labels will be presented. 
 
Results and discussion 
Descriptive results in Reaction time analysis for each of the phases are presented in the 
following table (Table IV-3): 
 
Table IV-3: Descriptive results of reaction times (in milliseconds) in Experiment 2 
 
Group  N Mean St.Deviation 
Training NI_ver_VIZ_MIN 15 1129.90 275.83 
NI_ver_VIZ_MAX 15 979.36 354.99 
Silent 15 955.64 307.42 
Test NI_ver_VIZ_MIN 15 1015.28 311.04 
NI_ver_VIZ_MAX 15 975.65 342.83 
Silent 15 790.99 273.60 
Label_test NI_ver_VIZ_MIN 15 881.30 210.03 
NI_ver_VIZ_MAX 15 848.34 299.43 
 
A two-way mixed-design ANOVA was conducted with Group as a between-subjects 
factor with three levels (minimal, maximal and silent) and Phase as a within-subjects factor with 





Results showed that there was no significant main effect of Group (F(2,42) = 1.700, p = 
.195, η
2 
= .075), but there was a significant main effect of Phase (F(1,42) = 10.052, p = .003, η
2 
= 




Finally, there was no significant difference in reaction times in the label test phase 
(F(1,28) = 0.122, p = .730, η
2 
= .004). 
These results show that there are no differences in reaction times across groups and that 
there was no eventual speed-accuracy trade off. Again, there was a difference between phases, 
which we can presume is due to learning. 
Accuracy. Descriptive results for accuracy (percentage of correct responses) are 
presented in the following table and chart (Table IV-4 and Figure IV-5): 
 
Table IV-4: Percentage of correct responses in Experiment 2 
 
Group  N Mean St.Deviation 
Training NI_ver_VIZ_MIN 15 73.43 9.49 
NI_ver_VIZ_MAX 15 69.12 16.70 
Silent 15 76.94 9.88 
Test NI_ver_VIZ_MIN 15 81.46 10.98 
NI_ver_VIZ_MAX 15 75.35 22.14 
Silent 15 77.71 15.61 
Label_test NI_ver_VIZ_MIN 15 68.41 20.13 










As in the reaction times analysis, a two-way mixed-design ANOVA was conducted with 
Group as a between-subjects factor and Phase as a within-subjects factor with two levels 
(training and test). 
There was no significant main effect of Group (F(2,42) = 0.660, p = .522, η
2 
= .030). 
However, there was a significant main effect of Phase (F(1,42) = 14.705, p < .001, η
2 
= .259). 
Finally, there was a marginally significant Group x Phase interaction (F(2,42) = 2.800, p = .072, 
η
2 
= .118). Unlike with the previous experiment, this marginal interaction is induced with a silent 




In the label test phase, there was no significant difference between groups (F(1,28) = 
.011, p = .916, η
2 
= .000). 
These results showed that there is no significant difference between minimal and 
maximal group, no matter which type of instruction the participants received. This is the same 
pattern of results as in chapter three, where instructions were presented. To further specify these 
effects, we need to compare them with results from chapter three. 
 
 
Comparison with results from the experiment with instruction 
Similarly, as in previous experiment, results will be compared to the experiment with 
instruction from the third chapter. 
For reaction times analysis, a two-way mixed-design ANOVA was conducted with 
Group as a between-subjects factor with four levels (minimum and maximum difference in both 
experiments) and Phase as a within-subjects factor with two levels (training and test). 
Results showed that there was no significant main effect of Group (F(3,56) = 1.628, p = 
.193, η
2 
= .080). Furthermore, there was no significant main effect of Phase (F(1,56) = 2.675, p = 
.108, η
2 
= .046). Additionally, there was no significant Phase x Group interaction (F(3,56) = 
0.909, p = .443, η
2 
= .046). 
Finally, there were no significant differences in reaction times in the label test phase 
(F(3,56) = 1.810, p = .156, η
2 
= .088). 
The results showed that participants responded with similar speed across conditions. This 
means that there was no speed-accuracy trade off. 
 
Accuracy. Descriptive results for all five experimental conditions are presented together 












Figure IV-6: Comparison of percentage of correct responses over phases and blocks 
 
 
As in the reaction times analysis, a two-way mixed-design ANOVA was conducted with 
Group as a between-subjects factor with four levels (minimum and maximum difference in both 
experiments) and Phase as a within-subjects factor with two levels (training and test). 
There was no significant main effect of Group (F(3,56) = 0.788, p = .506, η
2 
= .040). 
However, there was a significant main effect of Phase (F(1,56) = 30.422, p < .001, η
2 
= .352). 
Finally, there was no significant Group x Phase interaction (F(3,56) = 0.199, p = .896, η
2 
= .011). 





It seems that written verbal labels with instructions do not have influence on category 
learning, since in all four conditions, results have similar pattern. This is not in favour of James‟ 
hypothesis and Lupyan‟s experimental results.  It seems that effects of verbal labels are tied to 
modality: verbal labels can influence concepts learning and generalization only if they are 









4. EXPERIMENT 3 
In this experiment, the effects of minimally and maximally different visual non-verbal 
labels on category learning without instruction were tested. Since in chapter two the effects of 





The participants were thirty psychology students, who participated in the experiment for 
the course credit. Participants were randomly divided into two groups. In the first group, 
participants were presented with minimally, while in the second group with maximally different 
visual non-verbal labels. Data for the no labelled condition were taken from Chapter I (the first 
15 participants). 
Material and stimuli 
The material and stimuli were completely the same as those in Experiment 1 in Chapter 
II. 
Design and procedure 
The design and procedure were the same as in the chapter two, except that participants 
received different instruction. Instead of being given the instruction to pay special attention to 
labels and to make efforts to remember them (as in all previous experiments), they received no 
instruction related to labels, except that labels will be presented. 
 
Results and discussion 
The descriptive results in Reaction time analysis for each of the phases are presented in 
the following table (Table IV-5): 
 
Table IV-5: Descriptive results of reaction times (in milliseconds) in Experiment 3 
 
Group  N Mean St.Deviation 
Training NI_nvr_VIZ_MIN 15 967.23 371.81 
NI_nvr_VIZ_MAX 15 989.72 349.90 
Silent 15 955.64 307.42 
Test NI_nvr_VIZ_MIN 15 961.28 340.05 
NI_nvr_VIZ_MAX 15 896.32 331.12 
Silent 15 790.99 273.60 
Label_test NI_nvr_VIZ_MIN 15 803.62 114.31 
NI_nvr_VIZ_MAX 15 888.17 285.15 
 
In reaction times analysis, a two-way mixed-design ANOVA was conducted with Group 
as a between-subjects factor with three levels (minimal, maximal and silent) and Phase as a 
within-subjects factor with two levels (training and test). 
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Results showed that there was no significant main effect of Group (F(2,42) = 0.346, p = 
.709, η
2 
= .016), but there was a significant main effect of Phase (F(1,42) = 7.762, p = .008, η
2 
= 




Finally, there were no significant differences in reaction times in the label test phase 
(F(1,28) = 1.136, p = .296, η
2 
= .039). 
Again, these results show that there are no differences in reaction times across groups and 
that there was no eventual speed-accuracy trade off. The difference in phases is due to learning. 
Accuracy. Descriptive results for accuracy (percentage of correct responses) are 
presented in the following table and chart (Table IV-6 and Figure IV-7): 
 
Table IV-6: Percentage of correct responses in Experiment 3 
 
Group  N Mean St.Deviation 
Training NI_nvr_VIZ_MIN 15 73.47 11.30 
NI_nvr_VIZ_MAX 15 69.40 13.05 
Silent 15 76.94 9.88 
Test NI_nvr_VIZ_MIN 15 76.60 17.06 
NI_nvr_VIZ_MAX 15 73.82 13.19 
Silent 15 77.71 15.61 
Label_test NI_nvr_VIZ_MIN 15 61.11 18.64 










As in the reaction times analysis, a two-way mixed-design ANOVA was conducted with 
Group as a between-subjects factor and Phase as a within-subjects factor with two levels 
(training and test). 
 
There was no significant main effect of Group (F(2,42) = 0.780, p = .465, η
2 
= .036). A 
main effect of Phase was marginally, but still not significant (F(1,42) = 3.478, p = .069, η
2 
= 




In the label test phase, there was no significant difference between groups (F(1,28) = 
1.520, p = .228, η
2 
= .051). 
These results follow a similar pattern as the results we found in chapter two: there are no 
effects of non-verbal labels on category learning. For further conclusions, a comparison between 
two conditions (with and without instruction) is needed. 
 
 
Comparison with results from the experiment with instruction 
A comparison between obtained results from this experiment and results from 
Experiment 1 from the first chapter will be conducted. These two experiments are completely the 
same, except the difference in the instructions given. 
 
For reaction times analysis, a two-way mixed-design ANOVA was conducted with 
Group as a between-subjects factor with four levels (minimum and maximum difference in both 
experiments) and Phase as a within-subjects factor with two levels (training and test). 
Results showed that there was no significant main effect of Group (F(3,56) = 0.344, p = 
.794, η
2 
= .018). However, there was no significant main effect of Phase (F(1,56) = 0.583, p = 
.048, η
2 
= .010). Additionally, there was no significant Phase x Group interaction (F(3,56) = 
0.918, p = .438, η
2 
= .047). 
Finally, there were no significant differences in reaction times in the label test phase 
(F(3,56) = 0.406, p = .749, η
2 
= .021). 
Results showed that participants responded with similar speed across conditions. This 
means that there was no speed-accuracy trade off. Concerning the difference in phases, it can be 
assigned to learning. 
 
Accuracy. Descriptive results for all five experimental conditions are presented together 









Figure IV-8: Comparison of percentage of correct responses over phases and blocks 
 
As in the reaction times analysis, a two-way mixed-design ANOVA was conducted with 
Group as a between-subjects factor with four levels (minimum and maximum difference in both 
experiments) and Phase as a within-subjects factor with two levels (training and test). 
There was no significant main effect of Group (F(3,56) = 0.586, p = .627, η
2 
= .030). 
However, there was a significant main effect of Phase (F(1,56) = 14.814, p < .001, η
2 
= .209). 
Finally, there was no significant Group x Phase interaction (F(3,56) = 0.310, p = .818, η
2 
= .016). 




Again, results showed that there were no effects of all types of visual non-verbal labels 
on category learning, no matter if there is experimental instruction or not. Participants learned 




In this chapter, the effects of instruction on labelled category learning were tested. 
Results showed that instruction can affect attention and also the learning of labels, which 
consequently can lead to results which depend on label type and modality. 
Auditory verbal labels do not lead to better category learning when there is no instruction 
in the experiment. Additionally, the pattern of learning and the generalization of maximally 
different label condition and silent condition are similar, while minimally different condition is 
learned slower, but generalized similarly as in the other two conditions. This effect could be 
assigned to learning inhibition of minimally different label conditions, rather than the facilitation 
of maximally different condition. 
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Compared with those results obtained in the experiments with instruction (Chapter I), 
results showed that there is no difference between conditions, but there is a significant effect of 
interaction. This interaction is induced by a maximally different condition without instruction 
which is learned better than minimally different conditions, but generalized the same as those 
two. Furthermore, there is no difference between learning and generalization in this condition, 
while it is present for other three. 
Written verbal labels also do not bring better learning or generalization. Unlike auditory 
verbal labels, there was no interaction between the factors. Finally, non-verbal labels do not have 
effects on category learning, no matter if there is instruction or not. 
For all three types of labels, expectations from the introduction section were confirmed: 
labels do not lead to the effects in learning and generalizing when instruction that they need to be 
learned is omitted. But before we proceed with further interpretation, it is necessary to check the 
assumption whether we managed to manipulate attention on labels during the experiment. We 
were not sure whether participants would pay less attention to labels when there is no instruction. 
After obtaining the results, which showed that there are effects on learning while other 
experimental conditions were the same, we can conclude that the attention on labels was lower 
compared to the experiments where instruction was present. Further, those effects will be 
specified. 
The most interesting effects were obtained with auditory verbal labels. Concerning the 
learning, we identified that maximally different labels without instruction did not have effects on 
category learning, unlike maximally different labels with instruction. We can assign these effects 
to lower attention on verbal labels which was induced by instruction. This result is in line with 
James‟ hypothesis. 
Concerning a minimally different condition without instruction, learning was slower than 
in silent and with a maximally different condition. This means that participants paid some 
attention to labels and that these labels brought to an inhibition to category learning. 
Additionally, a minimally different condition without instruction was not different from a 
minimally different condition with instruction This signifies that minimally different labels could 
lead to a learning inhibition, no matter if there is instruction or not. 
This is in line with James‟ hypothesis: once there are more similar elements, categories 
are learned slower. Minimally different labels represent another highly similar element. The 
problem is why participants still paid attention on minimally different labels, when they did not 
on maximally different labels? There is a possibility that these labels are less distinctive, which 
brings attention of the participants to identify differences. On the other hand, maximally different 
labels are, at the first glance, different, and are not further inspected, since they were task 
redundant. 
Concerning the generalization, maximally different labels without instruction did not 
lead to better generalization. For the similar reasons like in learning, we presume that these 
effects are due to lower level of label learning, which decreases generalization once they are 
learned. This is in line with Lupyan‟s view, but also in line with James‟ hypothesis. 
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As far as minimally different labels without instruction are concerned, they also do not 
lead to better generalization, but this does not differ from maximally different or the silent 
condition. We can presume that labels do not allow for better generalization, since they are not 
learned well and hence do not differ from the no-label condition. This is in line with Lupyan‟s 
view, and also with James‟ hypothesis. 
 
The obtained results fit into the previously proposed Category learning based on the 
difference level model. According to the model, the probability of labelled category learning is 
calculated with the following equation: 
 
 (   )      (   )    ∏      ∏     
 
   
 
   
 
 
Meaning, the total difference between categories relies on the level of visual features 
difference and label difference, but also on their attentional weights. Since in this experiment 
only attentional weights of labels were manipulated, we will interpret this section. 
If label attention weight is higher, this leads to higher discriminability and a higher 
probability that categories will be learned. This is the case when labels are maximally different 
and the instruction is present. Once there is no instruction, categories will be less discriminable 
and consequently learned slower and generalized poorer. 
In the case of minimally different labels, due to the nature of the labels, the absence of 
instruction does not lead to lower attention compared to maximally different labels without 
instruction. This makes learning and generalization similar to the minimally different condition 
with instruction. However, since labels are minimally different and adhered to visual features, 
this discriminability is lower, which leads to slower learning in minimally different condition. 
The only remaining question is why generalization for minimally different condition does 
not differ from the silent one when labels are attended? The possible answer is that a learned 
category relies only on visual features, but not on labels. Even attended, these labels are not 
learned better and that is why their effects are diminished. Further possibility is that, as 
maximally different labels in Experiment 1 reached ceiling effects, we have here a kind of a 
bottom effect, where generalization cannot be lower. 
 
As previously stated, the effects of written verbal and non-verbal labels were not 
identified, no matter if there was instruction or not. As far as written verbal labels are concerned, 
apart from the reasons stated in the previous chapter, we can presume that there is higher 
attention across modalities (for example, Allport, Antonis, and Reynolds, 1972). Once labels are 
written (meaning visual) they are in the same modality as visual features. The problem with this 
explanation is that labels and objects are not presented at the same time, which means that there 
is a lower possibility that they will interfere. However, it partially remains unclear why written 




As far as non-verbal labels are concerned, their effect on category learning is the same 
with or without instruction. In the computational model in Chapter II it was specified that these 
labels represent only one dimension, unlike verbal labels which represent at least three. When 
attention is higher (not extremely high!), the value of this one dimension will not significantly 
contribute to the category difference as a multi-dimensional verbal label would. Hence, 
categories will not be learned faster and generalized better. This effect is even more significant 
















C H A P T E R   V 
 
 
EFFECTS OF LABEL DIFFERENCES ON CATEGORY LEARNING – 










In Chapter I, effects of verbal label differences on category learning were tested. In the 
conclusions of that chapter, it was stated that there are indications that the relationship between 
the level of label differences and their effects on category learning might be linear. Support to 
this conclusion was the effect of middle different labels, which lay between the effects of 
maximally and minimally different labels. It was also stated that testing this relationship would 
be very difficult with behavioural experiments, since it would be necessary to create several (at 
least ten) difference levels and to conduct experiments for each of them. Additionally, samples in 
those experiments should be significantly higher than in the experiments we conducted, for it 
would be very difficult to reach any significant level for small difference effects of labels. 
However, there is a method to solve this problem and to get an understanding of the 
relationship between the level of label difference and their effects on category learning. That 
method is connectionist cognitive modelling. If we create a neural network which can 
demonstrate our findings, we can manipulate the level of difference between labels and test how 
many epochs are necessary to train the network to discriminate two categories. In this way, we 
can explore the functional relationship between label difference and the effects it has on category 
learning, which could be linear, exponential or logarithmic (chapter I). Additionally, a neural 
network that can demonstrate results obtained in the previous experiments that could lead to the 
conclusion what are the internal (in the brain) relationships between words and concepts. 
It was stated that it “could lead to the conclusion” for a reason, since one can never be 
sure whether things really work that way. In connectionist modelling, there is always the 
possibility of „creating the network that works the way we want‟. The aim of this chapter is not 
to create the model that will be the same as the one in the brain, but which could present “one of 
the possibilities”. Additionally, there is a problem of reductionism. Once we explain behavioural 
data with a connectionist network, we are moving from behavioural to a deeper level. Even 
though this approach is thought provoking and can be often revealing, it would be wrong to 
consider it as the only possible explanation of the behavioural data. 
Some of the first connectionist models of semantic memory (in psychology) were the 
ones developed by Hinton (Anderson & Hinton, 1981) and by Rumelhart (Rumelhart, 
McClelland & the PDP Research Group, 1986; Rumelhart, 1993; McClelland & Rogers, 2003). 
The influence of the latter author was far more widely accepted. 
In order to simulate Quillian‟s hierarchical model, Rumelhart developed a model of 
association between concepts (plants and animals) and their attributes. The network consisted of 
three layers: representation, hidden and attributes. An additional layer (on the representation 
level) was the relation (isa, is, can, has). 
After the training, a network successfully demonstrated relations between attributes and 
concepts. Additionally, the model demonstrated similar effects after it was damaged (as in the 
process of dementia), when essential differences between concepts were much longer preserved 
compared to specific attributes of the concepts. 
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Further development of this model was proposed by McClelland as the complementary 
learning system theory (McClelland, McNaughton & O‟Reilly, 1995; McClelland & Rogers, 
2003). This model predicts the existence of two learning systems; fast-learning and slow-
learning. The former is hippocampal and occurs sometime after only one trial, while the slow-
learning system is cortical and occurs at a slow pace. 
There were some other connectionist models of semantic memory and learning, such as 
the ALCOVE model, developed by Kruschke and Nosofsky (Kruschke, 1992; Nosofsky, 
Kruschke, McKinley, 1992). This model demonstrated exemplar based category representation 
and learning, the model which was described in the introduction of this dissertation. 
However, for our topic, the most relevant are the models that include verbal labels and 
demonstrate their effects on category learning. In last couple of years, there is a growing interest 
in cognitive models describing the effects of verbal labels on categorisation in childhood 
(Capelier, Twomey &Westermann, 2016, Twomey & Westermann, 2016, Twomey & 
Westermann, 2018). One such model was mentioned in the introduction chapter: the dual-
memory model developed by Westermann and Mareschal (Westermann & Mareschal, 2014). 
The model predicted two types of memory: the fast-learning hippocampal system and the slow-
learning cortical system. The model consisted of a three layered neural network, with an input, 
and a representation layer, which consisted of two parts: cortical and hippocampal (mutually 
interconnected) and an output layer from both systems (Figure V-1). Finally, the model included 




Figure V-1: Dual memory model (from Westermann & Mareschal, 2014) 
 
Once categories are labelled with the global level labels, two principal components from 
the cortical representation units show much better differentiation between the categories, 
compared to non-labelled ones. Furthermore, once the verbal input is turned into an output, 
results show that labels are not just an additional feature, but rather object markers in a specific 
way: they do not make objects more similar, but representations of objects which are labelled are 
getting more prototypical, which is induced by label representation. In other words, labels are 
incorporated in object representation and are part of a so called compound representation 
(Twomey & Westermann, 2016; Capelier-Mourguy, Twomey & Westermann, 2016). 
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On the other hand, connectionist models that simulate effects of labels on categorisation 
in adults are significantly less frequent. One of the rare models is one developed by Gary Lupyan 
with which he demonstrated his Language augmented thought hypothesis Lupyan (Lupyan, 
2012a). 
The model consisted of three layers: perceptual, conceptual (representation) and a label 
level. All these levels were interconnected in two ways (Figure V-2). This interconnection could 
activate perceptual and label levels both internally and externally. The model learned two types 
of categories: goodies and baddies, which had some common features and some category 
specific features (which were produced by the function of probability). 
In the learning phase, the model firstly learned naming trials, where the inputs were the 
visual features and output the name of the category. On the comprehension trials, the model 
needed to output visual features based on the name of the category and finally, on naming + 
comprehension trials, the model needed to produce both names and visual features, when 




Figure V-2: Language augmented thought cognitive model (from Lupyan, 2012a) 
 
In testing, firstly, the labels were disconnected from the representational level, so the 
model could reproduce a word, but it could not feed-back to the conceptual level. In the second 
type of testing, the feed-back from labels was included, but labels needed to be reproduced (they 
were not externally provided). In the final type of testing, labels were provided externally. In all 
testing trials, weights between nodes in the network were frozen. 
Once labels are prevented from feeding back, the model significantly less effectively 
classified novel stimuli. This could be seen from the conceptual layer activation after principal 
component analysis. Based on this, it could be concluded that there are strong effects of labels on 
a representational level, which strongly goes in favour of the language augmented thought 
hypothesis. 
The main aim of this chapter is to develop the model which will demonstrate label 
differences on category learning. Meaning, the aim is to demonstrate effects obtained in the 
experiments from the first chapter of this dissertation, where the effects of the phonological 
difference of verbal labels are recorded. Furthermore, this model should be able to demonstrate 
functional dependence between label difference and category learning. 
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For that purpose, a feed-forward neural network was created. This network has three 
layers: input, hidden (representation) and an output layer. There are two types of inputs: one for 
visual features of the stimuli and the other for the labels. The back propagation learning 
algorithm was used, the most frequently used learning algorithm for psychological studies. 
 
2. METHOD 
In this model, the connectionist network attempts to demonstrate the effects of label 
difference on category learning. Nine different models of networks are designed and trained with 
label pairs of various levels of difference. 
Network design 
The basic network used for all models has three levels: input, representation and an 
output (Figure V-3). 
 
 
Figure V-3: Model of effects of label differences on category learning 
 
Input level consists of two parts: visual stimuli and labels. Visual stimuli represents visual 
features of two categories properly coded (described below). It has 24 nodes. On the other hand, 
labels represent verbal input, which is also coded and has 17 nodes (also described below). There 




Output level consists of a single node, which represents categorisation of the input (good 
or bad) with binary values (1 and 0 respectively). 
Representation level consists of nodes which are in between input and output. This level 
is implemented as integrated representation (both for visual features and labels) and consists of 
15 nodes. This makes the representation level compressed compared to visual or label input. 
The number of nodes is determined by the number of inputs and outputs: primarily, it 
should be less than the number of inputs. Since there are 24 nodes of visual features, the number 
of representation level nodes should be lower than 24. Furthermore, the number of nodes should 
not be too low, since the total number of input nodes in most of the models is 41. Finally, since 
the output is a single node, too high a number of hidden nodes is not desirable. Taking all 
previous arguments into consideration, a number of 15 nodes is considered to be optimal. 
 
Stimuli 
Visual stimuli. Coding of visual stimuli contained the following elements: common 
features (8 nodes) and category specific features (16 nodes). Since YUFO stimuli used in these 
experiments differed on two features: the head and the base, each of these features are coded 
with 8 nodes. 
Binary coding was used, where each node has a value 1 or 0. Category differences were 
coded as the following: for the first category (let us say “good”), the first four nodes of the 
feature are zeros (invariable), while the other four nodes are variable (for example – 0000.1101) 
in which within category specificities are coded. For the second category (let us say “bad”), the 
last four nodes describing visual features are invariable zeros, while the first four are variable 





Common features are always coded as 10101010. 





It is obvious that the values for the first eight nodes are always the same (10101010), 
while the following four of the “good” category are always zeros and the last four are within 
category specific values. It is the same for the “bad” category. 
Complete values for 8 training tokens per each category and an additional 4 testing 






Table V-1: Coding system for visual input 
 
 Category of “good” aliens Category of “bad” aliens 
Common features Head Base Head Base 
10101010 0000.0001 0000.0001 0001.0000 0001.0000 
10101010 0000.1010 0000.1010 1010.0000 1010.0000 
10101010 0000.0011 0000.0011 0011.0000 0011.0000 
10101010 0000.1100 0000.1100 1100.0000 1100.0000 
10101010 0000.0101 0000.0101 0101.0000 0101.0000 
10101010 0000.0110 0000.0110 0110.0000 0110.0000 
10101010 0000.0111 0000.0111 0111.0000 0111.0000 
10101010 0000.1000 0000.1000 1000.0000 1000.0000 
10101010 0000.1001 0000.1001 1001.0000 1001.0000 
10101010 0000.0010 0000.0010 0010.0000 0010.0000 
10101010 0000.1011 0000.1011 1011.0000 1011.0000 
10101010 0000.0100 0000.0100 0100.0000 0100.0000 
 
Labels. One of the possibilities to code label differences is to use the three levels of 
differences used in Chapter I, where labels differed on three dimensions: the phonological 
structure of the label, sonority gradient and vowel position. Another possibility is to describe 
minimally and maximally different label pairs and to establish the scale between these two 
extremes. 
 
The second approach will be implemented. In order to deeper describe the phonological 
difference between labels, based on linguistic measures, the following table of difference 
between maximally different labels (ketsi/ubom) and minimally different labels (dʒoset/ dʑoset) 
is constructed: 
 
Table V-2: Quantified differences between maximally and minimally different labels 
 
 
Maximum Difference Minimum  Difference 
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17 





From the table, it is obvious that the maximal difference between labels is quantified as 
17 and minimal as 1. Coding should satisfy this form, so the labels should differ maximally (at 
least) 17 points. 
In order to construct such labels, 17 nodes are needed. If labels differ on each node 
difference it would be maximal (for example 00000000000000000 vs 11111111111111111). 
Minimal difference will be represented only on the difference on one node (for example 
11111111111111111 vs 11111111111111110). 
Since 9 difference levels are needed, coded labels with the following numbers are 
constructed: 1, 3, 5, 7, 9, 11, 13, 15 and 17. The values of the coded labels are given in the 
following table (with a highlighted difference of label 2 compared to label 1): 
 
Table V-3: Coded labels and difference levels (the different bits in label 2 are highlighted) 
 
Difference level Coded label 1 Coded label 2 
1 1.0101.0101.0101.0101 1.0101.0001.0101.0101 
3 1.0101.0101.0101.0101 1.0100.0100.0101.0001 
5 1.0101.0101.0101.0101 1.0110.0110.0101.0001 
7 1.0101.0101.0101.0101 1.0110.0110.0011.0001 
9 1.0101.0101.0101.0101 1.0110.0110.1011.0011 
11 1.0101.0101.0101.0101 1.0110.1110.1011.0010 
13 1.0101.0101.0101.0101 0.0010.1110.1011.0010 
15 1.0101.0101.0101.0101 0.1010.1110.1010.0010 
17 1.0101.0101.0101.0101 0.1010.1010.1010.1010 
 
Procedure 
Training/Learning. In order to simulate conditions of the experiments conducted in this 
dissertation, each of the trials within the epoch in network training will consist of two sub-trials: 
visual and visual + label. 
A visual sub-trial will consist of the input from the visual nodes (24 nodes) plus 
invariable label input for all groups (0.5 for all label nodes). The latter is for the reason that 
participants do not hear the verbal label before the feedback, so the constant value of the label 
(0.5 for each node) simulates absence of verbal input. Since the participants in the experiment 
receive the feedback before they hear the label, after the visual sub-trial, the response will be 
checked and error correction propagated. 
The second sub-trial consists of both verbal and label input. This sub-trial simulates 
exposition of the label to the participants in the experiment. An adult person can relate the label 
to the visual features, even though it was seen only after the feedback. After hearing the feedback 
and seeing/ hearing the label, adults can relate these two and this relation can be considered as a 
feedback. For this reason, error correction is propagated also after the second sub-trial. 
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The training lasts until the network successfully classifies all members within the epoch 
in the appropriate group (good or bad). Within each epoch, all stimuli are presented in random 
order. After all stimuli within a block are presented, the next block starts with the same stimuli. 
In network training, each of 9 models was trained with the same (randomly selected) 
starting weights. 
The function used in hidden layer nodes was tan-sig, while in the output layer nodes the 
function used was log-sig. The learning rate was adaptive and the scaled conjugate gradient 
algorithm was used. The network was trained and tested using the Matlab 2019a programme. 
Testing. In testing, all weights within the network are frozen. Each model is tested for 
four additional stimuli per category (similarly as in behavioural experiment) and no label or 
feedback is presented. Learning is assessed by percentage of correct classifications. 
Each of the models (for each level of difference) was trained and tested for the number of 
sets (N sets) and the average number of epochs were taken as a measure of network learning 
speed (for training) and the average number of successfully classified novels within category 
stimuli as a measure of classification accuracy (in testing). This method was used since stimuli 
are deterministic and easy to learn. Consequently, within model variability it may be present and 
possibly distort effects of label difference on network training in one set. A higher number of 
trainings will demonstrate relatively stable properties of the models. 
The number of training sets (N) that were selected was 20, 40 and a 100. It is considered 
that N = 100 different training sets will be a sufficient number of sets for confident conclusions 
regarding the relation between two variables. On the other hand, N = 20 was selected, since there 
were 20 participants in the experiments in Chapter I. Finally, N = 40 was selected since it is a 
measure between the two extremes, which could indicate a possible trend on the scale of number 




Training was conducted on different numbers of training sets (N=20, 40 and 100). 
Obtained results are shown in the following table (Table V-4): 
 
Table V-4: Average training epochs for each model related to the difference level 
Level of difference Average of 20 sets Average of 40 sets Average of 100 sets 
1 65.05 64.3 64.39 
3 65.25 65.9 64.99 
5 65.05 64.82 64.35 
7 63.25 64.15 63.51 
9 62.2 62.77 63.16 
11 61.45 62 61.4 
13 61.15 60.87 60.84 
15 59.1 59.75 59.49 










Figure V-4: Number of learning epochs for levels of label differences for 20, 40 and 100 
training sets 
 
As we can see from the obtained results, even if we change the number of training sets, 
the trend of results remains the same: small differences of labels lead to almost the same rate of 
learning categories. However, after a certain point (in this case difference of 7) a higher 
difference of labels, leads to easier learning of categories and this trend becomes almost linear. 
Differences between the number of epochs is not high (maximum 8 epochs), but also, the 
number of learning epochs is small (as it was stated previously, for the reason that input 
properties are deterministic). Since the network was trained in a number of different sets (up to 






The obtained learning rate induced by label difference can be used for approximation of 
the function of dependence between two variables. Using visual inspection, there are two 
probabilities of an underlying function: linear or polynomial (quadratic). There is a possibility to 
use the even polynomial cubic function, but there is a probability of over-fitting the data. 
Approximation is conducted on the results from 100 training sets. Approximation of 




Figure V-5: Approximation function (linear & quadratic) of training epochs vs. label difference 
 
Obtained functions from these two approximations are the following: 
 
y = -0.42*x + 66 – linear function 
y = -0.02*x
2
 – 0.019*x + 65 – quadratic function 
 
where y is the number of epochs and x is the level of label difference. 
 
The norm of residuals from the linear function is 1.79, while for the quadratic function it 
is 0.89. This measure shows that the quadratic function approximates data much better compared 
to the linear function. 








Figure V-6: Residuals of linear (red) and quadratic (blue) function 
 
The obtained results, perfectly fit the data obtained in the experiments from Chapter I of 
this dissertation: as labels differ more, the effects on category learning are higher, meaning, 
categories are learned easier. However, this effect is not radical in the sense that small 
differences lead to huge consequences, but rather to the smaller but stable consequences. Since 
the sample in Chapter I was 20 students per group, it explains why there could not be an 
identified statistically significant difference between the middle difference and the maximal 
difference group, while there was a difference between minimal and maximal. It is highly 
probable that this significance would have been reached if the sample had been higher. 
 
Testing 
In network testing, each of 9 models were tested with new stimuli a number of times (N = 
20, 40 and 100). For each of the models, the success rate was 100%, which is somehow 
expected, since stimuli were deterministic and easy to learn and generalize. 
 
4. DISCUSSION 
In this chapter, nine different models of neural networks were trained, each with the same 
visual input, but different label pairs with different levels of “phonological” difference. The 
network was trained in the manner to simulate input from the experiments conducted in Chapter 
I of this dissertation. The output was a single node representing classification of presented 
stimuli to one of the two groups (good and bad). 
Results showed that the network learns faster once there is higher phonological difference 
of the labels, except for smaller differences between them. These learning rate differences are not 
enormous, but are steady and constant with an evident trend. These results perfectly fit the data 
obtained in Chapter I of this dissertation. 
The interpretation of these results can be taken from different points of views: James‟ 
hypothesis, Lupyan‟s language augmented thought hypothesis and Westermann‟s compound 
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representation approach. Additionally, we can interpret these results from the hypothesis 
developed in this dissertation: category learning based on the difference level. 
From the point of view of James’ hypothesis (James, [1931 (1890)]), which was the 
leading hypothesis of this dissertation, these results are completely expected: once labels are 
adhered to the concepts, and these labels are more different, the effects of learning will be 
evident.  However, the problem with this interpretation is related to representation: implicitly it 
was considered that James‟ hypothesis considers the existence of two different types of 
representation: visual and verbal. Both of these representations are independent, which is not the 
case with the model we trained. 
As far as Lupyan‟s Language augmented thought hypothesis is concerned (Lupyan et al., 
2007; Lupyan, 2012a), a faster learning rate of concepts labelled with phonologically more 
different labels is not expected. The reason why labelled concepts are learned faster is because 
the labels are also learned in the process and they feedback activation of typical features of the 
concepts. No phonological differences between labels participate in such a process. 
Additionally, Lupyan proposes (similarly like James) the independent existence of the 
representation of labels and concepts, which feed forward each other‟s activation. This is not the 
case in our model, since representations of objects (hidden layers in the network) are not 
separated. 
Finally, there is a possible interpretation from Westermann‟s compound representation 
approach (Westermann & Mareschal, 2014; Twomey & Westermann, 2016; Capelier-Mourguy, 
Twomey & Westermann, 2016). Concepts are represented with labels together, not 
independently, which is what was obtained in this model. Even though Westermann never 
explicitly mentioned the possibility of effects of label differences, this is very probable: as much 
as categories (including labels) are different, hidden levels will represent those differences. 
The final interpretation can be given from the position of category learning based on the 
difference level model. As labels are more different, the probability that labelled categories will 
be learned is higher. From Chapter I, this relation was expressed with following equation: 
 
P (I,J) = diff(I,J)T = diff(I,J)*diff(IL,JL) 
 
meaning, the probability of learning two categories depends on the level of difference of 
not only their visual features, but also the difference between their labels. 
This model does not presume whether representations of the labels are separated from 
representation of visual features or they are represented together. The model from this chapter 
amends this portion, demonstrating that these two representations are joint, or in Westermann 
terms, compound. 
There are several consequences of this kind of interpretation: 
1. All kinds of differences between inputs, whether it is visual or auditory, are relevant. 
The difference in label features is added up to the differences of visual features. This level of 
compound differences between categories is then relevant for category learning pace. 
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2. Possible differences between modalities are related to the modality or different coding 
induced by specific modality. 
3. Representation level is not modality specific. No matter if visual features are visual 
and labels phonological, on a conceptual level, they are similarly coded. 
Further interpretation of these results, will be presented in the conclusions of this 
dissertation. 
Something that the model did not demonstrate, but which was demonstrated in the 
experiments in Chapter I, were the effects of label difference on generalization. All nine models 
successfully generalized novel stimuli with a 100% success, which was not the case in the 
behavioural experiments. 
One of the reasons why this was the case could be the fact that the model learned up to 
the point when no mistakes were made in the entire epoch, which was not the case in the 
behavioural experiments. The training in the behavioural experiments was limited to nine blocks 
and the average success of the participants never reached 100%. Since training was not 100% 
successful, it is expected that test will not be 100% successful as well. 
 
Finally, in this chapter, one major theoretical problem was not mentioned: the effects of 
non-verbal labels on category learning, even though this problem was analysed in this 
dissertation and it was predicted to be modelled. It appeared that it is a more difficult task than 
predicted, since it was not possible to successfully implement any of the previously mentioned 
theoretical backgrounds in the model and to demonstrate the effects obtained in the experiments 
with non-verbal labels. The closest to that was the model in which non-verbal labels were 
considered as moderately complex (presented with 9 input nodes) in which differences between 
labels did not show any significant difference in effects on category learning (which were 
obtained in the experiments in this dissertation). However, in this model, network learned 
categories faster compared to the ones modelled with “verbal labels”, which was not the case in 
the experiments. One of the reasons for these results might be that network learns faster once the 
number of inputs is lower. 



































The aim of this chapter is to summarise results obtained in this dissertation. Furthermore, 
the aim, tasks, general and specific hypotheses stated in the introductory chapter will be 
recapitulated and individually elaborated. Additionally, general interpretation of the obtained 
results with existing and newly developed theoretical views will be integrated. Finally, in the last 
section, general conclusions of the dissertation will be stated. 
 
 
1. SUMMARY OF THE OBTAINED RESULTS AND HYPOTHESES TESTING 
 
Chapter I – Effects of verbal label differences on category learning 
The primary problem of the first chapter of this dissertation was the following: 
- Are the categories labelled with phonologically different words more easily learned 
compared to the categories labelled with phonologically similar words? This problem includes 
analysis of different level of similarity between verbal labels and its influence on concept 
formation. 
 
Based on this problem, the general task of the first chapter was to identify effects of the 
level of phonological differences of verbal labels on category learning, using behavioural and 
neuro-physiological measures. 
 
Founded on previously elaborated theoretical perspectives, the general hypothesis of this 
chapter was the following: Learning of categories labelled with phonologically different verbal 
labels will be faster and more easily generalized compared to the categories labelled with 
phonologically similar labels. 
 
The Specific hypotheses were defined in the first chapter, and included the following: 
- Categories labelled with phonologically more different verbal labels are learned faster 
and generalized better. 
This hypothesis was confirmed. Participants learned faster and generalized better 
categories that were labelled with phonologically maximally different labels, compared to those 
labelled with minimally different labels, as it was demonstrated in Experiment 1 of this chapter. 
 
- There is a continuum of effects of phonological labels differences. Meaning, categories 
labelled with middle different labels will be learned faster and generalized better compared to 








This hypothesis was not fully confirmed. However, there are some indices that this 
continuum exists: while there were significant differences between maximal and minimal 
condition, the middle condition was not significantly different from either of them. This could 
indicate that this difference lies somewhere in between the two conditions. 
 
- Categories labelled with maximally phonologically different labels are learned faster 
and generalized better compared to the no label condition (silent). This effect is higher compared 
to the effects of minimally different labels. 
This hypothesis was partially confirmed. Maximally different labels do have an effect on 
category learning and generalization compared to the no label (silent) condition. However, this 
was not the case for minimally and middle different labels. Additionally, it is an important 
finding that obtained interaction in the Experiment 1 indicates that labels for the last two 
conditions do not have effects on learning, but do have effects on generalization. Meaning, 
labelled categories with minimally and middle different labels were not learned better compared 
to the no labelled categories, but were generalized better compared to them. 
 
- Effects of label differences can be assigned to phonological difference, rather than to 
sound symbolism, even though the effects of sound symbolism could also be identified. 
This hypothesis was confirmed. In Experiment 2 of the first chapter it was demonstrated 
that there were no significant differences between maximally different labels conditions with or 
without sound symbolism. Even some previous research produced these differences, we could 
not identify them, probably due to the “ceiling effect”. Furthermore, it was demonstrated that 
phonological difference has an independent effect on category learning and generalization 
compared to sound symbolism. 
 
Concerning the general hypothesis, we can conclude that the hypothesis was confirmed. 
Learning of categories labelled with phonologically different verbal labels was faster and 




Chapter II – Effects of non-verbal labels on category learning 
The primary problem of the second chapter of this dissertation was the following: 
- Do non-verbal labels (visual and auditory) with different levels of similarity have 







Based on this problem, the general task of the first chapter was to identify the effects of 
the level of differences of non-verbal labels on category learning, using behavioural and neuro-
physiological measures. 
 
Founded on previously elaborated theoretical perspectives, the general hypothesis of this 
chapter was the following: Learning of categories labelled with phonologically different non-
verbal labels will be faster and easier generalized compared to the categories labelled with 
phonologically similar labels. 
 
The specific hypotheses were defined in the second chapter, and included the following: 
- Categories named with maximally different visual non-verbal labels will be learned 
faster and generalized better compared to those labelled with minimally different non-verbal 
labels. 
This hypothesis was not confirmed. While there were the effects of label differences on 
category learning with verbal labels, these effects were not present with visual non-verbal labels. 
 
- There is an overall effect of maximally different visual non-verbal labels, compared to 
the no label (silent) condition. 
This hypothesis was also not confirmed. Maximally different visual non-verbal labels do 
not lead to better learning or better generalization compared to the silent condition. 
 
- Categories named with maximally different auditory non-verbal labels will be learned 
faster and generalized better compared to those labelled with minimally different non-verbal 
labels. 
This hypothesis was not confirmed. While there were the effects of label differences on 
category learning with verbal labels, these effects were not present with auditory non-verbal 
labels. 
 
- There is an overall effect of maximally different auditory non-verbal labels, compared 
to the no label (silent) condition. 
This hypothesis was also not confirmed. Maximally different visual non-verbal labels do 
not lead to better learning or better generalization compared to the silent condition. 
 
Concerning the general hypothesis of this chapter, we can conclude that this hypothesis 
was not confirmed. Non-verbal labels do not have any statistically significant effect on category 








Chapter III – Relation between effects of verbal and non-verbal labels on category 
learning 
The primary problem of the third chapter of this dissertation was the following: 
- What is the relationship between the effects of verbal and non-verbal labels on category 
learning? 
 
Based on this problem, the general task of the third chapter was to identify relations 
between the effects of verbal and non-verbal labels on category learning, using behavioural and 
neuro-physiological measures. 
 
Founded on previously elaborated theoretical perspectives, the general hypothesis of this 
chapter was the following: Linguistic and non-linguistic labels (visual or auditory) have the same 
effects on category learning. 
In order to check this hypothesis, a comparison of the effects obtained in chapter I and 
chapter II needed to be tested. Prior to this comparison, the effects of the written verbal labels on 
category learning needed to be measured. 
 
The specific hypotheses defined in the third chapter were the following: 
- Categories labelled with phonologically more different written verbal labels are learned 
faster and generalized better. 
This hypothesis was not confirmed. Unlike the effects obtained for maximally different 
auditory verbal labels compared to minimally different labels, written verbal labels do not differ 
regarding the effects on category learning.  
 
- Categories labelled with maximally phonologically different written verbal labels are 
learned faster and generalized better compared to the no label condition (silent). This effect is 
higher compared to the effects of minimally different labels. 
This hypothesis was also not confirmed. Unlike with the auditory verbal labels, learning 
categories with written verbal labels do not differ from the non-labelled ones. 
 
Finally, related to the general hypothesis of the chapter, only auditory verbal labels have 
effects on category learning. In this sense, categories labelled with maximally different auditory 







Chapter IV – Effects of attention on labels induced by experimental instruction on 
category learning 
The primary problem of the fourth chapter of this dissertation was the following: 
- Whether the attention on labels induced by experimental instruction can produce effects 
on category learning and generalization? This problem also includes the question whether 
phonological difference of labels can have different influences on category learning? 
 
Based on this problem, the general task of this chapter was to identify the effects of 
experimental instruction on category learning, using behavioural measures. 
 
Founded on previously elaborated theoretical perspectives, the general hypothesis of this 
chapter was the following: Experimental instructions in which it is explicitly required from the 
participant to learn the label will have a higher effect on category learning, compared to the 
experiment in which there are no experimental instructions. 
 
The specific hypotheses defined in this chapter were the following: 
- More attended auditory verbal labels will have higher effects on category learning and 
generalization. 
This hypothesis was confirmed for maximally different labels. Once there is no 
experimental instruction, the effects of maximally different verbal labels are not recorded. 
Effects for minimally different verbal labels are reflected in the fact that there is an inhibition in 
the learning, but not in the generalization process. Furthermore, effects of maximally different 
labels without instruction on learning are the same, both in learning and in generalization 
compared to a non-labelled condition. 
 
- More attended visual verbal labels will have higher effects on category learning and 
generalization. 
This hypothesis was not confirmed simply because more attended visual verbal labels did 
not produce any effects on category learning. 
 
- More attended non-verbal labels will have higher effects on category learning and 
generalization. 
Similarly as with the previous hypothesis, this hypothesis was not confirmed, because 
more attended non-verbal labels did not produce any effects on category learning. Likewise, 
similar effect was recorded with non-attended ones. 
 
Concerning the general hypothesis, we can conclude that the hypothesis was confirmed. 
Learning and generalization of categories with explicit instruction that labels need to be learned 





Chapter V – Effects of label differences on category learning – connectionist 
modelling approach 
The primary problem of the fifth chapter of this dissertation was the following: 
Is it possible to create cognitive models which will be able to demonstrate obtained 
results from the previous experiments? Furthermore, is it possible to reveal functional 
dependencies between levels of label difference on category learning? 
 
Based on this problem, the general task of the first chapter was to create physiologically 
plausible cognitive models which will demonstrate the effects of label differences on category 
learning. 
 
Founded on previously elaborated theoretical perspectives, the general hypothesis of this 
chapter was the following: It is possible to create physiologically plausible cognitive models 
which will demonstrate effects of label difference on category learning. 
 
The specific hypotheses defined in this chapter were the following: 
- A developed connectionist model can demonstrate effects of label differences on 
category learning. 
This hypothesis was confirmed. The model that was developed in Chapter V does 
demonstrate effects of label differences on category learning. Once labels are more different, 
categories are learned faster compared to categories labelled with less phonologically different 
labels. 
 
- A developed connectionist mode can record functional dependence between label 
difference and category learning. 
This hypothesis was also confirmed. In Chapter V the functional dependence between 
different levels of label difference and category learning was demonstrated. This 
interdependence is rather quadratic than linear, but also a linear function can explain much of the 
variance of the model. 
 
- A developed connectionist model can demonstrate different effects of verbal and non-
verbal labels on category learning. 
This hypothesis was not confirmed. Since this problem was more complex than expected, 
work on this was left for further research. 
 
Concerning the general hypothesis, it can be considered to be confirmed, since it was a 





2. GENERAL INTERPRETATION OF THE OBTAINED RESULTS 
In this section, the obtained results from previous chapters will be interpreted from the 
point of view of different theoretical perspectives. These interpretations will be separated for 
behavioural and connectionist modelling results. In the final section, these interpretations will be 
integrated. 
Concerning the behavioural results, the following perspectives will be analysed: James‟ 
hypothesis, Lupyan‟s language augmented thought hypothesis, cognitive development approach 
(Waxman‟s view of labels as conceptual markers and Sloutsky‟s view of labels as object 
features). Finally, the alternative category learning based on the difference level approach will be 
presented. 
Concerning the connectionist modelling results, the results will be interpreted from the 
perspectives of James‟ hypothesis, Lupyan‟s language augmented thought hypothesis and 
Westermann‟s compound representation approach. Again in the end, results will be interpreted 
from the point of view of Category learning based on the difference level approach. 
 
 
INTERPRETATION OF BEHAVIOURAL RESULTS 
James’ hypothesis 
According to James‟ hypothesis (James, [1931 (1890)]), once categories are adhered with 
more distinct elements, these elements drag those categories apart and make them more distinct. 
Thus, it is easier to learn them and consequently easier to generalize from them. As we saw from 
the Introduction and Chapter I, these elements could be many different things, including labels. 
Once categories are named, since names are more distinct, categories will be learned faster and 
generalized better.  
This hypothesis perfectly explains results obtained with auditory verbal labels. If verbal 
labels are maximally different, they lead to faster learning and better generalization of categories. 
However, categories labelled with minimally different labels, are learned more difficult than 
those labelled with maximally different labels. It is expected that there is a continuum between 
phonological difference of labels and category learning and generalization. 
The problem with James‟ hypothesis is related to the effects of non-verbal labels on 
category learning. This hypothesis was not capable to explain these results. According to James‟ 
hypothesis, there is nothing inherently different between verbal or non-verbal labels, while they 
are distinct enough to bring category differences to a higher level. However, results from these 
experiments proved differently: verbal labels (auditory) do have effects on category learning and 
generalization, which is not the case with non-verbal ones and more surprisingly, with written 
verbal labels. As we noted previously, some authors (Waxman & Gelman, 2009; Lupyan, 2012a) 
claimed that words have a special status. 
Generally, James‟ hypothesis was the basic hypothesis of this dissertation. Since this 
hypothesis fails to give a full explanation of the phenomena described in this dissertation, we 
need to look for alternative explanations. 
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Lupyan’s language augmented thought hypothesis 
As it was noted in the introduction, Lupyan‟s language augmented thought hypothesis 
considers mutual interdependence between thought and language (Lupyan, Rakison & 
McClelland, 2007; Lupyan, 2012a; Lupyan, 2012b; Lupyan, 2015; Edmiston & Lupyan, 2015). 
Concepts are connected to labels in the long term memory. Once a concept or a specific 
exemplar is activated, it activates the labels, which in return loops back and activates typical 
features of the category. In that way, the most typical elements of the category are activated, 
which makes category a more “categorical”. Additionally, concerning the effects of verbal labels 
compared to non-verbal labels, Lupyan considers verbal labels as unmotivated cues which are 
related to all category members, unlike some non-verbal motivated cues which are related to 
some specific subcategories. 
Lupyan‟s hypothesis explains well the way in which labelled categories are learned, 
which was his main hypothesis in his seminal work (Lupyan et al., 2007). Simply, labelled 
categories are learned faster, since in the process of learning labels, they increase typicality of 
the category and makes identification easier of typical features of the category. 
Furthermore, Lupyan explains well the process of generalization. As it was noted, labels 
activate the most typical features of the categories. In that way, labelled categories will be 
generalized better, compared to the ones which are not labelled. 
There are however, some findings in this dissertation which cannot be explained by 
Lupyan‟s hypothesis. In the first place, how maximally different labels bring to faster learning 
and generalization compared to minimally different labels? Lupyan‟s hypothesis does not 
recognize the possibility that the level of label difference can influence learning and 
generalization of the categories. 
According to Lupyan‟s hypothesis, every label, no matter if it is different to the other 
label or not is equally effective in boosting categorical salience. Two categories which have 
either highly different or highly similar labels will be equally learned and generalized. However, 
findings in this dissertation, especially those in the first chapter, proved the opposite. 
Additionally, one notable problem is the difference between effects of verbal and non-
verbal labels. According to Lupyan, once these labels are unmotivated cues, there should be no 
difference in their effects on category learning and generalization (Edmiston & Lupyan, 2015). 
However, in this dissertation, we proved differently. In Chapter II, we demonstrated that 
non-verbal labels, even if they were unmotivated cues (labels did not vary with some elements of 
the categories), effects on category learning and generalization were not identified. It seems that 
there is a special status of words in human memory, but this status should be assigned to some 
other property, rather than its unmotivated nature. 
In the further text, we will try to additionally examine the nature of verbal labels 
compared to the non-verbal ones. Unfortunately, there are not many theories which were 
developed for adults in this area. Lupyan‟s language augmented thought is one of the rare. For 
that reason, we need to turn to theories created in developmental cognitive psychology, hoping 




Cognitive development approach 
As it was stated previously, this approach will be split in two basic views: Waxman‟s 
view of labels as conceptual markers and Sloutsky‟s view of labels as object features. 
- Labels as conceptual markers. As stated in the introductory chapter, this theory was 
developed by Waxman and her associates (Waxman, 1991; Waxman & Markov, 1995; 
Fulkerson & Waxman, 2007; Waxman & Gelman, 2009). This theory views labels as conceptual 
markers which refer to categories. In this sense, referring means that labels are related to more 
abstract category members, compared to any individual category member ever seen or which will 
ever be seen (Waxman & Gelman, 2009). This means that labels serve as an invitation to form 
categories. 
Non-verbal labels do not have this kind of property. They do not serve as an invitation to 
form category. For that reason, once the categories are labelled with verbal labels, they are 
learned faster and generalized better. 
We can only presume where this property of labels comes from, since Waxman does not 
specify the nature of this property. One of the possibilities is that we have inner instinct (or 
nature) to interpret verbal labels as something that marks categories. Implications of this view 
would be that there is a kind of a meta-categorical disposition in human brains, which is innate 
and which content is filled with specific experience. 
This view is in a sense close to rationalistic philosophy, very close to the views of Plato, 
Descartes, Leibniz or Kant. Even though this view is very interesting and thought provoking, it 
opens additional questions, on which this theory does not give explicit answers, such as: where 
this verbal labels invitation property comes from and what is its nature? 
This explanation is in a sense still scientifically valid. For example, we still do not know 
what in essence electricity is, but science developed an enormous body of knowledge related to 
the implementation of the electricity. This kind of theory gives us a good inspiration for 
empirical research which reveals many effects of verbal labels on concepts development and 
learning. 
However, a problem with this kind of theories is that often the same results one can 
interpret differently. For example, once you say that verbal labels represent invitation to form 
category, you can interpret all results where effects of verbal labels on category learning are 
recorded, not giving a precise explanation how these effects work. Similarly, results in this 
dissertation could be interpreted this way. However, unless you are capable to demonstrate how 
these mechanisms are conducted, the given explanation is only partially valid. 
Finally, there are some results obtained in this dissertation which cannot be explained by 
this theory, such us: how to explain the effects of verbal label difference level? If labels represent 
invitation to form categories, they would do it equally, no matter if they are phonologically 




- Labels as object features view. This view was developed by Vladimir Sloutsky and his 
associates (Sloutsky & Lo, 1999; Sloutsky & Fisher, 2004; Sloutsky & Fisher, 2012; Sloutsky, 
2010) and it represents a coherent view of child concept development. While Waxman‟s model 
is in a sense an extension of rationalistic philosophy, this model strongly relies on empiricist 
tradition. 
According to this view, labels are not category markers, but rather object features, just 
like any other feature. Once categories share the same name, this name contributes to their 
overall similarity, which leads to the more probable conclusion that the two exemplars are 
members of the same category. 
Sloutsky further specifies his claims in his SINC (Similarity Induction Naming 
Categorisation in young children) model (described in the introductory chapter), where he 
calculates the probability of categorising a certain exemplar in a given category. Probability will 
be higher, if the exemplar is more similar to the other members of the category. By using 
multiplicative rule, some very different elements could lead to very high differences between the 
given exemplar and the other category members. 
Sloutsky‟s model explains well both learning and generalization in our experiment, as far 
as verbal labels are concerned. If the verbal label is another feature contributing to overall 
similarity, than it will be easier to learn labelled compared to the non-labelled categories. Exactly 
this was obtained in our experiments. 
Furthermore, Sloutsky‟s model explains well the effects of label differences. In his model 
he predicted that similarity of the labels (meaning phonological similarity), lead to a higher 
similarity of the labelled categories and higher possibility that they will be estimated as members 
of the same category. 
There are, however, some shortcomings of Sloutsky‟s view: if a verbal label is just 
another feature, like any other non-verbal feature, the question is why there are effects of verbal 
labels, but no effects of non-verbal ones, which is also obtained in our experiments? 
Furthermore, why there are effects of label difference on category learning labelled with verbal 
but not on non-verbal labels. 
According to Sloutsky, the reasons for these effects are higher attentional weights of 
auditory labels. Auditory labels bring to the higher attention and easier learning of the categories. 
However, the problem with this proposition is that we did not obtain any effects of auditory non-
verbal labels either, which means that there is something inherent in the non-verbal labels 
compared to verbal labels, but not modality in which they are presented. 
The final problem with Sloutsky‟s view, which can be also applied to all theories of 
cognitive development, is that they are created for developmental psychology. We can never be 
sure whether these models are universal for adults. Furthermore, Sloutsky himself showed 
different results for adult participants in his experiments. Even if we use an argument that 
elements which we describe in the child development approach are the same and universal, we 
can never be sure about it. 
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For this reason and for the reason to explain other results obtained in this dissertation 
which could not be explained by one theory or hypothesis solely, the model of category learning 
based on the difference level was developed, which will be further specified. 
 
Category learning based on the difference level 
We will start the description of this model with individual dimensions. For example, if 
we have two categories which differ on three relevant dimensions (example: colour, size and 
shape), each of these dimensions can be quantified and represented as a difference between 
categories. For example, the colour spectrum can be divided from white to black, where each of 
the shades can be quantified. Those numeric values would represent the value of each dimension 
of the category. 
But the same category members might be of the different colours. In that case, the colour 
dimension for the category will be represented with the mean value of each of the members. In 
that case, the difference between the two categories A and B would be the following: 
 
                         
 
This difference represents the absolute value of the difference between the two categories 
on a certain dimension (for example colour). For the reason which will be described later, values 
of this difference are going from 1 (minimal difference or no difference) to 100 (maximal 
possible difference). In terms of colours, if all category members for both categories are white, 
this difference will be 1. If members of one group are white, and members of the other group are 
black, this difference will be 100. 
However, this difference does not represent the total difference between two categories 
on the certain dimension. Variability within categories significantly contributes to the overall 
difference. For example, it is not the same if all members of the category share the same colour 
or not. This type of difference, we can name as within category difference and it will represent 
variability within the group which can be calculated by the following equation: 
 
         
∑          
 




Where xi represents the value of i-th category member on the dimension and mean is the 
mean of the category on the dimension, while n is the number of category members. Similarly as 
with between group difference, this difference can have values from 1 (minimal within group 
difference, or no difference) to 10 (maximal possible within group difference). 
There are, however, two types of this difference: one within the first category and the 
other within the second category. Both of these differences, along with between group difference 
contribute to the overall (or total) group difference, but in different directions: while higher 
between group difference leads to a higher total difference, higher within group difference leads 
to a lower total difference. For example, more colours are within each of the categories, the 
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overall difference between categories will be lower, since some colours may be similar or even 
overlap. 
Having on mind this property, we can calculate total difference (Di) on measured 
category dimension with the following equation: 
 
      
        
                  
 
 
As we can see from the equation, the total difference on category dimension is directly 
proportional to between group differences and indirectly proportional to within group 
differences. 
An important property of these differences is pondering. Between group differences are 
pondered on a scale from 1 to 100, while within group differences are pondered on a scale from 
1 to 10. Why? The reason for this pondering is to avoid values from 0 to 1 which would go in the 
fraction numerator, since those values would lead to very high overall value. For example, if the 
one within group difference was 0.1 and the other was 0.2, multiplied this would be 0.02. Once 
we divide an even small value with this number (example 10), we would get a score of 500, 
which is an enormously high difference value. 
Furthermore, the between group difference value is pondered to 100 maximal value, so 
the division between two maximal values (10*10 = 100 in the numerator) would give 1. Thus, 
we get a possible total difference variability from minimally 100/1 = 100 to maximally 1/100 = 
0.01. 
The story of pondering does not finish here. These values are also pondered so it can take 
values from 0 (minimal difference or no difference – equal to 0.01 non-pondered value) to 1 
(maximal possible difference – equal to 100 non-pondered value). This pondered value of the 
total difference is marked with a capital D. 
For example, in terms of colours, two categories will be maximally different on colour 
dimension if their within group members are of the same colour (no within group differences, 
meaning values are 1) and the maximal between group differences (black and white, value is 
100). The score for the total difference will be dtot = 100/1 = 100, which will after pondering get 
a value of D = 1, meaning the maximal possible difference between categories on the dimension 
of colour. 
 
Not all dimensions are equal. Some are more important than others. For example, for 
differing a category of pencils from a category of pens, the difference in colours will hardly 
contribute much to their difference. In this case, shape might be more crucial than colour. 
These dimensional differences can be represented with f – feature weight. Values of this 
feature weight vary from 0 (no weight at all) to 1 (maximal feature weight, meaning the only 
element, crucial for category membership). 
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Apart from feature weight, an important element is also something that we can name as 
attentional salience - s. For example, a head of a figure is usually more salient than a tail. Values 
for this salience go from 0 (no salience) to 1 (maximal salience which everyone notice at first). 
However, these values usually do not vary that high. For example, the typical value for a head 
would be 0.60 and for a tail 0.40. 
The total weight of these two values could be expressed as S, or attentional weight, which 
is calculated as follows: 
 
         
 
meaning that the attentional weight is equal to the product of feature weight and 
attentional salience of the individual dimension. 
Using these two equations, we can express the level on which the individual dimension 
contributes to the between category differences: 
 
D * S 
 
With the above presented equation we can calculate differences between categories on 
the individual dimension. The problem is how to calculate the total between category differences 
on all relevant dimensions. One of the options is to use multiplicative rule for all dimensions. 
The problem is that once this rule is used, the low difference on one dimension, can lead to very 
low total differences. For this reason, we can use the summation rule. 
Using the summation rule, we have two options: to use Euclidean distance or average 
value. Even though Euclidean distance has more power (it can represent correlations between 
dimensions), for practical reasons, we will use average value, since average value will keep 
results values between 0 and 1, which is needed for probability calculation. 
Based on the previous claims, we can calculate between categories difference level – diff 
of the two categories A and B by the following equation: 
 
     (   )   
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Where n is the number of relevant dimension on which two categories differ. By using 
this equation, since values vary from 0 to 1, we can calculate probability that categories will be 
learned (differentiated), where higher probability means faster learning: 
 
 (   )        (   )   
∑      
 




This is the equation of the category learning based on the difference level. However, in 
light of the findings in this dissertation, one important element is missing and that is the label. 
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Similarly to the category difference, label difference level can be calculated, except that 
there are no within category differences, since one label is used for the entire category. 
 
                       
 
This difference represents total difference on selected dimension. In order to calculate 
overall between labels difference, we can use a similar equation as for the categories: 
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This equation shows that difference between two labels is calculated as an average value 
of difference and attentional weights on m relevant dimensions. As it was noted in Chapters I and 
II, this number may vary, and we presume that for the verbal labels it is at least 3, but for the 
non-verbal labels it is 1. This gives the difference between verbal and non-verbal labels and 
gives the verbal labels special status. 
If we merge two equations, we get the following final equation: 
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And the probability of learning labelled categories could be expressed with the following 
equation: 
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Based on this equation, we can estimate probability in which labelled category can be 
learned in a given time. We can see from the equation that the labels of the categories can 
contribute to the labelled categories difference in two ways: if they are more different than non-
labelled categories, they influence to a higher difference between labelled categories. If they are 
less different than non-labelled categories, then they contribute to higher similarity between 
labelled categories. This is in line with James‟ hypothesis, that labels which are more different 
than categories, once are adhered to them, stretch those two further apart. 
There is however, a problem with this model. We can have two categories which are very 
similar in almost all but one dimension, which is very salient and very different (let us say S = 
0.9 and D = 0.9, while other dimensions are S = 0.1 and D = 0.1). In this case if the number of 
dimensions is high, the average difference will be lower. For example, if we have two groups of 
aliens, which are almost the same on all dimensions but colours (example: one group is yellow 
and the other is blue). Calculating the overall difference based on the previous formula would 




Colour: 0.9*0.9 = 0.81; 
Head: 0.2*0.1 = 0.02; 
Tail: 0.1*0.1 = 0.01; 
Horns: 0.1*0.1 = 0.01 
 
The average value of these dimensions would be: 
 
(0.81+0.02+0.01+0.01) / 4 = 0.21 
 
This is a very low difference level, but categories would be easily differed: it is just 
necessary to notice their difference in colour. 
In order to avoid this situation, the easiest way is to turn difference levels on dimensions 
to similarity and then use the multiplicative rule: 
 
               
 
where simi represents similarity on the dimension i. Once we use this equation, we can 
calculate overall similarity using the multiplicative rule, suggested by Medin and Schaffer 
(Medin & Schaffer, 1978): 
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Once this between categories similarity is calculated, we can turn it back to difference by 
the inverse equation to the previous: 
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And now, this difference can be used for learning probability calculation. 
 
With this equation, calculation from our example would look like following: 
 
    (   )                                   
 
After similarity, we can calculate back the total category difference: 
 






This difference, unlike the one used by summation rule looks more plausible since one 
dimension which has high salience and high difference, no matter if other dimensions are almost 
the same, contributes highly to the overall difference between categories. 
 
Using similar method, we can calculate label total difference level. In that case, we 
primarily calculate the total between categories similarity (after dimensional differences are 
turned into similarities) including features and labels: 
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And finally, this similarity is turned to difference, which in return equals to probability of 
learning category in a given time. 
 
 (   )      (   )       (   )      (     ) 
 
Where P(A,B)T represents the total probability that labelled categories will be learned. As 
we can see, label difference also contributes to category difference. Once these labels have 
several dimensions (like we presumed for verbal labels), their contribution to overall categories 
similarity will be higher. If labels represent only one dimension (like we presumed for non-
verbal labels), there will be their contribution, but not as high as the one from the verbal labels. 
This model is capable to explain most of the findings in this dissertation. Prior to further 
elaboration, it is important to notice that this is speculative quantifying. Things might work this 
way, but also might not. For further confirmation, additional empirical findings would be 
needed. However, defined like this, the model explains well many of the obtained data related to 
effects of labels on category learning. 
 
We can now list findings in this dissertation which this model can explain. 
Concerning the learning, two labelled categories can be learned faster if the adhered 
labels are more distinct. Difference of labels, leads to higher overall difference of the categories, 
which in return brings to a higher possibility that they will be learned (meaning easier and 
faster). This is exactly what was obtained with auditory verbal labels. Once labels are less 
distinctive, they lead to higher similarity between categories, which can lead to slower learning 
and even inhibition compared to the no labelled condition. 
 
Obtained effects cannot be implemented for the non-verbal labels, for the property which 






Concerning generalization, we can record similar effects as in the learning, except that 
we now talk about mental representations. Once categories are learned (they are concepts now), 
and when they are associated to the labels representation, the difference between labels is also 
appropriately represented. More distinct labels lead to easier discriminability between concepts 
once they are activated. 
This view is close to Lupyan‟s view of mutual on-line activation of labels and category 
features. However, unlike Lupyan, this view considers that even representation of the labels 
remain its difference, which can lead to better discriminability between concepts and likewise 
better generalization.  
 
Finally, concerning the difference between verbal and non-verbal labels, as we 
previously noted, these differences can be explained by the difference in complexity of the 
verbal and non-verbal labels. While verbal labels are more complex and are composed of several 
dimensions, non-verbal labels are one-dimensional. This complexity leads to higher weight of 
verbal labels, compared to non-verbal labels, which is manifested in category learning and 
generalization. 
The nature of this complexity remains unclear. We demonstrated that there could be at 
least three dimensions on which verbal labels can be differentiated – phonological structure of 
the label, sonority gradient for alveolar/postalveolar sounds and vowel position. A possible 
additional dimension is sound symbolism. Apart from sound symbolism, previous dimensions 
are linguistic properties, but we cannot be certain about their psychological reality. It seems that 
there will be further research required to specify these verbal label dimensions and their 
cognitive representation, which makes them more complex compared to other types of labels. 
This view explains where the special status of words comes from. Verbal labels are not 
unmotivated cues, as Edmison and Lupyan claimed, or they are not just another feature which is 
not different from other features, like Sloutsky claimed. Verbal labels are also not referring to the 
categories and invite for their formation, but rather another feature which is more complex and 
which effects are more notable compared to other labels. 
 
However, one can question this kind of explanation: what tells us that non-verbal labels 
are one-dimensional? In Chapter II, non-verbal written labels were made using several variables, 
which opposes claims they were one-dimensional cues. 
In order to further explain effects of verbal and non-verbal differences on category 
learning, we can include a constant l
*
 in our equation (l stand for labels and the asterisk signifies 
that it is a constant). This constant is related to the nature of labels: whether they are verbal or 
non-verbal, auditory or visually presented. Additionally, it is related with relevant experience of 




The value of this constant goes from 0 to 1: if it is 0 (better to say close to 0), the effect of 
a specific type of label on the total category difference is very low. If this constant is close to 1, 
then the effects of a specific type of label on the total category difference is very high (close to 
their difference level). 
Once we use this constant, our focal equation of probability of category learning 
becomes: 
 
 (   )      (   )       (   )   
      (     )  
 
From the experimental results in this dissertation, it can be concluded that verbal labels 
auditorily presented have the highest l
*
. Let us say that this value is 0.9 or even higher. On the 
other hand, non-verbal labels have a lower l
*
 (let us say 0.6), which leads to a lower effect of 
their difference on the total category difference. 
For example, if the label difference, both for verbal and non-verbal labels is 0.9, this 
difference is multiplied with l
*





Verbal labels: 0.9 * 0.9 = 0.81 
Non-verbal labels: 0.9 * 0.6 = 0.54 
 
As we can see, the difference of non-verbal labels is lower and consequently its 
contribution on category difference will be significantly lower, which will further lead to lower 
probability of learning the given categories. 
 
This explanation looks satisfactory, unless we continue to question it further. There is an 
old saying in theoretical physics that once you cannot explain results, just put a constant in it and 
it will work perfectly. This saying was produced by increasing the number of constants across 
many equations which were used to describe fundamental laws of nature. Very few of these 
constants were described or explained even today. 
For this reason, explicit formulation of this constant is needed. This explicit formulation 
is also necessary, since in it the entire nature of effects of different types of labels is encoded. 
One of the explanations would be that verbal labels are (at least in adults) more reliable 
cues than other types of cues. From experience, adults know that labels are good category 
markers (Murphy, 2002). For example, more people know that Nepal is a state, but very few 
would recognize the flag of this state or even recognize sounds of the speech of their language 
(similarly with aliens in the experiments from Chapter II). Furthermore, frequency of auditory 
verbal labels is higher and phylogenetically older compared to written verbal labels. This 






Finally, modality of the label can possibly influence this constant. Each modality is coded 
differently on the neural level. There is a possibility that auditorily presented labels are encoded 
with a different number of nodes compared to the ones visually presented. The same stands for 
the type of labels (verbal or non-verbal). This explanation is close to the number of the relevant 
label dimensions presented previously in this chapter. 
 
From what is stated above, the l
* 












 is the modality of the label, e
*
















 represents frequency of occurrence of the label type, while r
*
 represents its 
reliability, meaning, how many times this type of labels proved to be reliable cue. 
 
Again, it needs to be mentioned that this is just an attempt to quantify the obtained 
results. In order to fully accept this explanation, further experimental research would be needed 
in which each of these constants would be precisely calculated and specified. 
 
Related to category difference, there is however one view which is thought provoking 
and which takes into consideration, apart from the above mentioned dimensions on which 
categories can differ, possible correlation of the dimensions, which can lead to overall between 
categories similarity. Furthermore, this model is based on Shannon‟s information theory. It is the 
model of statistical density developed by Kloos and Sloutsky (Kloos and Sloutsky, 2008). 
 
Statistical density model 
This model starts from the paradox that learning of some ill-defined categories, such as 
dogs and cats, is easy and effortless even for small children and without feedback, while learning 
some well-defined categories from the point of Boolean algebra rules is difficult even for adults 
who receive feedback after every learning trial. The reason for this, the model finds in so called, 
statistical density of the category. 
 
Statistical density is defined with the following equation: 
 
D = 1 – 
       





where Hwithin represents entropy within the category and Hbetween entropy between two 
compared categories. Each of the entropies consists of two basic elements: variance of the 
dimensions (varying dimensions – H
dim
) and variance of relationship between dimensions (H
rel
). 
Thus, each of the entropies is calculated as the following: 
 
 
                  
             




                
            
    
 
 
Furthermore, each of the entropies can be formally calculated on the principles of 
information theory, where: 
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wi represents attentional weight of the i dimension, which signifies the importance of the 
dimension. 
Other values in this equation vary depending on which exact type of entropy is 
calculated. If entropy due to varying dimensions is calculated, n represents the number of 
relevant dimensions, while pj represents probability of value j on dimension i. If entropy due to 
varying relations is calculated, n represents the number of possible dyadic correlations between 
dimensions and pj represents probability of co-occurrence of the two values (j) on dimension i. 
The model also presumes that mental representations of statistically dense categories are 
similarity-based, while representations of the statistically sparse categories are rule-based. This 
comes from the fact that sparse categories have one or several defining rules, which is much 
easier to store, than all possible dimensions and variations. 
 
This model satisfies most of the features of a good model and it can be used to partially 
explain results obtained in this dissertation. It explains well category difference and 
easiness/difficulties to learn them. It is also a well quantified model, based on solid mathematical 
and informational theory background. It amends some shortcomings of the difference level 





However, there are some shortcomings of this model. Primarily, the model is developed 
only for categorical, not continual values of dimensions (for calculation of entropy due to 
varying relations). Additionally, labels as an additional features and label difference level are not 
included in the model. 
 
The model can be extended to be used for continual dimensions as well. In order to make 
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This equation is similar to the previous one, except that there is r included, where r 
represents Pearson correlation of two dimensions. Since correlation values goes from -1 to 1 (in 
this case from 0 to 1 for absolute value is used), correlation is a perfect numeric match with 
probability. 
Additionally, a similar model can be developed for label density: 
 
LD = 1 – 
       
        
 
 
Where LD represents label density. Label entropy could be calculated similarly to the 
entropy of the visual features: 
 
                      
               
    
 
For the label density, within-category entropy is not calculated. There are many category 
exemplars, but there is only one label. In that case, within category entropy is completely 
redundant, and it can be exchanged with the value of 1, so the entire equation becomes: 
 
LD = 1 – 
 
        
 
 
It would be rather challenging to calculate eventual dimensional correlation between 
dimensions of labels in this model, but there is always such possibility. Once these dimensions 
are well defined and models are developed for them, this could be the case. For this moment, we 





INTERPRETATION OF CONNECTIONIST MODELLING RESULTS 
As it was stated in the beginning of this section, this interpretation will be taken from the 
perspectives of James‟ hypothesis, Lupyan‟s hypothesis, Westermann‟s compound 
representation approach and in this dissertation developed Category learning based on the 
difference level model. 
 
James’ hypothesis 
In Chapter V it was stated that the results obtained in the cognitive model that was 
developed comply with James‟ hypothesis (James, [1931 (1890)]). As it was stated in the 
Introduction chapter, James predicted that any kind of differences between labels (or anything 
adhered to the concepts) will drag the differences apart. Therefore, it can be concluded that 
higher label differences lead to easier discriminability between concepts and easier learning. 
This was demonstrated in the model developed in Chapter V. In that sense, we can claim 
that James‟ hypothesis is confirmed. However, this is not the case in terms of representation: 
according to James‟ hypothesis (even if it is not explicitly stated anywhere), there are separated 
representations of labels and concepts. In the model from Chapter V, these representations are 
integrated. Additional problem which cannot fit with James‟ hypothesis was presumed linearity. 
Even though a linear function is well represented in data obtained in Chapter V, a much better 
approximation is a quadratic function, since small differences between labels usually do not lead 
to any effects on category learning. 
 
Lupyan’s language augmented thought hypothesis 
In Lupyan‟s language augmented thought hypothesis (Lupyan et al., 2007; Lupyan, 
2012a), there is a prediction of the influence of verbal labels on category learning. These effects 
are due to mutual activation of the two on the representational level. Lupyan presumes separate 
representations of verbal labels and visual features which are interconnected. Furthermore, in his 
connectionist model (Lupyan, 2012a), Lupyan demonstrated all these effects of verbal labels, 
which are separated and do influence the concepts in a feed-forward activation loop. 
Concerning the model from Chapter V, Lupyan‟s hypothesis cannot explain the effects of 
verbal label differences, similarly as in behavioural results. Additionally, Lupyan presumes that 
there are separate representations of labels and visual features, which was not obtained in this 
model. For all these reasons, this hypothesis cannot be concerned as a good explanation of the 
results obtained in the model developed in this dissertation. 
 
Westermann’s compound representation approach 
Interpretation of some portion of results obtained in Chapter V can be conducted from the 
perspective of Westermann‟s compound representation approach (Westermann & Mareschal, 
2014; Twomey & Westermann, 2016; Capelier-Mourguy, Twomey & Westermann, 2016). This 
model was developed for children, but some elements can be used to explain the results from the 
connectionist model developed in Chapter V. Those elements are the following: 
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1. Verbal input is relevant for category learning and generalization, 
2. Representations of visual features and verbal labels are integrated. 
 
Verbal input is relevant for several reasons, some of which are explained in the 
previously mentioned Lupyan‟s hypotheses. Furthermore, it can be implicitly concluded (even 
though Westermann never explicitly stated this) that more different labels contribute to more 
different representations. The reason for this might be for the representations of both to be 
integrated (which lead us to the next element). 
Integrated representations of verbal labels and visual features are very relevant for the 
model developed in Chapter V, since a similar modelling method was used. This has important 
theoretical implications, since most of the previous models considered these two types of 
representation separated. 
From the integrated representation both labels and visual features can be extracted 
separately, even though these two are integrated (Westermann & Mareschal, 2014). That means 
that none of these two loses its identity on the representational level. This is also relevant for the 
model from Chapter V, even though output of this model is a single classification node. 
The problem with this model is that it does not explicitly predict effects of label 
differences. Additionally, this model is developed for children to fit data from behavioural 
experiments conducted on children, but not adults. The model developed in Chapter V is 
exclusively developed to fit data obtained from adults. 
 
Category learning based on the difference level 
From the point of view of this approach, it is expected that label differences will be a 
significant factor in category learning. If the labels are more phonologically different, it is 
expected that categories named with them will be learned significantly faster and generalized 
better. This relationship is expressed with the following equation: 
 
 (   )      (   )       (   )   
      (     )  
 
So the probability whether categories will be learned (discriminated) depends on the total 
difference between categories. This total difference is composed of the difference of visual 
features and difference of labels. 
This hypothesis predicts that in the connectionist model, categories named with more 
different labels will be learned faster. This prediction was confirmed. Furthermore, the 
hypothesis predicts that learned categories will be generalized better, but this was not confirmed 
for the reasons stated in Chapter V: input was too deterministic and easy to learn. Additionally, 
the network was trained until it completely learned the input, which was not always the case with 




However, there are some elements which are not predicted by this hypothesis: functional 
dependence between the learning rate and label difference, but also the representation of labels 
and categories (whether is it separated or integrated). Category learning based on the difference 
level hypothesis predicts that the relationship between the level of difference and ease of 
category learning is linear. In Chapter V, we saw that this was not the case. Additionally, this 
hypothesis implicitly predicts that representations of labels and categories are separated. The 
model developed in Chapter V proved it was not necessary, since the representation level was 
unique for both visual features and labels. 
In order to fully integrate these findings in Category learning based on the difference 
level hypothesis, both of these problems will be separately treated. 
 
Functional dependency 
The easiest way to integrate functional dependency obtained in Chapter V is to multiply 
the above stated equation with the relevant function. In order to do so, the function that was 
obtained in Chapter V should be calculated using variables transformed in Z values, so it will 
represent standardized values. After these transformations, we have the following plot of the 
function approximation (Figure VI-1): 
 
Figure VI-1: Standardized functional dependency between learning and label difference 
 
Obtained functions are the following: 
y = -0.96*x – linear function 
y = -0.28*x
2
 - 0.96*x + 0.25 – quadratic function 
 
Obtained norms of residuals for the linear function are =0.76 and for the quadratic = 0.38. 
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We can see from the obtained functions and norms of residuals, that the linear function, 
even though its norm of residuals is higher, well explains the obtained results. Meaning, there is 
a negative correlation between the two variables (-.96), which is very high. On the other hand, 
the model explains variance for more than 90% (R
2
 = .92), which is also a very high value. Since 
the number of training sets from which this function was approximated is quite high (N = 100), 
we can consider this value relevant, even though the statistical significance was not calculated. 
Concerning the obtained results and property that the linear function is usually more 
suitable and elegant for further calculations, the linear interdependency between learning and 
level of label difference will be preserved. Additionally, there is possibility that the quadratic 
function obtained in Chapter V over-fits the data (which is less possible, since results and the 
data trend were consistent for a number of different training sets). 
For the reasons stated above, the focal equation of Category learning based on the 
difference level hypothesis will not be changed to additionally fit the data. Linear dependency 
will be considered as relevant and its distortions will be considered as a product of error. 
 
Representations 
The second problem of the connectionist modelling data related to Category learning 
based on the difference level hypothesis were representations. In this hypothesis, it was 
implicitly presumed that mental representations of labels and visual features are separated. 
However, the model developed in Chapter V showed that also integrated representations are 
possible. For this reason, the integrated view needs to be included into this hypothesis. 
Before proceeding, there must be one serious restrain stated: there is a possibility that 
another representational level exists between the input and hidden level. Meaning, there might 
exist separated representations, which get integrated on the next processing level. If that kind of 
network was trained in similar manner as the one from Chapter V, results would be most 
probably similar to the obtained ones. 
The consequences of the integrated representations view are numerous, but the most 
relevant for this dissertation is that differences between labels and visual features are summed 
together, no matter from which modality they originate. For example, seeing an alien in the 
experiment and hearing its name, represents input which differs on a number of visual and 
phonological dimensions. All these dimensions are analysed and represented on one level. At 
this level, these differences are integrated and more easily separated and properly coded. In 
short, all relevant differences (no matter from which modality they come from) sum up and 
contribute to the overall difference and consequently to learning. 
Some further consequences from this view, lead us to the conclusion that different 
modalities of input (visual, auditory and similar) are integrated in the same coding structure. 
Differences of modalities are represented to the number of input nodes, rather than to a different 
code. However, these kinds of questions are going out of the scope of this dissertation and will 





3. GENERAL CONCLUSIONS OF THE DISSERTATION 
The aim of this section is to give some general conclusions and state the main 
contributions of this dissertation. 
 
The main contribution of this dissertation is stated as Category learning based on the 
difference level hypothesis. This hypothesis presumes that the probability of learning two 
categories (meaning speed of learning) depends on the overall difference level of the categories. 
This overall difference is composed of two parts: visual features differences and label 
differences. The entire hypothesis can be presented by the following focal equation: 
 
 (   )      (   )       (   )   
      (     )  
 
Where P(A,B)T represents probability (easiness) that the two categories, A and B will be 
learned, diff(A,B)T – total difference between two categories, diff(A,B) – difference of visual 
features of two categories and diff(L1,L2) difference between two labels L1 and L2 with which the 
two categories A and B are labelled. 
 
Apart from this main contribution, here will be stated some further empirical 
contributions which are mostly integrated in this hypothesis. 
Results obtained in this dissertation tend to give a small illumination to the language and 
thought debate. In the Introduction chapter it was stated that there are two schools of opinion in 
this debate: one which claims that thought (meaning concepts) is independent from language, 
while the other claims that language and thought are mutually interdependent. The results 
obtained in this dissertation support the latter claim, since the participants in the experiments 
where categories were named with more phonologically different labels, learned those categories 
easier and generalized better compared to those who heard phonologically less different labels. If 
categories were independent from labels, no effects of labels phonological difference would be 
recorded. 
Additionally, in this dissertation it was shown that verbal and non-verbal labels do not 
have the same status. Only verbal labels are capable to produce facilitation in category learning, 
specifically verbal labels which are auditorily presented. On the other hand, non-verbal labels are 
not capable to produce any facilitation effects, which lead to the conclusion that verbal labels 
have special status compared to other types of labels. 
The reason of this effect is still mysterious, but the explanation which was offered in this 
dissertation states that verbal labels are more complex (in terms of input), so their effects on 
categories are higher, since more complex input leads to higher differences between two 
categories and consequently to easier learning. This explanation was given along with a 
statistical density model (Kloos and Sloutsky, 2008) as equally relevant. Furthermore, statistical 




Another relevant contribution is related to label learning. It was shown that it is 
necessary to learn labels in order to have facilitation effects on learning. This learning was 
induced by instruction in the experiments, where it was explicitly requested from the participants 
to learn labels. The results showed that the group which had the instructions, learned categories 
much faster compared to the one which did not have the instructions. From this it can be 
concluded that label learning is necessary in order to produce effects on category learning. 
Meaning, it is not enough for the labels to be only presented to get facilitation effects in learning. 
Another important finding in this dissertation was the functional dependency between 
verbal labels and speed of category learning, which was obtained from behavioural 
experimental results, especially from the connectionist model. This functional dependency is 
mostly linear, even though sometimes, specifically when label differences are not that high, this 
dependency is non-existent. Using approximation methods, the best fit was provided with 
quadratic function, but since linear function still explained the high level of variance, it was 
decided to keep linear dependency as the relevant one. 
An additional contribution from this dissertation, specifically related to the cognitive 
model was the mental representations. In the developed connectionist model, it was 
demonstrated that there is no need for separated mental representations of labels and visual 
features, since they can be integrated. This integrated representation further goes in favour to the 
statement that label difference influences overall category difference, which consequently leads 
to faster learning. 
However, one restrain was stated: it is possible that there are separated representations of 
labels and visual features, which are integrated on the next level of processing. Furthermore, 
there could be another model developed which could simulate similar results. However, this does 




In the end, I would like to state that every scientific work is just a small drop in the ocean 
of the overall knowledge. What is new today becomes old tomorrow, like the drops in the oceans 
which slightly start sinking to the depths. However, even in the depths, this drop supports new-
coming droplets which are on the top. 
I hope that this dissertation presents one small drop which revealed some of the problems 
and make some people to ask further questions. If only one person stops and starts thinking about 
the stated problems and concludes that he was not thinking in the presented way or starts asking 
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Silent No label Chapter I Experiment 1 
Min.diff Minimal label difference Chapter I Experiment 1 
Max.diff 
Maximal label difference – also with 
sound symbolism incongruent with 
visual stimuli 
Chapter I Experiment 1 
Mid.diff Moderate label difference Chapter I Experiment 1 
Max.diff no ss 
Maximal label difference without sound 
symbolism 
Chapter I Experiment 2 
Max.diff congr 
Maximal label difference with sound 
symbolism congruent with visual stimuli 
Chapter I Experiment 2 
nl_VIZ_MIN 
Non-verbal (non-linguistic) visual label 
minimally different 
Chapter II Experiment 1 
nl_VIZ_MAX 
Non-verbal (non-linguistic) visual label 
maximally different 
Chapter II Experiment 1 
nl_AUD_MIN 
Non-verbal (non-linguistic) auditory 
label minimally different 
Chapter II Experiment 2 
nl_AUD_MAX 
Non-verbal (non-linguistic) auditory 
label maximally different 
Chapter II Experiment 2 
ver_VIZ_MIN Verbal visual label minimally different Chapter III Experiment 
ver_VIZ_MAX Verbal visual label maximally different Chapter III Experiment 
NI_ver_AUD_MIN 
Verbal auditory label without instruction 
(no instruction) minimally different 
Chapter IV Experiment 1 
NI_ver_AUD_MAX 
Verbal auditory label without instruction 
(no instruction) maximally different 
Chapter IV Experiment 1 
NI_ver_VIZ_MIN 
Verbal visual label without instruction 
(no instruction) minimally different 
Chapter IV Experiment 2 
NI_ver_VIZ_MAX 
Verbal visual label without instruction 
(no instruction) maximally different 
Chapter IV Experiment 2 
NI_nvr_VIZ_MIN 
Non-verbal visual label without 
instruction (no instruction) minimally 
different 
Chapter IV Experiment 3 
NI_nvr_VIZ_MAX 
Non-verbal visual label without 
instruction (no instruction) maximally 
different 










MATLAB SCRIPT USED FOR GENERATION OF NON-VERBAL VISUAL STIMULI IN 
CHAPTER II (RECEIVED FROM FROM HEDGE & VAN ESEN) 
 
 





 %During our actual neurophysiological recordings, the stimuli were synthesized online in 
real time,  
 %and was customized for the preferences of neuron under study.  Among other things, 
the stimulus  
 %size was a function of the empirically observed receptive field size of the neuron under 
study. 
 %The present script is intended to create stimuli for off-line use.  Therefore, this script 
simply 
 %hard-codes some stand-in values for the receptive field size. 
 
 RFRadius=512; 
  Step=1; 
  stimSize=1; 
  Contrast=1; 
  stimRadius=512; 




 stimCount = 0; 
  %Sinewave stimuli 
  phases=pi/2;  
  freqVec=[2:2:6]; 
  angleVec=[90:45:225]; 
  for(freq = freqVec); 
    for(angles = angleVec); 
      stim=LNG83_sine_stim(RFRadius, Step, stimSize, Contrast, freq, phases, angles, 
stimRadius); 
   imwrite((stim+1)/2, ['./stim_', num2str(stimCount), '.bmp']); 
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   stimCount = stimCount+1; 
    end 




  phaseh=0; 
  angleVec=[0:22.5:67.5]; 
  for(freq = 1:3);  
    for(angleh = angleVec); 
      stim=LNG83_hyperbolic_stim(RFRadius, Step, stimSize, Contrast, freq, phaseh, angleh, 
stimRadius); 
      imwrite((stim+1)/2, ['./stim_', num2str(stimCount), '.bmp']); 
   stimCount = stimCount+1; 
    end 





%First the concentric gratings 
  phasep= -pi/2; 
  freqr=0; 
  freqc_vec=[2:5]; 
  for(freqc = freqc_vec); 
    stim=LNG83_polarc_stim(RFRadius, Step, stimSize, Contrast, freqc, freqr, phasep, 
stimRadius); 
    imwrite((stim+1)/2, ['./stim_', num2str(stimCount), '.bmp']); 
  stimCount = stimCount+1; 
  end 
 
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%Now the radial gratings 
  phasep_vec=[pi, 0, pi, 0]; 
  freqc=0; 
  freqr_vec=[2:2:8]; 
  i=1; 
  for(freqr = freqr_vec); 




    imwrite((stim+1)/2, ['./stim_', num2str(stimCount), '.bmp']);  
  stimCount = stimCount+1; 
    i=i+1; 




  %Now change both the concentric and the radial frequencies, *in that order*. 
  freqc_vec=[1:4]; 
  freqr_vec=[2:2:8]; 
  for(freqr = freqr_vec); 
    if(freqr==2) 
      phasep= -pi/2; 
    elseif(freqr==4) 
      phasep= -pi-(pi/4); 
    elseif(freqr==6) 
      phasep= pi+(pi/2); 
    elseif(freqr==8) 
      phasep= pi-(pi/8);       
    end 
    for(freqc = freqc_vec);     
      stim=LNG83_polarcc_stim(RFRadius, Step, stimSize, Contrast, freqc, freqr, phasep, 
stimRadius); 
      imwrite((stim+1)/2, ['./stim_', num2str(stimCount), '.bmp']); 
   stimCount = stimCount+1; 
    end 
  end 
 




%Generates a sinusoid. 
function z = LNG83_sine_stim(rfRadius, step, stimSize, contrast, freq, phase, ori, stimRadius); 
 
  %Check the filter val 
  if(stimRadius > rfRadius); 
    stimRadius=rfRadius/2; 




  %Create the mesh grid à la mode Matlab's meshgrid() 
  num_col=length([-rfRadius:step:rfRadius]); 
  basis_vec=[-rfRadius:step:rfRadius]; 
  rawvec=repmat([-rfRadius:step:rfRadius], 1, num_col); 
 
  xmat=reshape(rawvec, num_col, [])'; 
  ymat=reshape(rawvec, num_col, []); 
    
  %Sinusoidal foreground generating 
  xvals=xmat*cos(ori/180*pi)-ymat*sin(ori/180*pi); 
  yvals=xmat*sin(ori/180*pi)+ymat*cos(ori/180*pi); 
  
  %Initalize the stimulus matrix 
  z=[]; 
  for(i = 1:num_col);   
    for(j = 1:num_col);     
      rel_distance=sqrt((basis_vec(i)*basis_vec(i))+(basis_vec(j)*basis_vec(j))); 
      if(rel_distance > stimRadius); 
    z(i,j)= -1; 
      else 
    z(i,j)=contrast*sin((pi/stimSize*freq/rfRadius)*xvals(i,j)+phase); 
      end 
    end 





%Generates a Hyperbolic Stimulus 
function z = LNG83_hyperbolic_stim(rfRadius, step, stimSize, contrast, freq, phase, angleh, 
stimRadius) 
 
  %Check the filter val 
  if(stimRadius > rfRadius); 
    stimRadius=rfRadius/2; 
  end 
  %Create the mesh grid à la mode Matlab's meshgrid() 
  num_col=length([-rfRadius:step:rfRadius]); 
  basis_vec=[-rfRadius:step:rfRadius]; 
  rawvec=repmat([-rfRadius:step:rfRadius], 1, num_col); 
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  x=reshape(rawvec, num_col, [])'; 
  y=reshape(rawvec, num_col, []); 
  
  %Initalize the stimulus matrix 
  z=[];   
  u=(x*cos(angleh/180*pi))-(y*sin(angleh/180*pi)); 
  v=(x*sin(angleh/180*pi))+(y*cos(angleh/180*pi)); 
  z=contrast*cos(2*pi*freq/rfRadius*sqrt(2)*sqrt(abs(u.*v))+phase);  





%Generates a Polar Stimulus (CLOCKWISE);.  See LNG83_polarcc_stim(); below for 
COUNTER-CLOCKWISE STIMULI. 
function z = LNG83_polarc_stim(rfRadius, step, stimSize, contrast, freqc, freqr, phase, 
stimRadius); 
 
  %Check the filter val 
  if(stimRadius > rfRadius); 
    stimRadius=rfRadius/2; 
  end  
    
  %Create the mesh grid à la mode Matlab's meshgrid() 
  num_col=length([-rfRadius:step:rfRadius]); 
  basis_vec=[-rfRadius:step:rfRadius]; 
  rawvec=repmat([-rfRadius:step:rfRadius], 1, num_col); 
  x=reshape(rawvec, num_col, [])'; 
  y=reshape(rawvec, num_col, []); 
  
  %Initalize the stimulus matrix 
  z=[]; 
  if(freqc>0);   
    if(mod(freqr,4)==0);     
      for(i = 1:(floor(2*rfRadius/step)+1));       
    for(j = 1:(floor(2*rfRadius/step)+1));  
     if(x(i,j)~=0);    
      radial=atan(y(i,j)/x(i,j)); 
     else     
      radial=pi/2; 
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     end 
     concentric=sqrt(x(i,j)^2+y(i,j)^2); 
    
 rel_distance=sqrt((basis_vec(i)*basis_vec(i))+(basis_vec(j)*basis_vec(j))); 
     if(rel_distance > stimRadius); 
      z(i,j)= -1; 
     else 
      z(i,j)=contrast*cos((2*pi*freqc/stimSize-
pi/2)/rfRadius*concentric+freqr*radial+phase); 
     end 
    end 
   end 
  else 
   for(i = 1:(floor(2*rfRadius/step)+1)); 
    for(j = 1:(floor(2*rfRadius/step)+1));  
     if(x(i,j)~=0);    
      radial=atan(y(i,j)/x(i,j)); 
     else     
      radial=pi/2; 
     end 
     concentric=sqrt(x(i,j)^2+y(i,j)^2); 
    
 rel_distance=sqrt((basis_vec(i)*basis_vec(i))+(basis_vec(j)*basis_vec(j))); 
     if(rel_distance > stimRadius); 
      z(i,j)= -1; 
     else 
      z(i,j)=contrast*cos((2*pi*freqc/stimSize-
pi/2)/rfRadius*concentric-pi+freqr*radial+phase); 
     end 
    end 
   end 
  end 
 else 
  if(mod(freqr,4)==0); 
   for(i = 1:(floor(2*rfRadius/step)+1)); 
    for(j = 1:(floor(2*rfRadius/step)+1)); 
     if(x(i,j)~=0);    
      radial=atan(y(i,j)/x(i,j)); 
     else            
      radial=pi/2; 
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     end 
     concentric=sqrt(x(i,j)^2+y(i,j)^2); 
    
 rel_distance=sqrt((basis_vec(i)*basis_vec(i))+(basis_vec(j)*basis_vec(j))); 
     if(rel_distance > stimRadius); 
      z(i,j)= -1; 
     else 
      z(i,j)=contrast*cos(freqr*radial+phase); 
     end 
    end 
   end 
  else 
   for(i = 1:(floor(2*rfRadius/step)+1));      
    for(j = 1:(floor(2*rfRadius/step)+1));  
     if(x(i,j)~=0); 
      radial=atan(y(i,j)/x(i,j)); 
     else 
      radial=pi/2; 
     end 
     concentric=sqrt(x(i,j)^2+y(i,j)^2); 
    
 rel_distance=sqrt((basis_vec(i)*basis_vec(i))+(basis_vec(j)*basis_vec(j))); 
     if(rel_distance > stimRadius); 
      z(i,j)= -1; 
     else 
      z(i,j)=contrast*cos(-pi+freqr*radial+phase); 
     end 
        end 
      end 
    end 





%Generates a Polar Stimulus (COUNTER-clockwise);.  See LNG83_polarc_stim(); above for 
CLOCKWISE STIMULI_ 





  %Check the filter val 
  if(stimRadius > rfRadius); 
    stimRadius=rfRadius/2; 
  end 
       
  %Create the mesh grid à la mode Matlab's meshgrid() 
  num_col=length([-rfRadius:step:rfRadius]); 
  basis_vec=[-rfRadius:step:rfRadius]; 
  rawvec=repmat([-rfRadius:step:rfRadius], 1, num_col); 
  x=reshape(rawvec, num_col, [])'; 
  y=reshape(rawvec, num_col, []); 
  
  %Initalize the stimulus matrix 
  z=[]; 
  if(freqc>0);   
    if(mod(freqr,4)==0);   
      for(i = 1:(floor(2*rfRadius/step)+1));       
    for(j = 1:(floor(2*rfRadius/step)+1));  
     if(x(i,j)~=0);    
      radial=atan(y(i,j)/x(i,j)); 
     else     
      radial=pi/2; 
     end 
     concentric=sqrt(x(i,j)^2+y(i,j)^2); 
    
 rel_distance=sqrt((basis_vec(i)*basis_vec(i))+(basis_vec(j)*basis_vec(j))); 
     if(rel_distance > stimRadius); 
      z(i,j)= -1; 
     else 
      z(i,j)=contrast*cos((2*pi*freqc-
pi/2)/rfRadius*concentric-freqr*radial+phase); 
     end 
    end 
   end 
  else 
   for(i = 1:(floor(2*rfRadius/step)+1));       
    for(j = 1:(floor(2*rfRadius/step)+1));  
     if(x(i,j)~=0);    
      radial=atan(y(i,j)/x(i,j)); 
     else     
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      radial=pi/2; 
     end 
     concentric=sqrt(x(i,j)^2+y(i,j)^2); 
    
 rel_distance=sqrt((basis_vec(i)*basis_vec(i))+(basis_vec(j)*basis_vec(j))); 
     if(rel_distance > stimRadius); 
      z(i,j)= -1; 
     else 
      z(i,j)=contrast*cos((2*pi*freqc-
pi/2)/rfRadius*concentric+pi-freqr*radial+phase); 
     end 
    end 
   end 
  end 
 else   
  if(mod(freqr,4)==0) 
   for(i = 1:(floor(2*rfRadius/step)+1));       
    for(j = 1:(floor(2*rfRadius/step)+1));  
     if(x(i,j)~=0);           
      radial=atan(y(i,j)/x(i,j)); 
     else            
      radial=pi/2; 
     end 
     concentric=sqrt(x(i,j)^2+y(i,j)^2); 
    
 rel_distance=sqrt((basis_vec(i)*basis_vec(i))+(basis_vec(j)*basis_vec(j))); 
     if(rel_distance > stimRadius); 
      z(i,j)= -1; 
     else 
      z(i,j)=contrast*cos(freqr*radial+phase); 
     end 
    end 
   end 
  else  
   for(i = 1:(floor(2*rfRadius/step)+1));       
    for(j = 1:(floor(2*rfRadius/step)+1));  
     if(x(i,j)~=0);    
      radial=atan(y(i,j)/x(i,j)); 
     else    
      radial=pi/2; 
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     end 
     concentric=sqrt(x(i,j)^2+y(i,j)^2); 
    
 rel_distance=sqrt((basis_vec(i)*basis_vec(i))+(basis_vec(j)*basis_vec(j))); 
     if(rel_distance > stimRadius); 
      z(i,j)= -1; 
     else 
      z(i,j)=contrast*cos(-pi+freqr*radial+phase); 
     end 
        end 
      end 
    end 





%Convolves with a central circular filter. 
function datamat = LNG83_central_filter(datamat, matRadius, mat_step, filter_rad, contrast); 
 
  num_columns=length([-matRadius:mat_step:matRadius]);  
  num_columns_in_filter=length([-filter_rad:mat_step:filter_rad, mat_step]);  
  mid_point=num_columns/2; 
  filter_size=filter_rad/mat_step; 
     
  for(one_row = 1:num_columns); 
    for(one_col = 1:num_columns); 
      rel_coord_x=one_row-mid_point; 
      rel_coord_y=one_col-mid_point; 
      rel_distance=sqrt((rel_coord_x*rel_coord_x)+(rel_coord_y*rel_coord_y)); 
      if(rel_distance > filter_size); 
    datamat(one_row, one_col)=-1; 
      end 
    end 










QUESTIONNAIRE USED FOR NORMING STUDY FOR NON-VERBAL AUDITORY 
LABELS (CHAPTER II) 
 
 
Please rate the difference of the following sounds on the scale from 1 (the same) to 7 (maximal 
difference  
1 _1 _2 1          2          3          4          5          6          7 
2 _1 _3 1          2          3          4          5          6          7 
3 _1 _4 1          2          3          4          5          6          7 
4 _1 _5 1          2          3          4          5          6          7 
5 _1 _6 1          2          3          4          5          6          7 
6 _1 _7 1          2          3          4          5          6          7 
7 _1 _8 1          2          3          4          5          6          7 
8 _2 _3 1          2          3          4          5          6          7 
9 _2 _4 1          2          3          4          5          6          7 
10 _2 _5 1          2          3          4          5          6          7 
11 _2 _6 1          2          3          4          5          6          7 
12 _2 _7 1          2          3          4          5          6          7 
13 _2 _8 1          2          3          4          5          6          7 
14 _3 _4 1          2          3          4          5          6          7 
15 _3 _5 1          2          3          4          5          6          7 
16 _3 _6 1          2          3          4          5          6          7 
17 _3 _7 1          2          3          4          5          6          7 
18 _3 _8 1          2          3          4          5          6          7 
19 _4 _5 1          2          3          4          5          6          7 
20 _4 _6 1          2          3          4          5          6          7 
21 _4 _7 1          2          3          4          5          6          7 
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22 _4 _8 1          2          3          4          5          6          7 
23 _5 _6 1          2          3          4          5          6          7 
24 _5 _7 1          2          3          4          5          6          7 
25 _5 _8 1          2          3          4          5          6          7 
26 _6 _7 1          2          3          4          5          6          7 
27 _6 _8 1          2          3          4          5          6          7 













clc, clear, close all 
 
indTrening = randperm(16); 
pr_ep = []; 
for d = 1:2:17 
    data = load(['diff_' num2str(d) '.txt']); 
    ulaz = data(:, 1:41)'; 
    izlaz = data(:, 42)'; 
     
    ulazTrening = []; 
    izlazTrening = []; 
    for i = 1:16 
        r = indTrening(i); 
        ulazTrening = [ulazTrening ulaz(:, 2*r-1)]; 
        ulazTrening = [ulazTrening ulaz(:, 2*r)]; 
         
        izlazTrening = [izlazTrening izlaz(2*r-1)]; 
        izlazTrening = [izlazTrening izlaz(2*r)]; 
    end 
     
    ulazTest = ulaz(:, 33:end); 
    izlazTest = izlaz(33:end); 
         
    br_epoha =[]; 
    uspeh = []; 
    N = 20; 
    for j = 1:N 
        net = patternnet(15); 
        net.trainParam.showWindow = false;     
        net.trainParam.min_grad = 0; 
        net.trainParam.goal = 0; 
        net.divideFcn = ''; 
        [net, tr] = train(net, ulazTrening, izlazTrening); 
        br_epoha = [br_epoha tr.best_epoch]; 
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        izlazPred = net(ulazTest); 
        c = confusion(izlazTest, izlazPred);         
        uspeh = [uspeh 1-c]; 
    end 
     
    por = ['Za razliku ' num2str(d) ' i N = ' num2str(N) ' prosecan broj epoha treniranja je ' 
num2str(mean(br_epoha)) ', a prosecna uspesnost test skupa je ' num2str(mean(uspeh)) '.']; 
    disp(por) 
    pr_ep = [pr_ep mean(br_epoha)]; 
end 
 
diff = 1:2:17; 
figure1 = figure; 
axes1 = axes('Parent',figure1); 
plot(diff, pr_ep, 'o'); 
title(['Average of ' num2str(N) 'trainings']), 
xlabel('Level of label difference') 
ylabel('Number of epochs') 











EXAMPLE OF THE CODED VALUES FOR INPUT AND OUTPUT STORED IN THE TEXT 
FILE USED FOR NETWORK TRAINING AND TEST (diff_7.txt, CHAPTER V) 
 
 
1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0.5
 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5
 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 1 
1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1
 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1
 0 1 0 1 1 
1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1
 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0.5
 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5
 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 1 
1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1
 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 1
 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1
 0 1 0 1 1 
1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0.5
 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5
 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 1 
1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1
 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1
 0 1 0 1 1 
1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1
 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0.5
 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5
 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 1 
1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1
 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 1
 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1
 0 1 0 1 1 
1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0
 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0.5
 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5
 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 1 
1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0
 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 1
 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1
 0 1 0 1 1 
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1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0
 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0.5
 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5
 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 1 
1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0
 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 1
 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1
 0 1 0 1 1 
1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0
 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 0.5
 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5
 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 1 
1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0
 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1
 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1
 0 1 0 1 1 
1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0.5
 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5
 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 1 
1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1
 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1
 0 1 0 1 1 
1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0.5
 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5
 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0 
1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1
 0 1 1 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 1 1
 0 0 0 1 0 
1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 0
 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0.5
 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5
 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0 
1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 0
 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1
 0 1 1 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 1 1
 0 0 0 1 0 
1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 1 1 0
 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0.5
 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5
 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0 
1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 1 1 0
 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 1
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 0 1 1 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 1 1
 0 0 0 1 0 
1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 1 0 0 0
 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.5
 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5
 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0 
1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 1 0 0 0
 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
 0 1 1 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 1 1
 0 0 0 1 0 
1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 0 1 0 1 0
 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0.5
 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5
 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0 
1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 0 1 0 1 0
 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 1
 0 1 1 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 1 1
 0 0 0 1 0 
1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 0 1 1 0 0
 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0.5
 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5
 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0 
1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 0 1 1 0 0
 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 1
 0 1 1 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 1 1
 0 0 0 1 0 
1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 0 1 1 1 0
 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0.5
 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5
 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0 
1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 0 1 1 1 0
 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 1
 0 1 1 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 1 1
 0 0 0 1 0 
1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.5
 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5
 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0 
1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
 0 1 1 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 1 1
 0 0 0 1 0 
1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1
 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0.5
 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5
 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 1 
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1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0.5
 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5
 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 1 
1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1
 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 1 0.5
 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5
 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 1 
1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0
 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0.5
 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5
 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 1 
1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 0 1 0
 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0.5
 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5
 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0 
1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0.5
 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5
 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0 
1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 1 0
 0 0 0 1 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0.5
 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5
 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0 
1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.5
 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5
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саопштавање дела, без промена, преобликовања или употребе дела у свом делу, ако се 
наведе име аутора на начин одређен од стране аутора или даваоца лиценце. Ова 
лиценца дозвољава комерцијалну употребу дела. 
6. Ауторство – делити под истим условима. Дозвољавате умножавање, дистрибуцију и 
јавно саопштавање дела, и прераде, ако се наведе име аутора на начин одређен од 
стране аутора или даваоца лиценце и ако се прерада дистрибуира под истом или 
сличном лиценцом. Ова лиценца дозвољава комерцијалну употребу дела и прерада. 
Слична је софтверским лиценцама, односно лиценцама отвореног кода. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
  
 
 
 
